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Abstract 
 
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea provides coastal States with rights 
to a minimum legal continental shelf of 200 nautical miles from their baselines – regardless of 
the physical condition of the seabed – which overlaps with the entitlement to the 200 nautical 
mile Exclusive Economic Zone. Beyond this limit, coastal States may have jurisdiction to the 
outer limit of the continental margin, provided the natural prolongation of their land territories 
extend beyond 200 nautical miles. The Convention does not prioritise between these two limits, 
creating the potential for overlapping entitlements between coastal States. Indeed, this creates 
a present and future point of contention, as continental shelf areas seawards of 200 nautical 
miles represent significant potential sources of income through the exploitation of seabed 
resources. Moreover, as an increasing number of coastal States lay claim to a continental shelf 
beyond 200 nautical miles, the issue of overlapping entitlements with the Exclusive Economic 
Zone regime is bound to arise more frequently. This thesis investigates whether a coastal 
State’s entitlement to a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles may overlap with another 
State’s Exclusive Economic Zone entitlement. To this end, a documentary research process of 
scholarly literature has been undertaken, as well as an investigation of relevant national 
legislation and international documentation. Relevant decisions of international courts and 
tribunals have also been extensively analysed, along with the submissions of coastal States to 
the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. Currently, there is a consistent and 
geographically widespread practice of coastal States refraining from claiming a continental 
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles into another State’s Exclusive Economic Zone. It should be 
noted, however, that this general practice has not yet crystallised into a rule of customary 
international law. Even so, such practice does demonstrate how States are dealing with this 
situation, and could thus indicate an emerging rule of customary international law. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This thesis examines the hierarchy of, and relationship between, the continental shelf and 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) regimes under the international law of the sea. Many coastal 
States around the world assert an entitlement to an EEZ up to 200 nautical miles (M) from their 
baselines, with a significant proportion of these States also claiming a continental shelf beyond 
200 M.1 These ‘outer continental shelf’2 claims encompass enormous areas, estimated to be in 
excess of 30 million square kilometres, and potentially include valuable marine resources.3 
Coastal States are required to delineate the outer limits of their continental shelves to 
distinguish the outer shelf from the seabed and deep ocean floor, with the latter areas falling 
under the purview of the International Seabed Authority (ISA).4 However, in some cases, there 
can be an overlap of entitlements between the EEZ and continental shelf regimes, either 
because: (i) the distance between two opposing coastal States is less than 400 M; or (ii) the 
outer continental shelf of one coastal State reportedly extends into the EEZ of another State.  
The overlap between the EEZ and continental shelf regimes not only creates a complex 
system that requires the balancing of rights between coastal States and other user States, but 
also raises the problem of interaction and even potential delimitation between the two maritime 
zones. This thesis seeks to fill a gap in the literature in this regard, answering the question as 
to whether one regime takes precedence over the other, and whether one State’s continental 
shelf beyond 200 M could extend into the EEZ of another State. These are the underlying 
questions for this thesis, and the answers will shape the methods and principles employed to 
deal with overlapping entitlements between the EEZ and the continental shelf. This thesis seeks 
to answer these questions by investigating the legal basis for the regimes and their development 
                                                 
1 As of 25 May 2019, 84 States have made submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf [CLCS] to delineate the outer limit of their continental shelves beyond 200 M. See Submissions, through 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, pursuant 
to article 76, paragraph 8, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982.  
2 The term ‘outer continental shelf’ (or ‘extended continental shelf’) is not a legal term used in the LOS 
Convention. Even so, it has been widely adopted when referring to the continental shelf beyond 200 M. The 
author prefers to use the term ‘outer continental shelf’, since the continental shelf is not itself being extended; 
see Arbitration between Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago, Award, 11 April 2006, XXVII Reports of 
International Arbitral Awards 147 [Barbados v Trinidad & Tobago], at footnote 4. 
3 Robert van de Poll and Clive H Schofield, Exploring to the Outer Limits: Securing the Resources of the 
Extended Continental Shelf in the Asia-Pacific, paper presented at the 7th Biennial Advisory Board on the Law 
of the Sea (ABLOS) Conference on UNCLOS in a Changing World, International Hydrographic Bureau 
Monaco, 3-5 October 2012, at 3.  
4 The areas under the purview of the ISA constitute the ‘Area’, which is defined as the “seabed and ocean floor 
and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction”; see LOS Convention, Art 1(1). 
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under international law. It will also critically examine case law with a view to identifying 
relevant circumstances and methodologies for delimitation, as well as identifying trends which 
can be used to forecast future developments in this area. 
Before engaging with these issues, however, this Chapter provides both a contextual 
and historical summary of the extension of coastal State jurisdiction beyond what had generally 
been the narrow confines of the territorial sea, leading to the emergence of the continental shelf 
and EEZ regimes. Thus, this Chapter provides an essential prelude to the more complex 
examination of each regime – considerations which will be discussed in greater detail in 
subsequent Chapters, notably in Chapters 2 and 3. Following on from this, an overview of the 
thesis objectives and the hypothesis is presented, together with the research questions. The 
discussion will then move onto the specific methodologies employed in conducting the study. 
Finally, the Chapter outlines the structure of the thesis as well as the significance of the 
research. 
 
1.1. Staking the Ocean – Extending Coastal State Jurisdiction Beyond the Territorial 
Sea 
Ever since the rise of Westphalian sovereign States with defined boundaries from the 17th 
century onwards,5 it has generally been accepted that coastal States enjoy certain rights to 
regulate activities in the seas adjacent to their land territory.6 In 1605, for example, King James 
I of England enacted a statute regulating fishing in England’s coastal waters.7 When Hugo 
Grotius published his seminal work ‘Mare Liberum’ (The Freedom of the Seas) in 1609, 
advocating for the sea to be open for all, he nonetheless restricted his argument to the high seas, 
excluding bays, narrow straits or any part of the sea that could be seen from the shore.8 
                                                 
5 The Peace of Westphalia was a series of peace treaties which signalled the end of the European wars of 
religion. Indeed, the signing of the treaties is considered foundational to the concept of modern sovereign States. 
The Peace comprised the Treaty of Osnabrück (15 May 1648) and the Treaty of Münster (24 October 1648). See 
‘The Articles of the Treaty of Peace, Sign’d and Seal’d at Munster, in Westphalia, October the 24th, 1648’, in A 
General Collection of Treatys, Declarations of War, Manifestos, and other Publick Papers, Relating to Peace 
and War, Among the Potentates of Europe, from 1648 to the present Time (Printed by J Darby for Andrew Bell 
in Cornhill, and E Sanger at the Post-house in Fleet Street, 1710), at 1-38. See also (for a more recent 
reprinting), Fred L Israel (ed), Major Peace Treaties of Modern History: 1648-1967, Vol 1, (Chelsea House 
Publishers, 1967). 
6 Robin R Churchill and Alan V Lowe, The Law of the Sea, (Manchester University Press, 3rd ed, 1999), at 71. 
7 C John Colombos, The International Law of the Sea (Longmans Green & Co, 6th ed, 1967), at 147. 
8 Hugo Grotius, The Free Sea, translated by Richard Hakluyt (Liberty Fund, 2004), at 32-33. 
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Therefore, implicit in Grotius’ arguments was a recognition that States have jurisdiction over 
coastal waters that are capable of being controlled from the land.9  
William Welwood, a Scottish jurist writing in response to Grotius, also argued that the 
part of the sea along the coast must belong to littoral States, as the inhabitants of such States 
have traditionally fished there.10 In his subsequent work, De jure Belli ac Pacis (On the Law 
of War and Peace), Grotius acknowledged the right of coastal States to appropriate gulfs, bays 
and straits enclosed by their land, but stressed that innocent passage must be preserved in these 
ocean areas.11 By the mid-19th century, the concept of States having jurisdiction over a belt of 
water immediately adjacent to their coast as an extension of their territory had been universally 
accepted – although the exact nature and spatial extent of those rights remained unclear.12 
The idea of coastal States having sovereignty over the territorial sea had crystallised by 
the end of the 19th century, but there was still no agreement as to its exact legal nature. Some 
scholars equated sovereignty over the territorial sea with actual ownership, while others took 
the view that a more limited form of sovereignty existed, one which only conferred 
jurisdictional rights on the littoral State.13 Notwithstanding these debates, it was generally 
agreed that coastal States had an exclusive right to regulate and exploit fisheries within their 
territorial sea, based on either sovereignty or certain rights States possess over their coastal 
waters.  
These debates led to another important issue regarding the territorial sea: its extent. 
Judge Shigeru Oda stated that the breadth of the territorial sea was inherently linked to the 
interest of coastal States in fisheries,14 as well as to the desire to control the waters off their 
territories (which to a large extent coincided with the 3 M cannon shot rule).15 Anything beyond 
                                                 
9 Churchill and Lowe, supra note 6. 
10 Welwood was concerned about Dutch seafarers fishing for herring in Scottish coastal waters and depleting the 
stock, see William Welwood, An Abridgement of All Sea-Lawes, 1613, Title XXVI (Digital Edition edited by 
Colin Mackenzie, 2011). 
11 Scott Truver, The Strait of Gibraltar and the Mediterranean (Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980), at 148; see also 
Erik Brüel, International Straits, A Treatise on International Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 1947), at 48-49. 
12 Colombos, supra note 7, at 87; Churchill and Lowe, supra note 6, at 72. 
13 Colombos, ibid, at 89. 
14 Shigeru Oda, ‘Fisheries under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’ (1983) 77 American 
Journal of International Law 739-755, at 740. 
15 This theory derived from the assumption concerning the extent to which a coastal State is capable of 
controlling its territory, see Colombos, supra note 7, at 87. Although certain coastal States claimed broader 
territorial seas based on the assertion that their cannons were more powerful and could reach further offshore, 
such as Norway’s 4 M claim in the mid-eighteenth century, see Churchill and Lowe, supra note 6, at 78.  
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the territorial sea of coastal States was viewed as high seas, and thus free to all, in keeping with 
Grotian principles. This conception also derived from and reinforced by the fact that, up until 
the 20th century, fishing was generally conducted by traditional means close to the coast.16  
By the early 20th century, coastal States sought greater control over the resources 
beyond their territorial seas.17 It was already generally accepted that possession of a territorial 
sea included rights over resources in the seabed and subsoil. A clear distinction had also been 
forged between the bed of the territorial sea and the bed of the high seas, with the latter area 
not being subject to coastal State jurisdiction.18 Just prior to World War II, technology had 
advanced to a point where it was possible to commercially exploit hydrocarbon resources 
beyond the territorial sea.19 As there was no legal regime in place to regulate the exploitation 
of such resources, some coastal States made unilateral claims to the continental shelf areas 
adjacent to their territorial seas.20 The inconsistency in the nature and geographical extent of 
these continental shelf claims, and the use of varying methods of delimitation, clearly 
demonstrate a lack of uniform State practice at the time.21 Nevertheless, these claims were 
integral to the development of the continental shelf regime.  
In order to exercise control over the resources beyond the territorial sea, it was 
necessary for coastal States to agree on the limits of the territorial sea. As expressed by Judge 
                                                 
16 Wilbert McLeod Chapman, ‘Fisheries Resources in Offshore Waters’ in Lewis M Alexander (ed), The Law of 
the Sea: Offshore Boundaries and Zones (The Ohio State University Press, 1966) 87, at 91. However, there have 
been a few instances where coastal States have claimed historic rights to sea-bottom fishing beyond the 
territorial sea, such as Australia’s 1886 historic claim to Shark Bay to control pearl fishing, and France’s historic 
claim over oyster fisheries in the Bay of Cancale, see Clive R Symmons, Historic Waters and Historic Rights in 
the Law of the Sea: A Modern Reappraisal (Brill Nijhoff Publishers, 2nd ed, 2019), at 318. 
17 Hurst, for example, wrote a compelling essay arguing that claiming ownership over the resources of the 
seabed was not inconsistent with the freedom of navigation. See Cecil JB Hurst, ‘Whose is the Bed of the Sea – 
Sedentary Fisheries outside the Three-Mile Limit’ (1923) 4 British Yearbook of International Law 34, at 43. 
18 Churchill and Lowe, supra note 6, at 142. See also The South China Sea Arbitration between the Republic of 
the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China, Award (Merits), 12 July 2016, PCA 2013-19, at para 269. 
The Tribunal confirmed that before the Second World War, the use of the seabed beyond the territorial sea was 
a freedom open to any State. 
19 Edwin Borchard, ‘Resources of the Continental Shelf’ (1946) 40(1) American Journal of International Law 
53, at 53. 
20 Donald R Rothwell and Tim Stephens, The International Law of the Sea (Hart Publishing 2010), at 98. 
21 See the award in the arbitration between Petroleum Development Ltd and the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, where 
Lord Asquith concluded that as of 1951, the doctrine of the continental shelf had not yet been admitted to the 
canon of international law, Arbitration between Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd and Sheikh of Abu 
Dhabi, Award, 28 August 1951, reprinted in (1952) 1 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 247, at 253, 
cited in Rothwell and Stephens, ibid, at 101. 
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Oda, “any extension to this area would encroach on the rights of other States who may 
otherwise have enjoyed freedoms in areas that were previously regarded as the high seas”.22 
The first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I), held in 1958, 
failed to reach an agreement on the breadth of the territorial sea. However, the continental shelf 
regime had gained widespread, albeit not uniform, support through State practice, and was 
officially recognised in the signing of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf 
(Continental Shelf Convention).23 The Continental Shelf Convention reaffirmed the doctrine 
that coastal States have exclusive sovereign rights to explore and exploit their continental 
shelves,24 confirming that the body of water above the continental shelf remains part of the 
high seas. Thus, a rule delimiting the continental shelf was laid down - one based on 
equidistance lines from the coast, unless special circumstances were present.25  
The Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS II) in 1960 
also failed to determine the breadth of the territorial sea. Although it was common State practice 
at the time for coastal States to have a 3 M territorial sea,26 some coastal States had claimed 6 
M,27 12 M,28 15 M,29 and even 200 M territorial seas.30 After the failure of UNCLOS II, it was 
clear that a compromise had to be reached between the maritime powers which sought to 
                                                 
22 Oda, supra note 14, at 739. 
23 Convention on the Continental Shelf, 29 April 1958, UNTS 499 311 (entered into force 10 June 1964) 
[Continental Shelf Convention]. 
24 Continental Shelf Convention, Art 2(1). 
25 Continental Shelf Convention, Art 3. Although it was notable that such ‘special circumstances’ were left 
undefined in the Convention. 
26 Those States which claimed 3 M territorial seas included: Jordan, see Jordanian Fisheries Act No. 25, 2 
December 1943; United Kingdom, see Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act 1878; United States, see Letter to 
Certain Foreign Ministers of November 8, 1793 proclaiming a three-mile Territorial Sea of the United States. 
27 Those States which claimed 6 M territorial seas included: Dominican Republic, see Act No. 186 of 13 
September 1967 on the Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone, Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf; 
Greece, see Law No. 230/1936 concerning the extension of the territorial waters of the Kingdom of Greece; 
Turkey, see Law No. 476 on Territorial Waters, 1964. 
28 Those States which claimed 12 M territorial seas included: Canada, see 1970 Territorial Sea And Fishing 
Zones Act: Chapter T-8; China, see Declaration of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on 
China’s Territorial Sea, dated 4 September 1958; France, see Law No. 71-1060 of 14 December 1971 regarding 
the delimitation of French territorial waters. 
29 States which claimed 15 M territorial seas included: Albania, see Decree No. 4650 on the boundary of the 
People's Republic of Albania dated 9 March 1970; Venezuela, see Act of 27 July 1956 concerning the 
Territorial Sea, Continental Shelf, Fishery Protection and Air-Space. 
30 Those States which claimed 200 M territorial seas included: Argentina, see Law No. 17,094 of 29 December 
1966; Congo, see Ordinance No. 049/77 of 20 December 1977 amending article 2 of Ordinance 26/71 of 18 
October 1971; Ecuador, see Civil Code as amended by Decree No. 256-CLP of 27 February 1970. 
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maintain the 3 M territorial sea (and thus maximise their navigational freedoms associated with 
the high seas), and coastal States pursuing a larger territorial sea (largely to advance their 
security or resources interests). Argentina and Peru were strong advocates of the 200 M 
territorial sea, while maritime powers such as the United States, United Kingdom, and the then 
Soviet Union preferred the 3 M territorial sea to ensure their naval forces enjoyed free 
movement.31 
When the preparation for the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS III) began in 1970, the breadth of the territorial sea was one of the outstanding issues 
that needed to be addressed. By this time, the United States had been convinced that the free 
passage of warships and military aircraft would be guaranteed in international straits, ensuring 
the unimpeded movement of their fleets through narrow areas that would otherwise have 
comprised the territorial seas of two or more adjacent coasts.32 Thus, when UNCLOS III 
commenced in 1973, most States had already accepted the idea of a 12 M territorial sea. 
However, there were still some States seeking a much wider territorial sea, or at least enhanced 
rights over areas seawards of their existing territorial seas, which in turn led to the creation of 
a whole new maritime zone – the EEZ. 
The EEZ was a completely new regime under international law, one which granted 
coastal States the right to explore and exploit the natural resources of the sea, seabed and 
subsoil up to 200 M from their coasts without impeding freedom of navigation.33 In other 
words, they have the exclusive right to fisheries and other living resources of the sea, as well 
as non-living resources like oil and gas of the seabed and subsoil. Coastal States also possess 
such jurisdiction as is necessary for them to exercise their sovereign rights,34 including limited 
jurisdiction over marine scientific research and the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment.35 Thus, the EEZ is neither an extension of the sovereignty of coastal States from 
their territorial seas, nor part of the high seas.36  
                                                 
31 Shigeru Oda, ‘Proposals Regarding a 12-Mile Limit for the Territorial Sea by the United States in 1970 and 
Japan in 1971: Implications and Consequences’ (1991) 22 Ocean Development & International Law 189, at 
191. 
32 Ibid. 
33 LOS Convention, Arts 56 and 57. 
34 LOS Convention, Art 73. 
35 LOS Convention, Art 56(1)(b). 
36 The legal status of the EEZ was heavily debated until a compromise position of ‘sui generis’ was reached. For 
a detailed discussion on the status of the EEZ, see Bernard Oxman, ‘An Analysis of the Exclusive Economic 
Zone as Formulated in the Informal Composite Negotiating Text’, in Thomas A Clingan Jr (ed), The Law of the 
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Within the EEZ, the jurisdiction of the coastal State is largely limited to natural 
resources, as provided in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS 
Convention or the Convention);37 and for other intents and purposes, the provisions of the high 
seas are applicable in the EEZ.38 Meanwhile, other States have the right to exercise high seas 
freedoms in the EEZ of any State, including the freedoms of navigation and overflight.39 This 
balancing of rights, which must be exercised with due regard, is integral to the management 
and operation of the EEZ regime. 
 
1.2. Setting the Rules – Limiting the Creeping Jurisdiction of Coastal States 
Throughout the three United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea, the gradual expansion 
of coastal States’ jurisdiction into the ocean was a common theme. This is evident from the 
extension of the territorial sea from 3 M to 12 M, the establishment of the continental shelf 
regime in the mid-20th century, to the creation of the EEZ during UNCLOS III. An important 
element of these debates was determining the limits of national jurisdiction within these 
maritime zones.  
 Prior to UNCLOS I, the limit of the continental shelf (as declared by coastal States) 
varied from a depth limit to a distance cut-off. The Continental Shelf Convention defined the 
continental shelf “to a depth of 200 metres, or beyond that limit, to where the depth of the 
superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas”.40 
However, this definition does not provide a definitive outer limit for the continental shelf. This 
is because, despite the 200-metre depth limit being definitive, the exploitability criteria is 
dependent on technological development.41  
                                                 
Sea: State Practice in Zones of Special Jurisdiction (The Law of the Sea Institute: University of Hawaii, 1982), 
57-78. 
37 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, (entered into force 16 November 1994) 
1833 UNTS 3 [LOS Convention].  
38 LOS Convention, Art 58(2). 
39 LOS Convention, Art 58(1). 
40 Continental Shelf Convention, Art 1. 
41 Friedman has stated that Article 1 of the Continental Shelf Convention was “one of the most disastrous 
clauses ever inserted in a treaty of vital importance to mankind” because it left the limits of national jurisdiction 
open; see Wolfgang Friedman, ‘Selden Redivjvus – Towards a Partition of the Seas?’ (1971) 65(4) American 
Journal of International Law 757, at 759. Kaye has stated that the imprecise definition “reflects a desire by 
States to have a degree of certainty as to the extent of the continental shelf while leaving open the outer limit of 
the continental shelf for further exploration as technology developed”; see Stuart Kaye, ‘State Practice and 
Maritime Claims: Assessing the Normative Impact of the Law of the Sea Convention’, in Aldo Chirop, et al 
(eds.), The Future of Ocean Regime-Building (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009), 133-158, at 140. 
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 Like its predecessor, the Continental Shelf Convention, the LOS Convention recognises 
that coastal States have sovereign rights to explore and exploit the natural resources of the 
seabed and subsoil of their continental shelves.42 The limits of the continental shelf regime was 
one of the most debated topics during the negotiations UNCLOS III. The Conference ultimately 
agreed on a ‘legal limit’ for the continental shelf - one which coincides with the limit of the 
EEZ: 200 M from the baselines.43 The creation of the EEZ regime, however, does not abolish 
the continental shelf regime, but rather preserves and expands upon it.44 The EEZ regime 
therefore overlaps with the continental shelf regime – at least within 200 M from the coast. 
Even though the LOS Convention established the legal limit of the continental shelf at 
200 M from the coast, the extent of the actual or ‘physical’ continental shelf may be greater 
than 200 M. Indeed, the Convention allows coastal States with broad continental shelves to 
claim sovereign rights to shelf resources up to 350 M from their coastlines or up to 100 M from 
the 2,500 metre isobath. 45  These entitlements are commonly referred to as the ‘outer 
continental shelf’. However, such assertions on the part of coastal States must be submitted to 
and reviewed by a special body established under the LOS Convention called the Commission 
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS).46 Any delineation of a continental shelf limit 
seawards of 200 M must be made on the basis of the CLCS’s recommendations.  
 
1.3. Settling the Differences – Living with Overlapping Entitlements 
As the national jurisdiction of States kept expanding, it became increasingly difficult to avoid 
overlapping claims. In the 1950s, and despite the lack of agreement on the outer limits of the 
continental shelf, coastal States started to delimit continental shelf boundaries among 
themselves. Since this was a new area in international law, there were no clear rules on how to 
delimit such a maritime zone. In 1952, Chile, Peru and Ecuador agreed on boundary lines 
parallel to the land boundary terminus between them.47 In 1957, Norway and the then Soviet 
                                                 
42 LOS Convention, Art 77. 
43 LOS Convention, Art 76(1). 
44 This notion will be discussed in greater detail in Part 6.2 of Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
45 LOS Convention, Art 76(5). 
46 LOS Convention, Arts 76(4) and 76(8). 
47 The lines were all-purpose boundaries that extended to a distance of 200 M from their respective coasts; see 
Agreement between the Government of Chile and the Government of Peru Relating to the Maritime Boundary 
between Chile and Peru, 18 August 1952 (entered into force 23 September 1954), reprinted in Jonathan I 
Charney and Lewis M Alexander (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries (The American Society of 
International Law, 1993), at 799; Agreement between the Government of Peru and the Government of Ecuador 
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Union agreed on a unique maritime boundary in the mouth of Varangerfjord.48 The boundary 
was not based on equidistance, but instead consisted of straight lines connecting three agreed 
points, all of which were influenced by the position of Norwegian baselines and the shape of 
the fjord’s mouth.49 In 1958, the United Kingdom drew maritime boundaries between Malaysia 
and Brunei Darussalam that covered a 3 M territorial sea and an unspecified adjacent 
continental shelf. These boundaries were drawn using a combination of an equidistance line 
and a line perpendicular to the general direction of the coast.50 In the same year, Saudi Arabia 
and Bahrain agreed on a continental shelf boundary which was predominantly based on the 
median line approach. Even so, the northern part of the boundary took into account resource 
considerations, and as a result, diverged to follow the outer limit of the Fasht Abu-Sa-‘fah oil 
field.51 The oil field was placed entirely on Saudi Arabia’s side of the boundary, but both of 
the disputing Parties agreed that Bahrain was entitled to an equal share from the petroleum 
revenue derived from the field.52  
 The question of the delimitation of the continental shelf was the subject of an 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) decision in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases in 1969. 
In its judgment, the ICJ declared that every coastal State has jurisdiction over the seabed that 
is a natural prolongation of their land territory.53 This decision was significant at the time for 
three reasons. First, it confirmed that coastal States have jurisdiction over their continental 
shelves. Second, it recognised the importance of the principle of natural prolongation in 
determining whether a coastal State is entitled to a continental shelf.54 Third, the Court stated 
                                                 
Relating to the Maritime Boundary between Peru and Ecuador, 18 August 1952 (entered into force 7 February 
1975), ibid, at 835. This boundary line, which was the subject of a dispute between Chile and Peru, was resolved 
by the ICJ in 2014, see Maritime Dispute (Peru v Chile), Judgment, 27 January 2014, (2014) ICJ Reports 3. 
48 Agreement between Norway and the Soviet Union Concerning the Sea Frontier in the Varangerfjord of 15 
February 1957 and Protocol of 29 November 1957, (entered into force 24 April 1957), reprinted in Charney and 
Alexander, ibid, at 1786. 
49 Ibid, at 1781. 
50 Sarawak (Definition of Boundaries) Order in Council, 1958, no 1518, 11 September 1958, reprinted in 
Charney and Alexander, ibid, at 924. 
51 Agreement between the Government of Bahrain and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Concerning Delimitation of 
the Continental Shelf, 22 February 1958 (entered into force 26 February 1958), reprinted in Charney and 
Alexander, ibid, at 1490 &1495. 
52 Ibid. 
53 North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v the 
Netherlands), 20 February 2916, (1969) ICJ Reports 3 [North Sea Continental Shelf Cases], at para 19. 
54 Ibid. 
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that in delimiting the continental shelf, coastal States should apply the principle of 
equitability.55  
In deciding to apply the principle of equitability when delimiting the continental shelf, 
the ICJ stated the principle had “underlain all the subsequent history of the [continental shelf]” 
since the Truman Declaration. 56  Furthermore, the ICJ pointed out that the equidistance 
principle in the Continental Shelf Convention was subject to reservations – a finding which 
supported the Court’s view that the principle did not have customary law status.57 The ICJ also 
stated that the use of the median line/equidistance principle in certain circumstances (in this 
case, Germany’s concave coastline) can lead to an “unnatural or unreasonable” result.58  
The ICJ thus formulated new criteria, stating that the delimitation of the continental 
shelf between adjacent States should be equitable 59  and take into account the relevant 
circumstances, such as the configuration of the coast.60 The ICJ also determined that the natural 
prolongation principle should play a role in determining the course of the boundary line:61  
 
delimitation is to be effected…in such a way as to leave as much as 
possible to each party all those parts of the continental shelf that 
constitute a natural prolongation of its land territory into and under the 
sea, without encroachment on the natural prolongation of the land 
territory of another [S]tate. 
 
It is important to note that the ICJ did not refer to the column of water above the 
continental shelf in its judgment. Nor did the ICJ indicate how far the natural prolongation of 
a State’s land territory could extend. Thus, on the strength of the ICJ’s decision, a coastal 
State’s continental shelf could arguably continue until a clear break emerges on the seabed. 
This affected how States negotiated their continental shelf boundaries in the 1970s. For 
                                                 
55 Ibid, at para 23. 
56 The Court regarded the Truman Declaration as the starting point of positive law on the subject of continental 
shelf; ibid, at para 47. 
57 Ibid, at para 63, see also Wolfgang Friedman, ‘The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases – A Critique’ (1970) 
64(2) American Journal of International Law 229, at 233. 
58 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 53, at para 24. 
59 Ibid, at para 55. 
60 Ibid, at para 91. 
61 Ibid, at para 101. 
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example, the United Kingdom argued that the Hurd Deep be taken into account as a relevant 
consideration in the delimitation of the continental shelf boundary between the United 
Kingdom and France.62 
Immediately after the decision in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, a seabed 
boundary was negotiated between Indonesia and Australia. 63  Indonesia argued that the 
boundary should be the equidistance line, while Australia argued that using such a line was 
inappropriate as there was a clear break between the continental shelves of Australia and 
Indonesia in the form of the Timor Trough.64 Australia, encouraged by the decision of the ICJ, 
insisted that the natural prolongation of its land goes out until the Timor Trough, which at its 
furthest point is almost 300 M from the coast of Australia. Recognising that the law on this 
subject was not in its favour (at least at the time), Indonesia eventually agreed on a boundary 
located at the southern side of the trough. However, with the adoption of the LOS Convention 
in 1982, and the advent of the EEZ regime, the prevailing legal seascape underwent substantial 
modification. 
Unlike the Continental Shelf Convention, which favoured the use of a median line, the 
LOS Convention adopted an equitable solution approach to delimiting the EEZ and the 
continental shelf.65 Unquestionably this approach was influenced by the decision in the North 
Sea Continental Shelf Cases. However, just three years after the LOS Convention was opened 
for signature, the ICJ issued another decision in the Libya/Malta Continental Shelf Case. In 
this case, the ICJ ruled that where the distance between two opposing coastal States is less than 
400 M, the distance factor, and not the geophysical factor, should be considered in determining 
the boundary.66 This development created a new set of challenges for States that had concluded 
                                                 
62 Case Concerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, and the French Republic (UK, France), Award, 30 June 1977, XVIII Reports of International 
Arbitral Awards 3 [Anglo-French Continental Shelf Case], at para 12. Courts and tribunals, however, have 
tended not to find these arguments compelling. For example, see for example the Arbitral Tribunal in the Anglo-
French Continental Shelf Case did not consider the Hurd Deep as “a geographical feature capable of exercising 
a material influence on the determination of the boundary”, see ibid, at para 107.  
63 Agreement between the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia and the Government of the Republic of 
Indonesia Establishing Certain Seabed Boundaries in the Area of the Timor and Arafura Seas, Supplementary to 
the Agreement of 18 May 1971, 9 October 1972 (entered into force 8 November 1973), 974 UNTS 319. 
64 Madeleine J Smith, ‘Australian Claims to the Timor Sea’s Petroleum Resources: Clever, Cunning, or 
Criminal?’ (2011) 37(3) Monash University Law Review 42, at 48. 
65 LOS Convention, Art 83. 
66 Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Merits, Judgment, 3 June 1985, (1985) ICJ Reports 13, at 
paras 39-40. 
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continental shelf boundaries based on the natural prolongation principle, but were yet to delimit 
the waters above the shelf. This will be discussed further in Part 5.2.2 below. 
Under the LOS Convention, rights to the seabed and subsoil under the EEZ regime must 
be exercised in a manner consistent with the continental shelf regime. 67  However, this 
provision does not resolve the problem of delimitation between coastal States with overlapping 
continental shelf and EEZ entitlements in the same area.68 The dispute in the East China Sea 
between China, South Korea and Japan is emblematic of this situation. The East China Sea is 
a semi-enclosed sea bordered by China on the west, South Korea on the north, Taiwan on the 
South and Japan on the east. Because the widest point that separates China and South Korea 
from Japan in the East China Sea is only 345 M, there is an area where each country’s EEZ 
projection overlaps. 
Japan argues that the EEZ boundary should be the median line between the coasts of 
the two States. China and South Korea, on the other hand, claim that they are each entitled to 
an outer continental shelf beyond their EEZ that extends to the Okinawa Trough, located up to 
277 M from their shores.69 Japan argues that the Okinawa Trough does not constitute a break 
in the continental shelf, but rather represents a continuous continental shelf, and thus the 
median line should be the boundary.70  
This dispute could potentially have been resolved by the CLCS - a scientific committee 
that determines the existence and limits of outer continental shelf claims based on scientific 
evidence. In 14 December 2012, China made a submission to the CLCS requesting a 
determination of its outer continental shelf in the East China Sea.71 Japan, however, objected 
to China’s submission,72 which prevents the CLCS from considering China’s submission.73 
                                                 
67 LOS Convention, Art 56(3). 
68 Stuart Kaye, ‘The Use of Multiple Boundaries in Maritime Boundary Delimitation Law and Practice’ (1998) 
19 Australian Yearbook of International Law 49, at 51. 
69 ‘China to submit outer limits of continental shelf in East China Sea to UN’ Xinhua News (16 September 
2012).  
70 Suk-Kyoon Kim, ‘Perspectives on East China Sea Maritime Disputes: Issues and Context’ in Clive Schofield, 
Seokwoo Lee and Moon-Sang Kwon (eds), The Limits of Maritime Jurisdiction (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2014), 285-296, at 291. 
71 Submission by the People’s Republic of China to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
(CLCS), ‘Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the Baselines: Submission to 
the Commission’ (14 December 2012) (China’s CLCS Submission), Executive Summary. 
72 Communications Received from Japan with regard to China’s CLCS Submission (28 December 2012). 
73 The CLCS cannot consider a submission where there exists a land or maritime dispute, see Rules of Procedure 
of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, CLCS/40/Rev.1, 17 April 2008, Annex I, Art 5(a). 
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Since no coastal State can confirm outer continental shelf limits without the recommendation 
of the CLCS, the issue will remain unresolved until both China and Japan request the CLCS to 
determine whether the shelf in the East China Sea consists of one continuous shelf or two 
distinct shelves separated by the Okinawa Trough, or until the Parties reach a compromise. 
The entitlement to the continental shelf regime beyond the 200 M EEZ limit also gives 
rise to new complications when delimiting maritime boundaries. Although the continental shelf 
regime coexists with the EEZ regime in the same area and despite the fact that the delimitation 
provisions for these zones are identical,74 they are not compatible for delimitation purposes.75 
Due to the differing natures of the EEZ and continental shelf regimes, the relevant 
circumstances to be considered when reaching an equitable delimitation will vary between the 
regimes. For example, while geomorphology will be relevant to continental shelf boundary 
delimitation, it would not affect the delimitation of the EEZ boundary.76  Conversely, the 
existence of traditional fishing rights may affect EEZ delimitation, but not continental shelf 
delimitation.77 Moreover, the fact that the continental shelf regime can extend beyond the 200 
M limit of the EEZ opens up the possibility of one State’s continental shelf extending beyond 
200 M into the EEZ of another State.  
Not only is the LOS Convention silent on this situation, but there is a dearth of 
jurisprudence dealing with the matter. The Convention only contains provisions on the 
delimitation of boundaries where the same maritime zone of different coastal States overlap. 
There has also been debate over whether a hierarchy exists between the EEZ regime and the 
continental shelf regime. Certainly arguments can be, and have been made, for the existence of 
a hierarchy between the two regimes. Some scholars have cited Article 56(3) of the LOS 
Convention as a basis for giving the continental shelf regime a higher priority than the EEZ 
regime. According to Chris Cook, that the rights set out in Article 56 of the LOS Convention 
with respect to the seabed and subsoil must be exercised in accordance with Part VI on the 
                                                 
74 See LOS Convention, Arts 74 & 83. 
75 The Tribunals in neither the Bangladesh/Myanmar case nor the Bangladesh/India case were able to delimit 
the overlap region between the EEZ and continental shelf regimes. This was because, despite there being an 
overlap of entitlement with respect to the continental shelf, no overlap of entitlement exists with respect to the 
column of water. See Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar), 
Judgment, 14 March 2012, (2012) ITLOS Reports 4 [Bangladesh/Myanmar], at para 471; and The Bay of 
Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration between the People’s Republic of Bangladesh and the Republic of India, 
Award, 7 July 2014, PCA 2010-16, at para 503. 
76 Bangladesh/Myanmar, ibid, at para 322. 
77 Stuart Kaye, supra note 68, at 57. 
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continental shelf78 implies that “the EEZ is derivative from the continental shelf and thus 
subordinate to it”.79 Malcolm Evans has also argued that the fact that the continental shelf is 
automatically appertained to a State by law, which is not the case with the EEZ, means that 
there is an inherent hierarchy between the two regimes.80 Surya Sharma on the other hand, 
argues that in cases where the distance between two States is less than 400 M, geology and 
geo-morphological factors are not relevant for purpose of delimitation, which effectively 
means that in these situations, the EEZ regime prevails over the continental shelf regime.81 
Recent decisions of international Tribunals, however, suggest that no such hierarchy 
between the two regimes exists. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in 
Bangladesh/Myanmar,82 and the Arbitration Tribunal in Bangladesh v India83 both allowed for 
an overlap of the EEZ of Myanmar and India with the continental shelf of Bangladesh beyond 
200 M. The Tribunals stated that the respective Parties to the disputes should share the 
resources in the overlapping area, implicitly allowing the outer continental shelf of a State to 
overlap with another State’s EEZ. This suggests that one regime is not afforded a higher status 
than the other, or at least that the EEZ regime does not trump the continental shelf regime 
beyond 200 M. However, if no hierarchy exists between the EEZ regime and the continental 
shelf regime, how should delimitation be conducted? The ICJ is currently considering a case 
between Nicaragua and Colombia that might address this issue. In a preliminary decision 
relating to a threshold question, the ICJ has declared that it possesses jurisdiction to consider 
Nicaragua’s request to delimit a boundary between the continental shelf of Nicaragua beyond 
200 M and the EEZ of Colombia.84 However, apart from this upcoming ruling, which is eagerly 
anticipated by the international community, the author could not find any consideration of this 
specific issue by either the judicial and academic community. 
                                                 
78 LOS Convention, Art 56(3). 
79 Chris Cook, ‘Filling the Gap – Delimiting the Australia-Indonesia Maritime Boundary’ (1981-1983) 10 
Australian Yearbook of International Law 131, at 165. 
80 Malcolm Evans, ‘Delimitation and the Common Maritime Boundary’ (1993) 64 British Yearbook of 
International Law 283, at 287.  
81 Surya P Sharma, ‘The Single Maritime Boundary Regime and the Relationship between the Continental Shelf 
and the Exclusive Economic Zone’ (1987) 2 International Journal of Estuarine and Coastal Law 203, at 212; 
see also Malcolm Evans, ibid, at 286.  
82 Bangladesh/Myanmar, supra note 75. 
83 Bangladesh/India, supra note 75. 
84 Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia beyond 200 Nautical 
Miles from the Nicaraguan Coast (Nicaragua v Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 17 March 2016, 
(2016) ICJ Reports 100. 
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1.4. Thesis Objectives 
The primary purpose of this research is to determine whether a coastal State’s entitlement to a 
continental shelf beyond 200 M may overlap with another State’s EEZ entitlement. As the LOS 
Convention does not provide clear guidance on this issue, the research aims to demonstrate 
how States should proceed in situations of overlapping entitlements. To this end, the research 
will analyse the history and development of both the continental shelf and EEZ regimes to 
provide a better understanding of the interaction between the two regimes. The jurisprudence 
of international Tribunals and Courts, as well as State practice in dealing with the overlapping 
entitlements, will also be analysed through the lens of maritime boundary delimitation. 
 
1.5. Hypotheses and Research Questions 
This research will test the following two hypotheses:  
 The continental shelf regime does not trump the EEZ regime; and  
 The continental shelf of a coastal State cannot extend beyond 200 M from its baseline 
into the EEZ of another State.  
The study will address five key research questions: 
1. What is the history and motivation behind the establishment of ‘inherent rights’ of States 
with regard to the continental shelf? 
2. Is there a hierarchy between the continental shelf and the EEZ within and beyond 200 M? 
3. Does the ‘natural prolongation’ principle dictate the supremacy of the continental shelf 
regime over the EEZ regime? 
4. Was the EEZ regime intended to absorb and replace the continental shelf regime? 
5. How should maritime boundary delimitation be conducted in cases where the EEZ regime 
overlaps with the continental shelf regime? 
 
1.6. Methodology 
To achieve the objectives stated above, the study has adopted traditional legal approaches – 
namely, synthesising available information from primary and secondary sources in order to 
comprehensively examine the research questions and analyse gaps in the legal and institutional 
framework. In this way, traditional legal research methods have proved fundamental to the 
study. In particular, documentary research of scholarly literature and specialist reports has been 
coupled with an investigation of relevant national legislation and international documentation. 
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Historical and archival research was an important dimension to the research process, 
particularly when analysing the summary records of the International Law Commission (ILC) 
between 1949 and 1956. This process aided in the legal conceptualisation of the continental 
shelf regime. In turn, this led to further archival research being undertaken into the travaux 
préparatoires and the official records of UNCLOS I and III, as such records were pivotal to 
understanding the drafting of the EEZ and continental shelf regimes.  
The author has also engaged key figures who are widely considered to be the leading 
architects of the law of the sea, and more specifically, the framers of the continental shelf and 
EEZ regimes in the LOS Convention before the initiation of the PhD process. The discussions 
with these luminaries partly inspired the study subsequently undertaken. A figure who deserves 
special mention in this regard is Ambassador Satya Nandan of Fiji, the former Rappertour of 
the Second Committee at UNCLOS III, who was responsible for drafting the bulk of the 
negotiating text which was ultimately adopted into the LOS Convention. The conversations 
that the author had with Ambassador Nandan were semi-structured, using open-ended 
questions to gain insights into Ambassador Nandan’s experience without imposing limitations 
on the interpretation of the information.85 This format allowed a greater breadth of data to be 
collected than a structured interview would otherwise have obtained.86  
The author’s discussions with leading specialists in the law of the sea, as well as the 
historical and archival research conducted, was combined with an examination of international 
jurisprudence and State practice on the issue (see Chapter 6). Decisions of the ICJ and other 
international Tribunals relevant to the continental shelf and delimitation of maritime zones 
were extensively analysed, along with the written submissions of the Parties to the various 
disputes, in order to understand the legal position of States on this issue.87 In examining State 
practice, the study analysed all the summary submissions of coastal States to the CLCS (84 in 
total), to discern if there was any commonality in how they approached the issue. The study 
has also analysed various maritime boundary agreements that deal with delimitation of the 
continental shelf beyond 200 M (19 in total).  
 
                                                 
85 A Fontana and JH Frey, ‘The Interview: From Structured to Negotiated Text’, in NK Denzin and YS Lincoln 
(eds) Handbook of Qualitative Research (Sage Publications, 2nd edition, 2000), 645-672, at 652. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Case studies are empirical mixed-method enquires that examine contemporary social and political phenomena 
and explore the actions of actors in the policy process and capture the dynamics of real life events. See Robert K 
Yin, Case Study Research and Applications: Design and Methods (SAGE Publications, 3th edition, 2003), at 2. 
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1.7. Thesis Structure 
The thesis comprises seven Chapters, as follows. This introductory Chapter traces the history 
of national claims over maritime areas, as well as the rules which have limited the expanding 
national jurisdiction of States. The Chapter then provides an overview of the problem with 
overlapping entitlements, the gap that currently exists in the law with regard to such overlap, 
as well as stating the hypothesis and objectives of the study. The Chapter also provides the 
methodology and the general structure of the thesis. 
 Chapter 2 critically examines the history and purpose of the continental shelf regime. 
It traces the changing definition of the continental shelf from a scientific term describing a 
specific part of the seabed, to a legal term that eschews any scientific connotations. 
Understanding the divergence of the current legal definition of the continental shelf from its 
geomorphological origin is important when determining whether the continental shelf of one 
State may overlap with the EEZ of another State. The Chapter follows the development of the 
definition of the term ‘continental shelf’ in chronological order: from its first uses in the early 
20th century, to the various claims made by coastal States over their continental shelves in the 
mid-1940s to 1950s, to the work of the ILC which produced the negotiation text during 
UNCLOS I, to its final incantation in the LOS Convention.  
 Chapter 3 analyses the events that led to the establishment of the EEZ regime. The 
establishment of the EEZ regime was a major turning point in the development of the 
continental shelf regime. By giving coastal States exclusive jurisdiction over the seabed and 
the water above it to a distance of 200 M from the coast, the EEZ overlaps with the continental 
shelf regime. Beyond that distance, coastal States with an actual or physical continental shelf 
extending more than 200 M can broaden their jurisdiction to the edge of the continental 
margin.88 This means that some coastal States are entitled to a continental shelf beyond 200 M, 
while others only have a continental shelf and EEZ to a distance of 200 M from their baselines. 
This Chapter sets the stage for overlapping entitlements between the two regimes. 
 Chapter 4 traces the development of the various legal limits that were proposed for the 
continental shelf regime in order to understand how these limits interact with the limits of the 
EEZ regime. The types of limits considered in Chapter 4 include the edge of the 
geomorphological continental shelf – which represented the physical limit when the concept 
was first introduced, as well as the depth exploitability criteria, which were used in the 
Continental Shelf Convention. The Chapter then examines the other alternative limits debated 
                                                 
88 LOS Convention, Art 76(1). 
 
18 
 
during UNCLOS III, before analysing the legal limits provided in Article 76 of the LOS 
Convention.  
 Chapter 5 analyses the history and development of the principles for the delimitation of 
both the EEZ and continental shelf regimes. This allows for an examination of the international 
rules and practice of States when the entitlements of the two regimes overlap. The Chapter also 
discusses the jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals in developing the delimitation 
principles based on the LOS Convention. 
 Chapter 6 is the core analytical Chapter in the thesis. It discusses the relationship 
between the continental shelf and the EEZ before answering the question as to what happens 
in the event of overlapping entitlements between the two regimes. To answer this question, the 
Chapter critically analyses the wording of the LOS Convention to determine whether the 
Convention provides any indication of one regime taking precedence over the other. The 
Chapter then examines the jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals to see how the 
ICJ and other Tribunals have dealt with the issue of overlapping entitlements. The Chapter then 
investigates the practice of coastal States, both through their submissions to the CLCS and their 
concluded bilateral maritime boundary agreements, to determine the outer limits of their 
continental shelf beyond 200 M. Finally, Chapter 7 synthesises the historical studies and 
analysis presented in the previous Chapters to answer the research questions and prove the 
hypothesis of the thesis.  
 
1.8. Significance of Research 
The development of the continental shelf and EEZ regimes has led to the need for clear legal 
rules on how the two regimes interact with each other. With an increasing number of coastal 
States asserting rights over areas of continental shelf located beyond 200 M, the issue of 
overlapping entitlements, and the resulting tension between the two regimes, will undoubtedly 
become more apparent. Developing rules for where and how far a State can extend its 
continental shelf beyond 200 M is an important priority for the international community, as 
disputes in this area are likely to arise with increasing frequency. 
Understanding the historical development of the two regimes is vital in determining 
whether the framers of the LOS Convention intended the two regimes to interact. One school 
of thought argues that the rights of States pursuant to the continental shelf regime trump those 
of the EEZ. One basis for this argument is nature of the continental shelf as an ‘inherent right’, 
as well as the natural prolongation principle as laid down by the ICJ in the North Sea 
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Continental Shelf Cases.89 Another view argues that EEZ rights should be afforded greater 
priority than continental shelf rights, especially when delimiting the EEZ of States with 
opposite coasts less than 400 M apart. The main reasoning supporting this argument is that the 
creation of an EEZ gives all coastal States a 200 M resource zone that includes the continental 
shelf. Thus, where an area to be delimited is less than 400 M, the principle of natural 
prolongation is not applicable. 
Even so, a strong argument can be made that no hierarchy exists between the EEZ and 
the continental shelf regimes, as indicated by the Tribunals in the Bangladesh/Myanmar and 
Bangladesh v India cases. It is important to note, however, that the Bay of Bengal scenario is 
likely unique, given the geography of the coast and the spatial scope of extended continental 
shelf claims that overlap among the Parties in dispute, as well as the prodigious depth of 
sediment of the seabed. Currently, there are no clear rules or principles on maritime boundary 
delimitation between the EEZ and the continental shelf. This is a potential point of contention, 
especially since these extended continental shelf areas represent potential sources of future 
income through the exploitation of seabed resources.  
The impact of the research will be twofold: a critical analysis on the interaction between 
the EEZ and continental shelf regimes, which is a topical subject for research with an increasing 
number of foreseeable problems, as well as clear and actionable guidance for States on 
establishing the limit of their continental shelves beyond 200 M. Indeed, a key aim of this 
research is to have a practical impact on States asserting their entitlement to a continental shelf 
beyond 200 M, specifically where States are advancing assertions to continental shelf rights 
within 200 M of a neighbouring State. This research will benefit key stakeholders including 
States, international organisations, as well as the fishing, shipping and oil industries, as it will 
assist these key players to understand where, what, how and by whom various activities may 
be carried out in the case of overlapping entitlements between the two regimes. The study is 
intended to bring novel insights to a complex and increasingly contested area of the 
international law of the sea - one which has significance for ocean governance on a global 
scale.  
 
                                                 
89 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 53. 
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2. History and Development of the Continental Shelf Regime 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The regime of the continental shelf was not introduced until the early 20th century. By the 
1940s, the regime had gained acceptance as a rule of customary international law, with an 
increasing number of coastal States claiming jurisdiction over their continental shelves. Since 
its introduction, a significant amount of literature has been published on the continental shelf 
regime. Most of this literature, however, does not provide any analysis of whether the 
continental shelf regime trumps the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) regime – which was 
established a few decades later. In order to answer this question, it is necessary to trace the 
history and development of the continental shelf regime (the history and development of the 
EEZ will be discussed in the next Chapter). By understanding the intention behind the genesis 
of the regime, it is possible to ascertain how the regime should interact with the more 
contemporary EEZ regime.  
This Chapter aims to provide an understanding of the history and purpose of the 
continental shelf regime. It will trace the evolution of the definition of the ‘continental shelf’, 
from a scientific term describing a specific part of the seabed, to a legal term that eschews any 
scientific examination. To this end, the Chapter will trace the development of the term 
‘continental shelf’ in chronological order: from its first uses in the early 20th century, to the 
various claims made by coastal States over their ‘continental shelves’ in the mid-1940s and 
1950s, to the work of the International Law Commission (ILC) which produced the negotiation 
text for the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1958 (UNCLOS I), and 
finally to the current definition of the continental shelf contained in the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention or the Convention).1 
Describing the continental shelf is fraught with difficulty. This is because even though 
the term is a legal construct for the purposes of the LOS Convention, it also exists in a scientific 
sense.2 Gardiner has even declared that “there is no real relationship between the scientific and 
                                                 
1 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, (entered into force 16 November 1994) 
1833 UNTS 3 [LOS Convention]. As of 9 April 2019, there are 168 Parties to the LOS Convention (including 
the European Union), with Azerbaijan having acceded to the Convention on 16 June 2016. 
2 Hyun Jung Kim, ‘Natural Prolongation: A Living Myth in the Regime of the Continental Shelf’ (2014) 45 
Ocean Development & International Law 374, at 375; Joanna Mossop, The Continental Shelf Beyond 200 
Nautical Miles: Rights and Responsibilities (Oxford University Press, 2016) at 20.  
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the legal usage of the term ‘continental shelf’”.3 The scientific definition of the continental 
shelf – which is based on the geomorphology of the seabed (geomorphology is the science that 
describes the surface of the earth, its origin and history)4 – is far more limited than the current 
legal definition of the continental shelf (as will be discussed below). So how was the law able 
to supersede a concept that was purely geomorphological in origin? The divergence between 
the legal definition and the geomorphological definition took place incrementally, and 
coincided with the development of the legal concept of the continental shelf in the early 20th 
century. 
 
2.2. The Development of the Continental Shelf in the Early 20th Century 
Even before the 1940s, there was a general acceptance that possession of a territorial sea 
included rights over resources in the seabed and subsoil.5 Moreover, a clear distinction had 
been forged between the bed of the territorial sea on the one hand, and the bed of the high seas 
on the other, with the latter area not being subject to the jurisdiction of coastal States. 6 
Importantly, there was no internationally recognised appropriation or right of appropriation to 
submarine areas outside of a State’s territorial sea at the time.7  
The potential importance of such submarine areas, however, had been recognised since 
the early 20th century. Even before coastal States had realised the hydrocarbon resource 
potential of submarine areas adjacent to land masses, they were cognisant that an abundance 
of marine life was concentrated on this shallow shelf region, known as the ‘continental shelf’.8 
In this context, the term ‘continental shelf’ refers to the region extending from the coastline to 
                                                 
3 Piers RR Gardiner, 'Reasons and Methods for Fixing the Outer Limit of the Legal Continental Shelf Beyond 
200 Nautical Miles' (1978) 11-12 Iranian Review of International Relations 145, at 151.  
4 Philip G Worcester, A Textbook of Geomorphology (D Van Nostrand Company, 2nd ed, 1948), at 3.  
5 Robin R Churchill and Alan V Lowe, The Law of the Sea (Manchester University Press, 3rd ed, 1999), at 142. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Robert B Krueger, 'The Convention of the Continental Shelf and the Need for Its Revision and Some 
Comments Regarding the Regime for the Lands Beyond, Part III: Zones of National Interest: A Discussion of 
the Need for Revision of the Geneva Conventions' (1968) 1 Natural Resources Lawyer 1, at 1. Even so, some 
States like Bahrain and Sri Lanka had claimed exclusive rights to pearl fishing over their respective continental 
shelves, and the United Kingdom had enacted legislation regarding the operation of the undersea mines in 
Cornwall as early as 1878; see Makhdoom Ali Khan, 'The Juridical Concept of the Continental Shelf' (1985) 
38(2) Pakistan Horizon (Karachi) 19, at 19.  
8 League of Nations Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law League of 
Nations, 'Questionnaire No. 2: Territorial Waters' (1926), reprinted in 20(3) The American Journal of 
International Law, Supplement 62, at 125-126.  
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a great step that marks the beginning of the abysmal region,9 and this shallow region can extend 
well beyond the territorial sea. In justifying the right of coastal States to exploit submarine 
resources beyond the territorial sea, Hurst argued in 1923 that the right of coastal States to 
exploit sedentary fisheries in the seabed and subsoil outside of the territorial sea was not in 
conflict with the universal right of other States to navigate the high seas.10  
This realisation inspired a series of early rights claims over marine resources beyond 
the territorial sea. In the same year that Hurst published his work on the sedentary species 
beyond the territorial sea, Panama claimed jurisdiction over pearl fisheries beyond the limit of 
its territorial sea, with Venezuela following suit in 1935.11 Subsequently, in 1941, Venezuela 
expanded its claim to cover all fishery resources on its continental shelf.12 The ‘continental 
shelf’ which Venezuela was likely referring to was the continental shelf in the 
geomorphological sense – that is, the then prevailing scientific understanding of the term which 
did not include the continental slope and rise.13 Indeed, a similar situation occurred in 1916, 
when Spain’s then Director-General of Fisheries argued for extending the State’s territorial sea 
to include the continental shelf, as most of the edible species of fish were found above this 
area.14 Nine years later, Spain and France agreed to extend their littoral zones to a distance of 
12 to 15 nautical miles (M) from their coasts, to cover their respective continental shelves.15 
In 1926, a Committee of Experts formed by the League of Nations supported this 
argument, recognising that at a certain distance from the coast, the bottom of the sea is marked 
by a ‘great step’ that divides it into two distinct areas: the ‘continental shelf’, which extends 
from this step to the coastline and where most edible fish can be found; and a vast abysmal 
region that extends beyond this step.16 Based on this conception, Barbosa de Magelhaes, a 
                                                 
9 Wilbert McLeod Chapman, 'Fisheries Resources in Offshore Waters' in Lewis M Alexander (ed), The Law of 
the Sea: Offshore Boundaries and Zones (The Ohio State University Press, 1966) 87, at 126. 
10 Cecil JB Hurst, 'Whose is the Bed of the Sea - Sedentary Species Outside the Three-Mile Limit' (1923) 4 
British Yearbook of International Law 34, at 43. 
11 1931 Fiscal Code of Panama, tit. V. ch. III and Venezuelan Pearl Fisheries Act of 1935, cited in Alberto 
Szekely, Latin-America and the Development of the Law of the Sea, Regional Documents and National 
Legislation (Dobbs Ferry, 1978), at 38 & 39. 
12 Venezuelan Act of 22 July 1941, Arts. 7-8, reprinted in ibid, at 39. 
13 Robert Y Jennings, 'The Limits of Continental Shelf Jurisdiction: Some Possible Implications of the North 
Sea Case Judgment' (1969) 18(4) The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 819, at 827. 
14 League of Nations, supra note 8, at 125-126.  
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid, at 126. 
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member of the committee from Portugal, suggested that the width of the territorial sea be 
expanded to 12 M.17  Although this attempt to expand the territorial sea beyond the then 
commonly accepted 3 M mark (and based on the continental shelf argument) did not garner 
wide acceptance, the idea that States have certain ‘rights’ over the continental shelf beyond the 
territorial sea began to gain traction.  
By the mid-20th century, it was generally accepted in the scientific community that the 
term ‘continental shelf’ referred to the section of the seabed immediately adjacent to the coast 
that gently slopes from the shoreline into the edge of the shelf, at which point there is a marked 
change in the angle of the decline.18 Seaward of the continental shelf, the depth increases more 
rapidly, forming a zone known as the ‘continental slope’.19 Beyond the continental slope, there 
is a zone formed by the accumulation of sediment transported from the continent, which is 
generally of shallower gradient and known as the ‘continental rise’.20 Beyond the continental 
rise lies the abyssal plain of the deep ocean basin.21 The continental shelf, continental slope 
and continental rise together form the ‘continental margin’ (see Figure 2.1 below).22 
 
Figure 1: The Continental Margin 
                                                 
17 Ibid, at 129.  
18 Richard Young, 'The Legal Status of Submarine Areas Beneath the High Seas' (1951) 45(2) The American 
Journal of International Law 225, at 234. 
19 Philip A Symonds, et al, 'Characteristics of Continental Margins' in P. J. Cook and Chris Carleton (eds), 
Continental Shelf Limits: The Scientific and Legal Interface (Oxford University Press, 2000) 25, at 29. See also 
Churchill and Lowe, supra note 5, at 141.  
20 Symonds, et al, ibid, at 31. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid, at 29.  
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The desire of States to extend their territorial sea to include the geomorphological 
continental shelf was originally driven by their fishing interests. This situation changed in the 
1940s, when technology allowed for the exploration of hydrocarbon resources further into the 
seabed, while the deepening conflicts of World War II drove countries to secure their oil 
supplies. In 1942 and against this backdrop, the United Kingdom, as the colonial power 
administering Trinidad and Tobago, entered into a treaty with Venezuela whereby the seabed 
beyond the two States’ territorial sea was delimited (Gulf of Paria Treaty).23 This treaty was 
the first to delimit the seabed beyond the territorial sea, and its significance derives from the 
fact that the legal concept of the continental shelf was not yet firmly established. During the 
negotiation of the treaty, both States were at pains to ensure that the freedom of navigation on 
the high seas was not affected by the delimitation.24 This compromise between the need of 
coastal States to exert jurisdiction over seabed resources on the one hand, and the need to 
preserve the freedom of high seas navigation on the other, became an important factor in the 
development of the legal regime of the continental shelf (as will be seen in the next part).  
The signing of the 1942 Gulf of Paria Treaty signalled the expansion of coastal State 
jurisdiction beyond the territorial sea in order to secure hydrocarbon resources. At this critical 
juncture, some coastal States including Spain, Venezuela and Panama enacted laws that had 
the effect of extending their jurisdiction into the edge of the continental shelf. It was axiomatic 
that when the term ‘continental shelf’ was mentioned in the respective statutes of these States, 
it was referring to the geomorphological continental shelf as understood in the scientific 
community.  
 
2.3. The Truman Proclamation 1945 
In the 1940s, technology had advanced to a point where it was possible to commercially exploit 
hydrocarbon resources from the seabed beyond the territorial sea. As there was no legal regime 
in place to regulate exploitation of these resources, some coastal States made unilateral claims 
                                                 
23 Treaty between His Majesty in Respect of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of 
Venezuela Relating to the Submarine Areas of the Gulf of Paria, 26 February 1942 (entered into force 22 
September 1942), reprinted in Jonathan I Charney and Lewis M Alexander (eds), International Maritime 
Boundaries (The American Society of International Law, 1993), at 651. 
24 Ibid, at 641. The treaty does not treat the seabed of the Gulf of Paria as a separate juridical concept, but as res 
nullius that had come under occupation through claim and exploitation. See Khan, supra note 7, at 20. 
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to continental shelf areas adjacent to their territorial seas.25 The Truman Proclamation marks a 
watershed moment in the development of the continental shelf regime. With this Proclamation, 
the United States unilaterally declared its exclusive right over the resources in the seabed that 
formed part of the natural prolongation of its land territory.26 The United States was not the 
first State to declare some sort of sovereign right over the seabed adjacent to its land territory. 
In 1944, for example, Argentina laid claim to a 200 M territorial sea and all resources within 
it, including the continental shelf.27 However, the Truman Proclamation was the first statement 
of its kind to assert a claim over the continental shelf, and to clarify associated legal rights and 
entitlements. Although the Truman Proclamation did not define the outer limits of the 
continental shelf, the accompanying press release described it as an area adjacent to the 
continent to a depth of 100 fathoms (equating to 188 metres, with the figure usually rounded 
to 200 metres).28 
Two important features can be gleamed from the Truman Proclamation. First, like the 
Gulf of Paria Treaty, the Proclamation expressly recognised that the freedom of the high seas 
was preserved above the claimed seabed.29 Thus, the United States only claimed jurisdiction 
over the resources in their seabed, but did not claim any rights in the waters or the resources 
above the seabed. Second, there were no major objections to the Proclamation, with other States 
quickly asserting their own jurisdiction over natural resources of the seabed that they 
considered an extension of their land territory.30 Brownlie asserted in 1969 that even though 
the Truman Proclamation was the product of special interests within the United States, other 
States have accepted the general principles embodied in the Proclamation.31  In 1950, for 
                                                 
25 Donald R. Rothwell and Tim Stephens, The International Law of the Sea (Hart Publishing, 2nd ed, 2016), at 
102.  
26 1945 US Presidential Proclamation No 2667, Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural 
Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, (1945) 10 Fed Reg 12,305 [Truman 
Proclamation].  
27 See Rothwell and Stephens, supra note 25, at 100-101. See also Richard Young, 'Recent Developments with 
Respect to the Continental Shelf' (1948) 42 The American Journal of International Law 849, at 852. 
28 Young, ibid, at 851. See also Edwin Borchard, 'Resources of the Continental Shelf' (1946) 40(1) The 
American Journal of International Law 53, at 55. 
29 The Truman Proclamation, supra note 26. 
30 See Ian Brownlie, 'Recommendations on the Limits of the Continental Shelf and Related Matters: A 
Commentary' in Lewis M Alexander (ed), National Policy Recommendations (The University of Rhode Island, 
1969) 133, at 133. 
31 Ibid. 
 
26 
 
example, Pakistan followed the United States by defining the edge of its geomorphological 
continental shelf as occurring at a depth of 100 fathoms or 188 metres.32 
However, there was no uniform State practice on the scope of these rights over the 
resources of the continental shelf.33 Some States not only declared their sovereign rights over 
resources in the seabed, but also their sovereignty over the body of water above it. For example, 
in October 1945 Mexico issued a declaration asserting jurisdiction not only over the continental 
shelf bordering its territory, but also of the sea waters covering the shelf.34 The geographical 
scope of the ‘continental shelf’ also varied. Chile, for example, rejected the 100 fathoms or 
200-metre depth formula used by the United States and Mexico, instead choosing to use a line 
200 M from and parallel to its coast.35 
The inconsistency over the nature and geographical extent of continental shelf claims 
following the Truman Proclamation clearly demonstrates a lack of uniform State practice. Lord 
Asquith in 1951 opined that the doctrine of the continental shelf was not yet “admitted to the 
canon of international law”.36 Nevertheless, the fact that the Truman Proclamation was met 
with almost no protests, and that other States followed the example of the United States, 
demonstrated that there was a uniformity of practice with regard to States extending their 
jurisdiction over the continental shelf, albeit while claiming diverse jurisdictional rights.37 
Furthermore, the extensions of jurisdiction were all uniform in one crucial aspect: they all 
guaranteed the freedom of navigation on the waters above the continental shelf.38  These 
unilateral declarations were instrumental to the development of the legal regime of the 
continental shelf. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) later recognised the importance of 
the Truman Proclamation, describing it as “the starting point of the positive law on the subject”, 
and affirming that “the chief doctrine it enunciated, namely that of the coastal State as having 
                                                 
32 Pakistan, Decree of 9 March 1950, Gazette, 14 March 1950. 
33 See Hersch Lauterpacht, ‘Sovereignty over Submarine Areas’ (1950) 27 British Yearbook of International 
Law 376, at 382.  
34 Young, supra note 27, at 852. 
35 Ibid, at 853. 
36 See Arbitration between Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd and Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, Award, 28 
August 1951, reprinted in (1952) 1 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 247, at 253. 
37 Only the most extreme declarations prompted protests from other States, see Lauterpacht, supra note 33, at 
383. 
38 Ibid. 
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an original, natural, and exclusive (in short a vested) right to the continental shelf off its shores, 
came to prevail over all others”.39 
By describing the continental shelf as an area adjacent to the continent to a depth of 100 
fathoms, the United States evinced an intention that the term ‘continental shelf’ (as used in the 
Proclamation) be construed in the geomorphological sense as understood by the scientific 
community. This was also the view of Symonds et al, who have attested that the Truman 
Proclamation was “referring to the inner part of the continental margin, the geomorphic 
continental shelf”.40 The Proclamation also mentioned that the resources of the continental 
shelf “frequently form a seaward extension of a pool or deposit lying within the territory”.41 
Thus, the Proclamation’s conceptualisation of the continental shelf relied not only on 
geographical contiguity but also on the geological continuity of the seabed.42 
 
2.4. The Legal Conceptualisation of the Continental Shelf by Richard Young 1948 
Even though the 100 fathoms depth limit referred to in the Truman Proclamation reflects the 
average depth of the continental edge,43 this is not always the case. In some regions, the edge 
of the shelf may lie at depths more than 100 fathoms.44 The width of the shelf also varies from 
less than one nautical mile in some areas to 800 M in other areas.45 This was why, following 
the Truman Proclamation, the term ‘continental shelf’ was used loosely in claiming areas of 
unspecified extent without any reference to the geological configuration of the seabed.46 As 
Gidel has shown, the various natural sciences at the time were still far from agreeing on the 
outer limits of the continental shelf.47  
                                                 
39 North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v the 
Netherlands), 20 February 2916, (1969) ICJ Reports 3 [North Sea Continental Shelf Cases], at para 47. 
40 Symonds, et al, supra note 19, at 26.  
41 The Truman Proclamation, supra note 26. 
42 Kim, supra note 2, at 375. 
43 Young, supra note 18, at 234. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Khan, supra note 7, at 23. 
46 Ibid, at 24. 
47 Gilbert Gidel, 'The Continental Shelf' (1954) 3(1) University of Western Australia Law Review 87, at 89.  
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Due to these uncertainties, in 1948 Richard Young suggested “an appropriate standard 
for fixing what one might call the ‘legal edge’”.48 Young proposed the following standards for 
defining the ‘legal edge’ of the continental shelf:49  
 
1. As a general rule, the seaward limit of the continental shelf should 
be considered to be the 100-fathom (or 200-metre) line. For the sake 
of uniformity, this should be the case even when the shelf in fact 
terminates at a lesser depth. 
2. When the submarine terrain creates more than one such line, the 
outermost 100-fathom contour should be regarded as the limit of the 
shelf. 
3. A possible boundary line should not be regarded as discontinuous 
merely because it may be interrupted by submarine canyons running 
out from land. On a principle somewhat analogous to the headland 
theory for bays, such canyons should be spanned by straight lines 
connecting the 100-fathom contours. By the same analogy, the 
permissible length of such lines might be limited to that applied by 
the coastal state to its bays. 
4. Isolated patches of limited size which are over 100 fathoms in depth 
should be disregarded and absorbed into the shelf area. In narrow or 
landlocked seas particularly, depressions over 100 fathoms deep 
which do not connect with the ocean depths or which are of small 
size in relation to the total area of the sea in question, should be 
assimilated to the surrounding shallows. 
 
Although this legal definition does not accurately reflect the geomorphological 
continental shelf, it did approximate the geomorphological location of the edge of the shelf. 
Even Young himself recognised that in defining the legal edge of the continental shelf, some 
degree of arbitrariness was involved.50 This, he argued, was unavoidable in order to have a 
workable legal rule that was “reasonably fair, certain and uniform in its effect”.51 Young’s 
proposal did not diverge too far from the scientific definition of the continental shelf, as it was 
                                                 
48 Young, supra note 18, at 234. 
49 Ibid, at 235. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
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generally accepted at the time that the average depth of the shelf was around 100 fathoms, even 
though in some areas the shelf extends beyond this depth. Thus, Young’s legal definition of 
the continental shelf was mostly congruent with the prevailing scientific definition of the shelf 
at the time. 
In defining a legal edge for the continental shelf, Young was attempting to formulate a 
consistent legal rule to govern an inherently variable geomorphological concept. Furthermore, 
Young’s proposal set the scene for the later divergence between the legal and 
geomorphological definition of the continental shelf. Indeed, Young’s legal definition of the 
continental shelf was seriously considered by the International Law Commission (ILC), which 
will be discussed below. 
 
2.5. The Work of the International Law Commission 1949-1956 
The ILC was established by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in 1947. It was tasked 
to “initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of...encouraging the progressive 
development of international law and its codification”.52 In its first session in 1949, the ILC 
agreed that the topic of the high seas was ripe for codification.53 The ILC appointed J.P.A. 
Francois – who had served as the rapporteur for the high seas question during The Hague 
Codification Conference in 1930 – as a Special Rapporteur to study the question of the high 
seas regime.54  
Francois noted that it was equally important to study the modern regulations governing 
the continental shelf. 55  The ILC, motivated by the development of State practice on the 
continental shelf, as well as the lack of a uniform definition of the term, agreed with Francois. 
In its general directives on the drafting of the reports for the rapporteurs, the ILC stressed that 
the rapporteur for the high seas regime should “make a careful study of the new doctrine of the 
control of natural submarine resources, known as the ‘doctrine of the continental shelf’”.56  
                                                 
52 Charter of the United Nations, 1 UNTS XVI, 24 October 1945, Art 13(1)(a). 
53  International Law Commission, 'Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1949: Summary Records 
and Documents of the First Session including the Report of the Commission to the General Assembly' (United 
Nations, 1956), at 43. 
54 Ibid, at 238. 
55 Ibid, at 43. 
56 Ibid, at 237. 
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When Francois delivered his report at the ILC’s third session in 1951,57 the definition 
of the ‘continental shelf’ was heavily debated. Francois emphasised that the scientific 
community could not determine the location of the shelf edge with any degree of certainty.58 
Indeed, considering the geological diversity among coastal States would have made reaching a 
consensus on the limits of the continental shelf extremely difficult, the resulting uncertainty 
was hardly surprising.59 The International Committee on Nomenclature of the Sea Floor, for 
example, proposed the following definitions:60 
 
Continental shelf, shelf edge and borderland. The zone around the 
continent, extending from the low-water line to the depth at which there 
is a marked increase of slope to greater depth. Where this increase 
occurs the term shelf edge is appropriate. Conventionally, the edge is 
taken at 100 fathoms (or 200 metres) but instances are known where the 
increase of slope occurs at more than 200 or less than 65 fathoms. When 
the zone below the low-water line is highly irregular and includes 
depths well in excess of those typical of continental shelves, the term 
continental borderland is appropriate. 
 
This uncertainty was seen by Francois as the very reason a legal definition was 
required.61 Thus, Francois set a fixed depth limit for the extent of his legal definition of the 
continental shelf: “[t]he continental shelf is constituted legally by the bed and the subsoil of 
the submarine regions, situated off the coast, where the depth of the water does not exceed 200 
metres”. 62  This legal definition was similar to Young’s proposal. Like Young, Francois 
acknowledged that his definition “entirely disregarded” the geomorphological and geological 
concept of the continental shelf, but that due to the disagreement between geologists and 
                                                 
57 International Law Commission, 'Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1951 Vol II: Documents of 
the Third Session including the Report of the Commission to the General Assembly' (United Nations, 1957), at 
75-103. 
58  International Law Commission, 'Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1951 Vol I: Summary 
Records of the Third Session 16 May - 27 July 1951' (UN Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1951, United Nations, 1957), at 
270.  
59 Kim, supra note 2, at 376. 
60 Joan DH Wiseman and Cameron D Ovey, 'Definitions of Features on the Deep-Sea Floor' in Louis Fage, 
Cameron D Ovey and Mary Sears (eds), Deep Sea Research (Pergamon Press, 1953) vol 1, at 11. 
61 International Law Commission, supra note 58, at 269. 
62 Ibid. 
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geographers over the meaning of the term ‘continental shelf’, a strict legal concept of the 
continental shelf was needed.63 However, by establishing the 200-metre depth criterion, which 
is the average depth of the continental shelf, Francois’ definition actually pays deference to the 
geological and geographical concept of the continental shelf. 
Some members of the ILC, however, were not satisfied with the fixed limits set out by 
Francois.64 In particular, Jesus Maria Yepes expressed concern over the application of the fixed 
limits with regard to coastal States like Chile, where the depth of the seabed was considerably 
more than 200 metres near the shore.65 Faris el Khoury echoed the sentiments of Yepes, 
proposing that all coastal States be able to exercise rights to a minimum distance, irrespective 
of depth.66 El Khoury’s proposal was met with swift opposition. Francois explained that a depth 
limit of 200 metres had been set because, according to experts, resources at a depth greater than 
200 metres were not capable of being exploited.67 For Gilberto Amado,  el Khoury’s proposal 
“represent[ed] a total subversion of all law”, while Ivan Kerno – the Assistant Secretary-
General – questioned the merit of according such rights when no exploitation was possible.68  
Francois’ proposed definition was also challenged by Manley Hudson, who argued that 
any depth limitation should apply on a provisional basis only. Central to this view was the 
notion that States should be entitled to claim a continental shelf of a greater depth when new 
technology allows for the exploration of resources at such depth.69 Francois conceded that he 
had entertained such a possibility, but that in his estimation, it was in everyone’s interest to 
have clear guidance with regard to how far the rights of States could be extended.70 Francois 
also noted that the 200-metre limit was not immutable, but that it adhered to existing technical 
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limitations. 71  Moreover, Francois argued that a depth of 200 metres had generally been 
accepted as the exploitation limit, as evidenced by a number of proclamations setting such a 
depth limit, such as the Truman Proclamation and the Mexican Proclamation of 29 October 
1945.72 
Yepes, however, remained unsatisfied and reminded the ILC of their report published 
only a year earlier. In this earlier report, the ILC had asserted that if jurisdiction or control over 
the seabed depended on the existence of a continental shelf, an unjust result would accrue to 
countries without such a shelf, such as Peru and Chile.73 Amado, also opposed to the 200-metre 
depth limit, reiterated Hudson’s argument that technical progress may one day make it possible 
to exploit the seabed at increasing depths.74 Georges Scelle agreed with Amado and asked why 
countries like Chile should be prevented from exploiting submarine resources from its coast if 
they managed to find the means to do so. Scelle argued that “what was required was an abstract 
definition of the right of States to exploit all resources of the sea”.75 Roberto Codova supported 
this argument, declaring that the ILC should “aim at a higher ideal, and grant all coastal States, 
without exception, the right to exploit the natural resources of the sea-bed off their coasts”.76 
To deal with this difficult issue, Cordova proposed that a sub-committee be formed to 
examine the position of countries lacking a continental shelf, and to draft a text that would be 
acceptable to all. 77  The ILC agreed to establish a sub-committee consisting of Cordova, 
Francois, Yepes and Hudson.78 The sub-committee delivered its findings a week later and 
concluded that the best way to avoid any difficulties was to omit the reference to a 200-metre 
depth from the definition of the continental shelf, instead replacing it with the phrase “…such 
as to permit the exploitation of the natural resources of the sea-bed and subsoil”.79 Yepes 
explained that such definition “restored equality among all States” since it granted all States 
the entitlement “to exercise control and jurisdiction over the stretch of sea contiguous to their 
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shores, so long as it was possible for them to exploit the resources of the subsoil”.80  The 
definition formulated by the sub-committee was ultimately adopted, and in their first draft 
articles, the ILC eschewed any reference to a depth limit, instead defining the continental shelf 
as:81  
 
the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas contiguous to the coast, 
but outside the area of territorial waters, where the depth of the 
superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of 
the seabed and subsoil.  
 
When the issue of the continental shelf was revisited by the ILC in its fifth session in 
1953, some members were of the view that the definition needed to be based on natural 
geomorphological factors. According to the conception of these members, the depth of the 
continental shelf reaches up to where the steep slope of the seabed begins. Fyodor Kozhevnikov 
of the then Soviet Union proposed an alternative text:82  
 
As here used, the term continental shelf means the sea-bed and subsoil 
of the submarine areas contiguous to the coast, but lying outside the 
area of the territorial waters, up to the line where the steep slope of the 
sea-bed begins.  
 
The reference to the ‘steep slope’ in the text above indicates the end of the geological 
continental shelf and the beginning of the continental slope. Francois responded to the 
alternative text by asserting that reliance on a geomorphological concept would inevitably 
result in situations where coastal States would have no continental shelf.83 Since there were 
many coastal States lacking this specific geomorphological condition, Francois thought that it 
was “unjust not to accord to coastal States the right to exploit natural resources in such cases”.84 
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Indeed, this was the reason why the ILC had omitted the depth criterion from the definition of 
the continental shelf in favour of the exploitability criterion in 1951.  
The ILC re-examined the definition during their 1953 session, following reports from 
a number of Governments that the definition lacked precision and could conceivably give rise 
to disputes and uncertainty.85 Safe in the knowledge that it would be impossible to exploit 
resources in the seabed beyond a 200-metre depth for the conceivable future, the ILC decided 
that the 200-metre depth limit “would be sufficient for all practical purposes at present and 
probably for a long time to come”.86 Thus, the ILC amended Article 1 as follows:87 
 
Article 1 
As used in these articles, the term "continental shelf" refers to the sea-
bed and subsoil of the submarine areas contiguous to the coast, but 
outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of two hundred metres. 
 
In its 1956 session, the ILC again reconsidered the definition. In March 1956, the Inter-
American Specialized Conference on ‘Conservations of Natural Resources: Continental Shelf 
and Oceanic Waters’ was held at Ciudad Trujillo (Dominican Republic). Here, it was 
concluded that the right of coastal States should extend beyond the 200-metre depth limit “to 
where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of 
the seabed and subsoil”. 88  Following this conference, some ILC members were again 
persuaded that the right of coastal States to exploit the resources of the seabed should not be 
limited to a depth of 200 metres, provided such exploitation was possible.89  Amado, for 
example, stated that:90 
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[j]urists from the American continent appreciated the problems of those 
countries which had no continental shelf, and he felt that the 
Commission could not prevent such countries exploiting the natural 
resources of the sea-bed at a greater depth than 200 metres if 
exploitation were possible.  
 
The Chairman of the ILC at the time, F.V. Garcia-Armador, also pointed out that “the 
limit of 200 metres might well be exceeded in some twenty to thirty years”.91 Limiting the 
continental shelf to a 200-metre depth could thus lead to instability, as technical developments 
might make it possible to exploit resources at a depth greater than 200 metres in the future.92 
Furthermore, the geomorphological continental shelf might include submarine areas lying at a 
depth more than 200 metres.93 The ILC thus decided that setting a 200-metre depth criterion 
would not be sufficient to meet the needs of coastal States seeking to exploit the resources 
beyond such depth, if such exploitation was possible.94 That is why the ILC decided to keep 
both the 200-metre depth limit and the exploitability criterion in their definition of the 
continental shelf. In its report to the UN General Assembly on 1956, the ILC defined the 
continental shelf as follows:95 
 
For the purposes of these articles, the term "continental shelf" is used 
as referring to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to 
the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 
metres (approximately 100 fathoms), or, beyond that limit, to where the 
depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural 
resources of the said areas. 
 
The reasoning behind this definition is somewhat paradoxical. The ILC sought a legal 
definition for the continental shelf due to the diversity and complexity in defining the 
geomorphological edge of the shelf. However, the ILC simultaneously desired the legal 
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definition to adhere as close as possible to the geomorphological one. Such a clear contradiction 
can be seen in the ILC endorsing the 200-metre depth limit (which is the average depth where 
the geomorphological edge of the continental shelf is commonly found), in addition to the 
exploitability criterion.  
Since the ILC decided not to use the geomorphological definition of the continental 
shelf in the strict sense, why was the term ‘continental shelf’ used at all? During the third ILC 
session in 1951, A.E.F. Sandstrom suggested that the term ‘continental shelf’ be abandoned 
altogether in favour of another term. For Sandstrom, this was because geographical and 
geomorphological considerations were inconsequential when defining a legal continental 
shelf.96 Ricardo Alfaro also “did not consider the term ‘continental shelf’ a very good one, as 
there might be a submarine shelf contiguous to islands”.97 Shuhsi Hsu opined that since the 
term ‘continental shelf’ was a recent term, it could easily be replaced by some other expression, 
such as ‘submarine areas’, which in his view was more accurate.98 
The Commission thus considered using the term ‘submarine areas’, which had been 
used in certain scientific works as well as domestic statutes and international instruments. This 
suggestion was rejected, however. According to Hudson, the term ‘continental shelf’ had 
already entered into general use.99 Further, it was felt that the term ‘submarine areas’ would 
not give a sufficient indication of the nature of the areas in question.100 The ILC considered 
that some departure from the geomorphological meaning of the term ‘continental shelf’ was 
justified due to the absence of a generally agreed scientific definition. Moreover, the ILC was 
confident that it had formulated a clear legal definition for the term.101  
From this point on, it was generally accepted that the legal definition of the continental 
shelf only partially followed the geomorphological definition. Despite of this, the legal 
definition of the continental shelf (as drafted by the ILC) mostly conforms to the 
geomorphological one. Indeed, the 200-metre limit follows the average depth of the 
geomorphological continental shelf before the angle of the decline of the seabed changes 
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drastically – a feature of the seabed known as the continental slope. As stated by the ILC, the 
depth of 200 metres “also coincides with that at which the continental shelf in the geological 
sense generally comes to an end and the continental slope begins, falling steeply to a great 
depth”.102  
The fierce debate over defining the continental shelf during the ILC’s first few sessions 
illustrates the challenges faced by the ILC in establishing a new legal regime that was based in 
natural science rather than law. The ILC began by using only the depth criterion in defining 
the legal limit of the continental shelf, only to abandon this approach in favour of the 
exploitability criterion. Then, in a complete reversal of its earlier position, the ILC reverted 
back to the depth criterion to appease the need for certainty by several Governments. 
Ultimately, however, the ILC re-introduced the exploitability criterion at the behest of Latin 
American countries. As Khan has pointed out, the “long discussions in the Commission over 
the years 1951-1956 are an indication of the immaturity of legal thought and practice on the 
subject”.103 In its final incantation, the definition adopted by ILC ignores the geomorphological 
factors of the seafloor, instead privileging depth limit and exploitability as the relevant criteria 
in defining the legal continental shelf.104 
 
2.6. UNCLOS I 1958 
When UNCLOS I was held in Geneva, Switzerland in 1958, the negotiating States benefitted 
from having the draft articles recommended by the ILC before them. Although the 200-metre 
depth limit and exploitability criteria laid down by the ILC did not provide a clear method to 
determine the outer edge of the continental shelf, the continental shelf regime was still 
attractive to many States, as it provided a legal basis for exploiting the resources in the seabed 
and subsoil adjacent to their coasts.105 In the end, UNCLOS I produced four Conventions which 
adopted most of the ILC’s recommendations:106 the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the 
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Contiguous Zone;107  the Convention on the High Seas;108  the Convention on Fishing and 
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas; 109  and the Convention on the 
Continental Shelf (Continental Shelf Convention).110  
Article 1 of the Continental Shelf Convention followed the recommendation of the ILC 
and adopted a legal definition for the continental shelf:111 
 
For the purpose of these articles, the term “continental shelf” is used as 
referring (a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent 
to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 
metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent 
waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said 
areas; (b) to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent 
to the coasts of islands. 
 
In adopting the ILC’s definition, various statements were made at UNCLOS I 
supporting the 200-metre depth point as the limit at which exploitation was thought possible.112 
Thus, the legal concept of the continental shelf ends at the fixed depth limit of 200 metres, 
despite this limit being criticised an imprecise on the basis that the geomorphological 
continental shelf edge could be located either before or beyond that point.113  
As the actual geomorphological edge of the continental shelf varies from coast to coast, 
fixing a legal limit would provide certainty. However, the addition of the exploitability criterion 
allowed States to expand their jurisdiction beyond the fixed 200-metre depth limit. That said, 
the phrase “submarine areas adjacent to the coast” arguably limited this exploitability within 
the geomorphological continental shelf. Nevertheless, the exploitability criterion defeated the 
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purpose of fixing the 200-metre depth limit, as technological development soon allowed States 
to exploit the resources of the seabed and subsoil beyond the 200-metre depth limit. As Emery 
stated at the time, “[e]xploitation appears to be a poor criterion in these days of rapidly 
expanding marine technology”.114  
During the negotiation of UNCLOS I, China submitted that “…from the legal point of 
view, the latter [exploitability] contradicted the former [200-metre depth] in that it removed 
the limit which was fixed in the former for the purpose of avoiding disputes or uncertainty”.115 
Turkey also viewed the exploitability criterion as “so ambiguous that, far from avoiding 
conflicts, it might actually create them”.116 Greece suggested abandoning the exploitability 
criterion in favour of the depth criterion.117 Indeed, this view was supported by Lebanon, in 
part due to the risk posed by the exploitability criterion in limiting the freedom of the high 
seas.118 Pakistan also recognised that the depth criterion was imperfect, but in the interests of 
providing for a specific and objective delimitation, recommended deleting the exploitability 
criterion. 119  Guatemala described the exploitability criterion as “dangerously vague, 
and…particularly unfair to under-developed countries” on grounds of access to technology.120 
The United States also doubted the wisdom of adopting the exploitability criterion.121 
As was the case with the ILC, there was a strong belief among States at UNCLOS I that 
the 200-metre depth limit criterion was inadequate.122 Colombia proposed that if the main 
purpose of establishing the continental shelf was to exploit resources, then the logical criterion 
for its definition should be exploitability. 123  For Colombia, the 200-metre depth limit 
disregarded scientific progress and had the potential to make the definition “ineffective and out 
of date or [one] requir[ing] constant substantive modification”.124 It argued that having sole 
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reliance on a geomorphological definition was “extremely unjust” as it would have 
“perpetuated natural inequalities”.125 Chile was also opposed to removing the exploitability 
criterion, since its coast was replete with coal mines reaching a depth of 1,000 metres below 
sea-level.126 El Salvador supported the exploitability criterion, asserting that all submarine 
areas adjacent to the coast that are susceptible to exploitation should form part of the territory 
of the coastal State.127 The United Arab Emirates also supported the exploitability criterion, 
stressing that:128  
 
… consideration should be given to the desire of countries without a 
continental shelf to have sovereign rights over the adjacent part of the 
seabed, whatever its depth, for the purposes of exploitation. 
 
A middle ground between the opposing views described above also surfaced during 
UNCLOS I. According to this view, both sets of criteria could be used in defining the 
continental shelf. The Dominican Republic supported the retention of the ILC’s definition – 
that is, with both the geomorphological inspired limit and the exploitability limit.129 It argued 
that “international law relating to the continental shelf should take account of economic and 
historical no less than of geological factors”.130  Despite not being a perfect solution, the 
Dominican Republic viewed the ILC’s definition as offering “the best possible prospect of 
agreement and the best basis for the new legal institution of the continental shelf”.131 India also 
supported the ILC’s definition, stating that the “elastic definition” proposed by the ILC would 
suffice to “cover normal requirements”.132  
Ultimately, all of the proposed amendments to the ILC’s definition – except for the 
Philippines’ proposal for the definition to include similar submarine areas from the coast of 
islands – were rejected.133 Throughout the discussions, negotiating States were mostly satisfied 
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that the legal limit of the continental shelf would differ from the geomorphological limit, since 
they considered the latter to be insufficient to address the needs of coastal States and to keep 
apace with technological innovation.134 Thus, the Continental Shelf Convention resulted in the 
ILC’s definition of the shelf being adopted – one which contained both the 200-metre depth 
and exploitability criteria. 135  This definition excluded any reference to geology or 
geomorphological factors, which were essential components of the continental shelf as 
expressed in the Truman Proclamation.136  
 
2.7. Developments Between 1960-1969 
Following UNCLOS I, the UN General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to convene 
a Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS II) to consider the topics 
that had not been agreed upon in UNCLOS I.137 UNCLOS II was held from 17 March to 26 
April 1960. However, the Conference failed to reach any agreement, and it was decided that 
the outstanding issues would be deferred until a later stage.138 
After UNCLOS II, there were two major developments that affected the debates on the 
continental shelf. The first was the burgeoning notion that the exploitation of the deep seabed 
beyond a State’s national jurisdiction should be carried out for the benefit of humanity as a 
whole.139  This idea of the seabed constituting the ‘common heritage of mankind’ gained 
popularity after Ambassador Arvid Pardo of Malta gave a notable speech to the First 
Committee of the General Assembly in 1967. Ambassador Pardo feared that the vigorous race 
among States to claim the seabed resembled the scramble for Asian and African colonies in the 
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nineteenth century, and that only those who had the technology to exploit the seabed would 
profit.140 Ambassador Pardo also posed the following question in his stirring speech:141  
 
…the sea-bed beyond the 200-metre isobath will soon be subject to 
exploitation. The only question is, will it be exploited under national 
auspices for national purposes, or will it be exploited under 
international auspices and for the benefit of mankind? 
 
Indeed, Ambassador Pardo’s address is viewed by many commentators as the pivotal 
moment that led to the decision to convene another law of the sea conference.142 
 The second major event after UNCLOS II was the 1969 decision of the ICJ in the North 
Sea Continental Shelf Cases. 143  The ICJ did not directly deal with the definition of the 
continental shelf in this case, as most of the submarine areas in the North Sea are less than 200-
metres deep (rendering the location of the shelf edge a non-issue). The Court did, however, 
reintroduce natural factors as part of the legal concept of the continental shelf - factors that had 
earlier been abandoned by the Continental Shelf Convention.144 In its decision, the ICJ stated 
that:145 
 
[t]he institution of the continental shelf has arisen out of the recognition 
of a physical fact; and the link between this fact and the law, without 
which that institution would never have existed, remains an important 
element for the application of its legal regime.  
 
The ICJ thus viewed the concept of the continental shelf as being based on a concrete 
foundation.146 The Court opined that what gives coastal States jurisdiction over the continental 
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shelf is the fact that those submarine areas, although covered with water, “are a prolongation 
or continuation of [the land] territory, an extension of it under the sea”.147 The Court affirmed 
the inherent right of coastal States to explore and exploit the natural resources in the continental 
shelf, as laid down in the Continental Shelf Convention.148 The Court, however, pointed out 
that “the rights of the coastal State in respect of the area of continental shelf that constitutes a 
natural prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea exist ipso facto and ab initio, 
by virtue of its sovereignty over the land” [emphasis added].149  
In conclusion, the ICJ’s concept of natural prolongation, which was absent from the 
Continental Shelf Convention,150 had the effect of incorporating geomorphological features 
into the legal concept of the continental shelf.151 The concept also gave credence to the notion 
that States should have jurisdiction over the resources in the seabed beyond the legal definition 
of the continental shelf, provided the seabed forms part of the natural prolongation of a State’s 
land territory. This, however, was in stark contrast to the idea of the deep seabed being the 
common heritage of mankind (and thus beyond appropriation by any State). The struggle 
between these two concepts was a prominent issue in the negotiations of the Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III).  
 
2.8. UNCLOS III 1973-1982 
Following Ambassador Pardo’s speech in 1967, the UN General Assembly established a 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of 
National Jurisdiction (the Seabed Committee) on 21 December 1968. 152  Following the 
recommendation of the Seabed Committee, on 17 December 1970, the UN General Assembly 
decided to convene a third conference on the law of the sea, to be held in 1973.153 The UN 
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General Assembly also instructed the Seabed Committee to act as a preparatory body for the 
conference.154 The Seabed Committee divided the subjects to be discussed and allocated them 
to the three sub-committees: the first sub-committee was to prepare draft articles on the 
international regime for the area and the resources of the seabed and the ocean floor beyond 
the limits of national jurisdiction; the second sub-committee was tasked to prepare a 
comprehensive list of subjects and issues relating to the law of the sea, including the continental 
shelf; and the third sub-committee was to focus its efforts on the preservation of the marine 
environment and scientific research.155 
 UNCLOS III was convened on 3 December 1973. In its first session, it was decided 
that the work of the conference would also be divided among three committees which would 
deal with the subjects covered by the three sub-committees of the Seabed Committee.156 The 
issue of the continental shelf was thus delegated to the Second Committee. During the second 
session of UNCLOS III in 1974, the Second Committee debated the definition of the 
continental shelf. A clash quickly emerged between, on the one hand, maintaining the seabed 
and subsoil beyond national jurisdiction as the common heritage of mankind, and on the other, 
the desire of coastal States to extend their jurisdiction over the continental shelf.157  This 
highlighted the necessity of defining the limit of coastal State jurisdiction over the continental 
shelf.  
 There were two aspects to the debate on the limits of the continental shelf. The first was 
whether the continental shelf concept should be retained at all, in light of the emerging concept 
of the EEZ. The establishment of the EEZ during UNCLOS III meant that coastal States were 
entitled to a legal continental shelf up to 200 M from their baseline, no matter how far their 
physical continental shelf actually extended. Indeed, by virtue of being distance-based, the EEZ 
regime covered the physical continental shelf of most coastal States, despite some States 
possessing physical continental shelves which extended beyond 200 M from their baselines. 
Thus, there was a debate during UNCLOS III over whether to keep the continental shelf 
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concept and allow these broad-shelf States to have jurisdiction over their physical continental 
shelf beyond 200 M.158  Lebanon, for example, argued that retaining the continental shelf 
concept would be unfair and undemocratic, and that the concept of the continental shelf should 
be replaced with the EEZ.159 Lebanon’s view was that the ambiguity surrounding the definition 
of the continental shelf in the Continental Shelf Convention should not continue to bound the 
international community, and said that “[i]f a mistake had been made in 1958, there was no 
need to perpetuate it”.160 
The second aspect of the debate was whether the continental shelf concept should not 
only be retained, but extended to allow coastal States to have jurisdiction over their whole 
continental margin – which comprises not only the physical continental shelf, but also the 
continental slope and continental rise – beyond 200 M. According to Brownlie, this trend 
towards States claiming large areas of seabed beyond the geological shelf can be traced back 
to the Truman Proclamation (as demonstrated in Part 2.3 above).161 Indeed, the Proclamation 
justified the extension of jurisdiction over the natural resources of the continental shelf by 
claiming that the shelf constituted “an extension of the land-mass of the coastal nation”.162  
The principle of natural prolongation (as described by the ICJ in the 1969 North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases) was also viewed as confirming the trend towards expansive 
continental shelf claims. 163  The doctrine of natural prolongation appeared to provide the 
justification for coastal States to extend their jurisdiction beyond the physical continental shelf 
to “the foot of the continental slope or the toe of the continental rise”164 (the doctrine of natural 
prolongation will be discussed further in Chapter 5). As Gardiner has argued, the continental 
margin is a natural prolongation of a continental landmass, one which serves as the boundary 
between the continental crust and the oceanic crust. 165  Thus, for Gardiner, the whole 
continental margin is a natural prolongation of the continent.  
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It is doubtful, however, whether the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Cases intended 
the whole continental margin to come under coastal State jurisdiction. In considering the case, 
the ICJ pointed out that Articles 1 – 3 of the Continental Shelf Convention were “regarded as 
reflecting, or as crystallizing, received or at least emergent rules of customary international law 
relative to the continental shelf”.166 Oxman has argued that the exploitability criterion under 
Article 1 of the Continental Shelf Convention was not even meant to cover the continental 
slope, let alone the continental rise.167 Oude Elferink also considered it unlikely that before the 
negotiations of UNCLOS III, the legal continental shelf extended to the outer edge of the 
continental margin.168 Indeed, Oude Elferink has highlighted that the North Sea Continental 
Shelf Cases only dealt with delimitation of the continental shelf in a shallow sea.169 Thus, the 
Court was not required to define the outer limit of the continental shelf, as the whole area in 
dispute was part of the geomorphological continental shelf of the disputing Parties.  
However, the idea of treating the whole continental margin as part of the natural 
prolongation of the landmass found favour with the so called ‘broad-shelf States’ at the 
preparatory meetings for UNCLOS III.170 These States were of the view that under the concept 
of natural prolongation, their jurisdiction extended to the outer limit of their continental margin, 
well beyond the geomorphological continental shelf. 171  For example, a year before the 
negotiations of UNCLOS III, a group of Caribbean countries held a specialised conference to 
discuss issues relating to the sea, and adopted the Declaration of Santo Domingo.172  The 
declaration urged the Latin American delegations in the Seabed Committee to “promote a study 
concerning the advisability and timing for the establishment of precise outer limits of the 
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continental shelf taking into account the outer limits of the continental rise” [emphasis 
added].173 
 At the start of the Second Session of UNCLOS III in 1974, Mexico addressed the 
Plenary Meeting and stressed that coastal States should exercise sovereign rights over the shelf 
up to 200 M from the coast, or as far as the outer limit of the continental margin.174 Mexico 
explained that after the Continental Shelf Convention came into force, it had amended its 
Constitution to include the shelf, which extended beyond 200 M, as an integral part of its 
territory.175 Since Mexico had been exercising rights over its shelf beyond 200 M from its coast, 
it could not accept that this right could be adversely affected by the Conference. 176  By 
introducing the continental margin as the outer limit, Mexico reintroduced the 
geomorphological criterion in the debate over the definition of ‘continental shelf’. 
 Mexico’s statement marked the beginning of an intense debate among members of the 
Second Committee during the Second Session of the Conference. Japan argued strongly against 
using the geomorphology criterion, stating that such criteria “would perpetuate the inequity of 
nature” by giving some States a seabed area only a few miles from their coast, while giving 
other States seabed areas for hundreds of miles.177 Kenya also found the proposal to broaden 
the continental shelf to encompass the whole continental margin to be unacceptable.178 Kenya 
argued that neither the Truman Proclamation nor the many claims following it had mentioned 
the continental slope or the rise, and that the concept of margin had not been seriously 
considered in UNCLOS I.179 
 Mexico responded by explaining that in interpreting the Continental Shelf Convention, 
the geological unity of the continent and the submerged area has to be taken into account.180 
Mexico argued that this geological unity applies not only to the physical continental shelf, but 
on the strength of geomorphological evidence and the structure of the subsoil, also to the 
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continental slope and rise.181  Mexico propounded that by adopting the outer limit of the 
continental rise as the limit of the continental shelf, this geological unity would be preserved, 
and the ambiguity of the Continental Shelf Convention resolved.182 
 Norway also supported Mexico’s position to extend the limit of the continental shelf to 
include the continental slope and rise. Norway argued that this would take into account those 
States whose continental shelves extended beyond 200 M – an area over which such States 
already possessed sovereign rights based on the exploitability criterion.183 Australia supported 
the position of Mexico and Norway, stressing that the unity of the continental shelf should be 
preserved.184 Australia further stated that any diminution of the rights of the coastal State over 
the continental shelf would be inequitable for those States already exercising such rights.185  
 Ghana was not convinced that coastal States should be able to extend their jurisdiction 
over the continental shelf to the outer edge of the continental margin on the basis of acquired 
rights under the Continental Shelf Convention. Even so, Ghana conceded that there was no 
means to compel those States from relinquishing their holds over those areas beyond the 
proposed 200 M limit.186 Jamaica also doubted whether coastal States could rely on the ICJ’s 
decision in the North Continental Shelf Cases to justify their jurisdiction extending beyond the 
shelf to the outer limits of the continental margin.187 Indonesia, however, submitted that many 
coastal States had not only defined the shelf beyond the 200-metre depth limit in good faith, 
but had also concluded agreements with their neighbours on the delimitation of the continental 
shelf.188 Indonesia thus suggested that the limit of the continental shelf be fixed at some point 
between the 200-metre depth point and the outer edge of the continental margin.189 
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 The debate over whether coastal States should be permitted to extend their continental 
shelf beyond 200 M into the edge of the continental margin continued in the ensuing sessions 
of UNCLOS III. When the Informal Single Negotiating Text (ISNT) was distributed at the end 
of the Third Session in 1975, the desire of coastal States to broaden the definition of the 
continental shelf to include the continental margin was reflected in the text. Article 62 of the 
ISNT defined the continental shelf as follows:190 
 
The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the sea-bed and 
subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea 
throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge 
of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from 
the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured 
where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to 
that distance. 
 
However, extending the definition of the continental shelf in this manner still received 
strong opposition from landlocked and geographically disadvantaged States, as well as from 
African and Arab groups, which formed a blocking minority. At the Fourth Session in 1976, 
Austria proposed to define the continental shelf as follows:191 
 
The sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but 
outside the territorial sea, to a depth of 500 metres or to a distance of 
200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the 
territorial sea is measured, whichever is the further from the coast. 
 
The Austrian proposal represented a compromise deal that was supported by the 
landlocked group of States. Under this proposal, broad-shelf States would be entitled to claim 
a continental shelf beyond 200 M, but a depth criterion would also apply, serving as a ‘cut-off’ 
to national jurisdictional claims over the continental shelf. 
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The broad-shelf States supported the proposal put forward by Ireland, which defined the 
limit of the continental shelf as including the continental slope and rise.192 Despite the Irish 
proposal reducing the entitlement of such States under the Continental Shelf Convention, broad-
shelf States nonetheless supported the proposal during the Fourth Session of the Conference.193 
Due to the strong support to include the continental margin in the definition of the 
continental shelf, the definition remained unchanged in the Revised Single Negotiation Text 
(RSNT) when the Fifth Session was convened in 1976.194 The definition in the RSNT, however, 
did not include the methods proposed by Ireland in determining the outer limit of the continental 
margin. This was because the Chairman of the Second Committee felt that further investigation 
was required before including such technical requirements.195 At the end of the Fifth Session, 
the Chairman of the Second Committee concluded that the right to invoke a continental shelf 
beyond 200 M was one of the main components of the ‘package deal’.196 The Chairman also 
noted that a “compromise solution might lie in a system of revenue-sharing”.197 
When the Informal Composite Negotiation Text (ICNT) was distributed at the Sixth 
Session in 1977, the President of the Conference also noted that the definition of the continental 
shelf (which had been reproduced verbatim from the RSNT and included the continental 
margin) was one of the essential elements of the package deal.198 However, there was still 
strong opposition to any extension of the continental shelf beyond 200 M. This was reflected 
during the Seventh Session in 1978, when the Arab Group submitted an informal proposal 
limiting the natural prolongation to a distance of 200 M.199 
 At the Eighth Session in 1979, Russia proposed cut-off criteria to the continental shelf 
beyond 200 M.200 Under this proposal, the continental shelf could not extend beyond a distance 
of 100 M from the outer limit of the EEZ (this was later changed to 350 M from the baseline as 
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part of a compromise – see the discussion in Chapter 4); or beyond 60 M from the line 
connecting the depth of 2,500 metres.201 At the Ninth Session in 1980, the Arab Group finally 
agreed to extend the continental shelf beyond 200 M, provided the extension was based on a 
distance criterion (as suggested by Russia) and that an arrangement for payments and 
contributions be established.202  This system of payments and contributions is reflected in 
Article 82 of the LOS Convention.  
From the Ninth Session onwards, the definition of the continental shelf remained 
relatively unchanged from the one appearing in the revised ICNT until the LOS Convention 
was adopted in 1982. The first paragraph of Article 76 of the LOS Convention defines the 
continental shelf as follows: 
 
The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed and subsoil 
of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout 
the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the 
continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the 
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured 
where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to 
that distance. 
 
The first part of Article 76(1) retains the geomorphological element of the definition of the 
continental shelf, but also extends this element to include the continental margin. The second 
part provides for a distance criterion, which is somewhat of a legal abstraction from a scientific 
point of view,203 as it is not based on any element of the sea floor. Thus, Article 76(1) of the 
LOS Convention renders the continental shelf a legal construct – one which is distinct from the 
geomorphological definition of the shelf while at the same time incorporating 
geomorphological factors into its frame of reference. 
 
2.9. Conclusion 
The complex history surrounding the development of the continental shelf regime played a 
crucial role in shaping the legal definition that persists today. This Chapter has traced the 
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development of the regime, closely examining how the legal definition differs from the 
geomorphological one. In the early 20th century, when several States first extended their 
jurisdiction to include the continental shelf beyond the territorial sea, the shelf referred to a 
specific physical construct of the seabed. The Truman Proclamation in 1945 was the catalyst 
for States subsuming the continental shelf within their national jurisdiction. The Proclamation 
affirmed the geomorphological and geological character of the continental shelf, while setting 
a depth criterion of 200 metres, with this figure representing the average depth of the edge of 
the shelf, before its descent towards the ocean floor.204 
 However, as the contour of the seabed varies from coast to coast, the depth criterion of 
200 metres does not accurately reflect the physical location of the shelf edge. Noting this 
physical variation, Richard Young proposed a legal definition for the continental shelf, one 
which fixed the outer limit of the continental shelf to a depth of 200 metres.205 However, 
Young’s definition did not reflect the geomorphological character of the continental shelf, as 
it was solely based on water depth. Even so, it is important to note that the depth figure set by 
Young is based on the average depth of the edge of the shelf. The ILC adopted Young’s legal 
definition but added an exploitability criterion 206  This legal definition was adopted by 
UNCLOS I,207 transforming the term ‘continental shelf’ into a legal construct – one which was 
no longer tied to its geomorphological and geological origins. Thus, what started as a reference 
to a physical feature had turned into a distinct legal concept. 
 This legal concept was realigned when the ICJ issued its ruling in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases in 1969.208 In its judgment, the ICJ reintroduced a geomorphological 
and geological element to the legal definition of the continental shelf, stating that such shelves 
constitute a natural prolongation of a coastal State’s land territory.209. 
 Relying on the ICJ’s explicit reference to a geomorphological and geological element, 
broad-shelf States sought to extend their jurisdiction during UNCLOS III not only over the 
physical continental shelf, but beyond it to the continental slope and rise. Couching their 
arguments in terms of geomorphology and geology, these States argued that the continental 
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shelf, slope and rise – which when combined form the continental margin – represented the 
natural prolongation of their land territory.210 Indeed, the view of these broad-shelf States 
prevailed at UNCLOS III, thus extending the legal concept of the continental shelf all the way 
to the edge of the continental margin, which includes not only the geomorphological 
continental shelf, but also the continental slope and rise. UNCLOS III, however, also added a 
distance criterion into the definition of continental shelf,211 making the current ‘continental 
shelf’ a legal construct that is based on both distance and geomorphological elements.
 Since the legal concept of the ‘continental shelf’ does not sit comfortably with the 
scientific definition, questions were raised over whether another term should be used to better 
reflect the physical reality of the regime.212 However, even the term ‘continental margin’, had 
it been adopted, fails to accurately describe the physical reality of Article 76(1) of the LOS 
Convention. This is because ‘continental margin’ does not reflect the distance criterion 
contained in the Article. But with the advent of UNCLOS III transforming the term ‘continental 
shelf’ into a completely new legal construct, the decision was made to keep the definition as 
is. As Gardiner has shown, the legal entrenchment of the term ‘continental shelf’ since 1958 
has made it somewhat immutable, and considering the various permutations of the term leading 
up to during UNCLOS III, any change in terminology had the potential to hinder rather than 
help the Conference.213  
 Understanding the divergence between the current legal definition of the continental 
shelf and its geomorphological origin is important from the standpoint of answering the 
research question posed by this thesis – that is, whether the continental shelf of one State could 
overlap with the EEZ of another State. The two criteria established in the LOS Convention 
grants coastal States a minimum legal continental shelf of 200 M from their baseline, 
notwithstanding the physical condition of the seabed.214 This entitlement is purely based on 
distance, similar to the EEZ regime. Beyond that, coastal States can extend their jurisdiction 
until the outer limit of the continental margin, provided the natural prolongation of their land 
territories extend beyond 200 M.215 Thus, beyond 200 M, the criterion is no longer solely 
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distance, but geology and geomorphology. These different bases of entitlement to the 
continental shelf will be considered in greater detail in Chapter 6 in order to comprehensively 
answer the research question stated above. 
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3. History and Development of the Exclusive Economic Zone 
 
3.1. Introduction 
The development of the continental shelf regime during the Third United Nations Conference 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) is intricately tied to the birth of the Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ) regime. The distance criterion of 200 nautical miles (M) added to the definition of 
the continental shelf corresponds with that of the EEZ. Coastal States are thus entitled to a 200 
M continental shelf (or one that is broader, if their continental margin extends beyond that 
distance).1 This means that some coastal States possess a continental shelf beyond 200 M, 
while others only have a continental shelf and EEZ extending 200 M from their baselines. 
When these two entitlements overlap between two coastal States, questions arise over which 
regime prevails and how to delimit the two different maritime zones.  
The EEZ is a specific legal regime whereby coastal States enjoy sovereign rights and 
jurisdiction over the natural resources in the body of water and subsoil up to 200 M from the 
shore, and where other States have certain rights and freedoms as provided for in the 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention or the Convention).2 This 
means that within their EEZ, coastal States have exclusive rights to fisheries and other living 
resources of the sea, as well as to the oil and gas resources of the seabed and subsoil. In this 
way, the EEZ regime overlaps with the continental shelf regime. Having analysed the history 
and development of the continental shelf regime in the previous Chapter, it is important to 
examine the history and development of the EEZ regime to elucidate the complex interplay 
between the EEZ and continental shelf regimes. 
This Chapter therefore analyses the events that led to the establishment of the EEZ 
regime. Although the concept of the EEZ was only formally introduced during UNCLOS III, 
the root of the concept can be traced back to the early 20th century. In 1916, Spain’s then 
Director-General of Fisheries urged the Spanish Government to extend Spain’s territorial sea 
to include the waters above the continental shelf.3  Although the claim did not expressly 
                                                 
1 LOS Convention, Art 76(1). 
2 LOS Convention, Arts 56 and 57. 
3 League of Nations Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law, ‘Questionnaire 
No 2: Territorial Waters’ (1926), reprinted in 20(3) American Journal of International Law, Supplement 62, at 
125-126.  
 
56 
 
mention the term ‘fishing zone’, it recognised that most of the edible species of fish were found 
in the waters above the continental shelf.4  
When the Truman Proclamation on the continental shelf was issued by the United States 
in 1945, it received much attention. However, a second Proclamation was issued the same day 
– one which, though overshadowed by the former, was no less important. While the first 
Proclamation declared the right of the United States to explore the natural resources in the 
continental shelf contiguous from its land territory (see the discussion in Part 2.3 of the 
previous Chapter),5 the second stressed the need for conservation zones and the protection of 
the nation’s fishery resources in high seas areas ‘contiguous to its coasts’.6 However, the 
United States did not claim sovereignty over living resources in those waters.7 These unilateral 
Proclamations constituted the first formal recognition of the right of the coastal State to extend 
its jurisdiction over natural resources beyond the territorial sea.  
The second Truman Proclamation asserted the right of the United States to regulate and 
control fishing activities in waters beyond the territorial sea. Like the first Proclamation on the 
continental shelf, this Proclamation was influential in that it prompted a series of unilateral 
declarations by countries claiming ‘entitlement’ or ‘sovereignty’ over bodies of water beyond 
their territorial sea.8  In 1947, for example, Chile9  and Peru10  proclaimed sovereignty and 
jurisdiction over the seas adjacent to their coasts up to a distance of 200 M. This step was taken 
to protect their offshore fishing industries from distant-water fishing fleets.  
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Even though there were inconsistencies in relation to the nature and geographical extent 
of sovereignty claims over offshore fishing activities following the Truman Proclamations, 
these claims were important to the development of the EEZ regime. Indeed, the decision of the 
Latin American countries to claim 200 M jurisdiction over fishing activities in the wake of the 
Truman Declaration was the pre-cursor for the EEZ regime. These declarations also motivated 
subsequent attempts to codify international rules on the law of the sea, as will be discussed in 
the next part. 
 
3.2. UNCLOS I and II 
In 1957, and following an exhaustive process by the International Law Commission (ILC) to 
codify the regimes of the high seas and the territorial seas, the United Nations (UN) General 
Assembly convened an international conference to examine the issues relating to the law of the 
sea.11 The first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I), which was 
tasked “to examine the law of the sea, taking account not only of the legal but also of the 
technical, biological, economic and political aspects of the problem”, produced four 
conventions in 1958.12 However, the Conference did not reach any agreement on a fishing zone 
regime beyond the territorial sea. A Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS II) was held in 1960, focusing on questions relating to the breadth of the territorial 
sea and how far coastal States could extend their fishery rights beyond their territorial seas. 
However, UNCLOS II also failed to reach agreement on both issues. 
This failure led to several coastal States unilaterally declaring exclusive fishing zones 
beyond their territorial sea between 1960 and 1967. Iceland was the first to establish such a 
zone in 1960, extending nine nautical mile beyond its three nautical mile territorial sea.13 This 
was followed by the Faroe Islands in 1962, Ireland and Canada in 1964, New Zealand in 1965, 
as well as Australia and Spain in 1967.14 Even the United States – one of the biggest opponents 
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to the establishment of exclusive fishing zones during UNCLOS II – established a nine nautical 
mile fishing zone adjacent to its three nautical mile territorial sea in 1966.15  
On 18 December 1967, and fuelled by Arvid Pardo’s rally cry to make the seabed and 
the ocean floor the common heritage of mankind, the General Assembly decided to establish 
an Ad Hoc Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond 
the Limits of National Jurisdiction.16 The following year, the General Assembly replaced the 
Ad Hoc Committee with a permanent one, with the mandate to study the legal principles and 
norms to promote cooperation in the exploration of the seabed and the ocean floor beyond 
national jurisdiction.17 Known as the Seabed Committee, the work of this body nonetheless 
played an influential role in the establishment of the EEZ regime. 
 
3.3. The Work of the Seabed Committee 
Based on the work of the Seabed Committee, in 1970 the UN General Assembly convened 
UNCLOS III to establish an international regime for: (i) the resources of the seabed beyond 
the limits of national jurisdiction; (ii) a precise definition for such an area; and (iii) a broad 
range of related issues including the high seas, the continental shelf, the territorial sea and 
contiguous zone, fishing and conservation of high seas resources, as well as the preservation 
of the marine environment and scientific research.18 In a departure from UNCLOS I, the 
Seabed Committee – as opposed to the ILC – was given the task of preparing draft treaty 
articles not only on the seabed regime, but also on a comprehensive list of subjects and issues 
relating to the law of the sea to be dealt with by the conference.19 The UN General Assembly 
                                                 
15 Ibid. 
16 UN General Assembly, Examination of the Question of the Reservation Exclusively for Peaceful Purposes of 
the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, Underlying the High Seas beyond the Limits of 
Present National Jurisdiction, and the Use of Their Resources in the Interests of Mankind, UNGR 2340 (XXII), 
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also expanded the Seabed Committee, adding 44 mostly developing and recently independent 
States to its membership.20  
The Seabed Committee was thus practically functioning as a preparatory committee for 
UNCLOS III. In 1971, the Seabed Committee organised its work into three sub-committees. 
The first Sub-Committee was tasked to prepare draft articles on the international regime “for 
the area and the resources of the seabed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond 
the limit of national jurisdiction taking into account the equitable sharing by all States in the 
benefits to be derived therefrom”. 21  The second Sub-Committee was asked to prepare a 
comprehensive list of subjects and issues relating to the law of the sea, including the regimes 
of the high seas, the continental shelf, the territorial sea and contiguous zone, fishing and 
conservation of high seas living resources, as well as draft treaty articles on these issues.22 The 
third Sub-Committee was tasked to deal with the preservation of the marine environment and 
scientific research.23 
In the first few meetings of the second Sub-Committee, each State was given the 
opportunity to present law of the sea issues to be considered by the Sub-Committee. In the sixth 
meeting of the Sub-Committee, which took place on 30 July 1971, Australia raised the issue of 
fisheries. 24  Australia expected that the list of subjects to be considered in the following 
conference would include preference rights in relation to fishing and conservation of living 
resources of the high seas.25 Indeed, at this time, to keep up with economic demands, Australia 
had enacted a law applicable to domestic fishermen up to a distance of 200 M from its coast.26 
Australia proposed that coastal States should have a wider power of management with respect 
to fisheries resources in their adjacent waters to ensure the rational utilisation of such 
resources.27 In this regard, Australia disagreed with Japan, which argued that the freedom to 
fish on the high seas must be preserved. It should be noted, however, that Australia’s proposal 
                                                 
20 Ibid, at para 5. 
21 Sub-Committee I, Note by the Chairman, UN Doc A/AC.138/SC.I/L.2, 16 March 1971, at para 1.  
22 Sub-Committee II, Note by the Chairman, UN Doc A/AC.138/SC.II/L.2, 18 March 1971,at para 1. 
23 Sub-Committee III, Note by the Chairman, UN Doc A/AC.138/SC.III/L/2, 22 March 1971, at para 1. 
24 Sub-Committee II, Summary Record of the Sixth Meeting, UN Doc A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.6, 30 July 1971, at 9. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid, at 10. Note, however, that Australia was not the only coastal State that had enacted such legislation, see 
Koh, supra note 13. 
27 Ibid, at 11. 
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fell short of recommending that such a zone be an exclusive fishing zone.28 The United States 
was also opposed to a zone of exclusive coastal State jurisdiction beyond 12 M being created. 
On this point, the United States submitted that fisheries would be better managed by competent 
international organisations, with participation from all fishing and interested coastal States.29 
Nigeria, on the other hand, proposed that there was definitely a need to establish an 
exclusive fishing zone, as it was battling to protect its fishing industry from foreign fleets 
operating in its waters.30 Iceland, having extended its fishery limits to cover the waters of its 
continental shelf area, also shared similar view, saying that “…to claim the right to harvest the 
coastal fishery resources of other nations was like claiming access to their mineral and forest 
resources”.31  Iceland called for recognition that coastal fishery resources form part of the 
natural resources of a coastal State up to a reasonable distance from the coast. Guyana also 
argued that coastal States should have the exclusive right to exploit the living resources of their 
adjacent ocean space, and that this right was justified not only by the inter-relationship of the 
land, its people and the adjacent ocean space – but also by the costs of keeping the adjacent 
ocean environment in a condition conducive to the survival and regeneration of fish. 32 
Argentina, having extended its jurisdiction over the sea adjacent to its coasts up to 200 M,33  
called for individual nations to protect the resources adjoining their territories, or risk other 
States appropriating such resources for their exclusive benefit.34  
On the other side of the debate, the Soviet Union rejected the establishment of an 
exclusive or preferential fishing zone beyond territorial waters. It argued that this would be 
detrimental to developing States, depriving them of the opportunity to develop their ocean 
fisheries and confining them to coastal fishing. 35  This view, however, was rejected by 
                                                 
28 Ibid, at 14. 
29 Sub-Committee II, Summary Record of the Thirty-First Meeting, UN Doc A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.31, 29 March 
1972, at 120. 
30 Sub-Committee II, Summary Record of the Seventh Meeting, UN Doc A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.7, 2 August 1971, 
at 30. 
31 Sub-Committee II, Summary Record of the Ninth Meeting, UN Doc A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.9, 6 August 1971, at 
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32 Sub-Committee II, Summary Record of the Thirtieth Meeting, UN Doc A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.30, 29 March 
1972, at 86. 
33 Sub-Committee II, Summary Record of the Tenth Meeting, UN Doc A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.10, 10 August 1971, 
at 81. 
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35 Sub-Committee II, Summary Record of the Twelfth Meeting, UN Doc A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.12, 13 August 
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Indonesia, which stated that the Soviet’s proposal would be tantamount to making fishing on 
the high seas the monopoly of developed States.36 Indonesia propounded that intensive fishing 
on the high seas could seriously affect the coastal water resources of developing States.37 
Indonesia thus interpreted Article 6 of the High Seas Convention as granting coastal States 
special rights with regard to fisheries adjacent to their territorial seas.38  
Tanzania also disagreed with the Soviet’s view, stating it was almost impossible to 
prevent coastal States from exploiting their offshore resources in partnership with foreign 
countries.39 Similarly, Chile argued that allowing the freedom of fishing to all States would not 
benefit countries with food shortages. This was because developing countries lacked the 
capacity to fish intensively, thus allowing developed States with advanced fishing gear and 
techniques to unfairly capitalise on the freedom to fish.40 These statements demonstrate that as 
early as 1971, a majority of coastal States sought to extend their fisheries jurisdiction beyond 
the territorial sea. And although there were a few dissenting States, such as Japan and the Soviet 
Union, the call for a fishing zone beyond the territorial sea was growing in scale and intensity. 
On the eleventh meeting of the second Sub-Committee, Kenya introduced the idea of 
an economic zone beyond the territorial sea. In this zone, coastal States would not only have 
the right to exercise control over fisheries, but also regulate pollution up to 200 M from their 
coasts.41 Similarly, Venezuela suggested the establishment of a ‘patrimonial’ sea zone to a 
maximum breadth of 200 M from the coast. In the patrimonial sea, coastal States would have 
the exclusive right to exploit all resources. Indeed, Venezuela went further than Kenya, 
proposing that in addition to exclusive fishing rights, coastal States be granted the right to 
explore and exploit all the resources of the sea-bed and its subsoil.42 This proposal came the 
closest to the current EEZ regime, which was proposed in the 1971 meeting of the second Sub-
Committee.  
                                                 
36 Ibid, at 112. 
37 Ibid. 
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39 Sub-Committee II, Summary Record of the Twenty-Eighth Meeting, UN Doc A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.28, 24 
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The debate over granting coastal States preference or exclusive rights over resources 
alarmed landlocked and geographically disadvantaged States. Bulgaria argued that the 
geographical advantages possessed by coastal States should not be used to the detriment of 
non-coastal States.43 Bulgaria was of the view that fishing and conservation of the marine 
environment should not be monopolised through the extension of coastal State jurisdiction. 
Nepal also claimed that exercising exclusive control over high seas fishing would be 
incompatible with the existing law, stressing that the freedom of the high seas must not be 
jeopardised. 44  Bolivia, another landlocked State, asserted that extending coastal State 
jurisdiction out to 200 M would effectively reserve 40 percent of the exploitable area of the 
ocean for coastal nations. Thus, even if the concept of areas beyond national jurisdiction 
constituting the common heritage of mankind was enshrined in the convention, it would not 
offer any benefits to landlocked countries. 45  Indeed, the concerns of landlocked and 
geographically disadvantaged States would influence the development of the EEZ regime later 
on.  
Responding to these concerns, Tanzania made a strong argument that the interests of 
landlocked States would be better served through bilateral cooperation with coastal States.46 
Tanzania argued that only the resources near the coast would be placed under national 
jurisdiction, while the resources of the deep oceans – particularly nodules – would be 
unaffected by the extension of economic zones. 47  Tanzania also highlighted that those 
developed States opposed to the concept of an economic zone were also opposed to placing 
resources in that zone under international ownership. For Tanzania, this was because such 
States wanted complete freedom to exploit such resources, and indeed they possessed the 
means and methods to do so.48  
Iran noted the growing tendency to link fishing areas with the continental shelf, since 
many of the world's more productive fisheries were situated in the relatively shallow shelf 
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waters above the continental shelf.49 Iran argued that the right of coastal States to marine 
resources adjacent to their coasts was derived from the fact that the continental shelf is the 
natural prolongation of the land domain into and under the sea.50 
The United Kingdom sought to balance the exclusive rights claims of States wanting to 
exploit waters in the vicinity of their coasts, and the general freedom of all States to fish in the 
high seas.51 The United Kingdom acknowledged that the high seas freedom principle was 
suspect to some countries. Such suspicion derived from the fact that defenders of the principle 
stood to gain the most from high seas fishing, with the result that landlocked and geographically 
disadvantaged States viewed the principle as empty and lacking any moral basis.52  
India agreed that there should be a balance between the two points of view, stressing 
that a simple expansion of the territorial sea to include a fishing zone would not be in keeping 
with the overall interests of international navigation.53 India stated that any enlargement of the 
fishing zone beyond 12 M should be for fishing purposes only, and that the freedom of 
navigation should be left unaffected.54 India considered Iran’s proposal that the continental 
shelf concept be extended to the superjacent waters – thus giving coastal States exclusive 
jurisdiction over living resources above the shelf. However, India advanced the position that 
the depth criterion (as laid down in the Continental Shelf Convention) was not suitable to define 
a zone for living resources above the seabed, instead proposing the adoption of the distance 
criterion as the sole basis of jurisdiction over such resources.55  
Iceland agreed that the depth criterion might not be suitable to define the limit of an 
exclusive fisheries zone, but pointed out that for technical and scientific reasons, the outer 
limits of such zone should coincide with the outer limits of the continental shelf regime.56 This 
proposal raised some concerns among broad-shelf States, which were opposed to their 
continental shelf jurisdiction being limited by a distance criterion (see the discussion in Part 
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2.8 of the previous Chapter). However, the idea of having the same distance criterion for both 
the EEZ and the continental shelf regime gained support and was later adopted into the final 
text of the LOS Convention. 
In the 1972 session, Kenya again provided a clear vision for a compromise solution. 
Kenya updated its original proposal and introduced the concept of EEZ – which it first 
introduced at the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee in 1972.57 The EEZ would lie 
between the 12 M territorial sea and the high seas proper.58 Kenya highlighted that the EEZ 
regime differed from that of the territorial waters in that the freedom of navigation and 
overflight, as well as the freedom to lay submarine cables, would be recognised.59 On the other 
hand, a coastal State's EEZ would be distinct from the high seas in that a State would have 
exclusive jurisdiction over all living and non-living resources of the water surface, the water 
column, as well as the sea-bed and ocean floor.60 Although the draft articles presented by 
Kenya conferred on coastal States “exclusive jurisdiction for the purpose of control, regulation 
and exploitation of both living and non-living resources of the Zone and their preservation”,61 
there were no express provisions in the proposal obliging coastal States to preserve the 
resources in the zone.  
Kenya’s proposal was objected to by those States that stood to lose their traditional 
fishing grounds if large ocean areas adjacent to their coasts were to come under the exclusive 
jurisdiction of other coastal States. Japan and the Soviet Union tried to ‘soften’ the EEZ regime, 
proposing that preferential rights (as opposed to exclusive rights) be accorded to coastal States 
in relation to fisheries.62 This concept would have allowed the preferential rights of coastal 
States to overlap with the historic/traditional fishing rights of other States. Similarly, Australia 
and New Zealand proposed recognition of the historic rights of developed distant-water fishing 
States, but clarified that such rights should also eventually be phased out.63 Malta and Zaire 
also proposed that the right of coastal States to exploit living resources in their waters up to 
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200 M should take into account the historic/traditional fishing rights of other States.64 The 
notion that traditional fishing practices would be affected by the establishment of an exclusive 
fishing zone was one of the issues that UNCLOS III had to resolve in order to reach an 
agreement.  
In the next meeting, Australia and New Zealand presented their joint working paper, 
laying down some principles for the fisheries regime.65 The working paper not only suggested 
that coastal States be granted exclusive jurisdiction over marine living resources in a zone 
adjacent to their territorial seas, but expressly provided that coastal States take responsibility 
for the proper management and utilisation of the living resources within this zone, including 
“maintenance of the level of stocks which will provide the maximum sustainably yield”.66 The 
working paper also elaborated the various powers which coastal States would have within the 
zone, such as to determine the allowable catch of any particular species;67 to allow the entry of 
foreign fishing vessels where they were unable to take one hundred percent of the allowable 
catch of a species;68 and to board, arrest and detain fishing vessels.69 
In the following session in 1973, the notion that coastal States should have an EEZ 
beyond the territorial sea continued to gain popularity. An increasing number of States not only 
supported of the idea of having exclusive rights over fisheries resources beyond the territorial 
sea, but also exclusive rights over the non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil. For 
example, Pakistan argued that within the EEZ, coastal States should have exclusive jurisdiction 
for the purpose of control, regulation and exploitation of both living and non-living resources 
of the zone, either on the water surface or within the water column, or on the soil or subsoil of 
the seabed and ocean floor.70 China also stated that coastal States should have ownership of the 
economic resources in the EEZ, including living resources and seabed natural resources.71  
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In July 1973, China submitted a working paper proposing that all the natural resources 
within the economic zone, including living and non-living resources of the whole water 
column, seabed and subsoil, fall under coastal State jurisdiction.72 Around the same time, 
Australia and Norway submitted a working paper containing certain basic principles on the 
economic zone, including that renewable and non-renewable resources of the waters, the 
seabed and the subsoil, come within the ambit of the zone.73 On 16 July 1973, several African 
countries submitted Draft Articles on the EEZ. Article VI stated that coastal States shall have 
exclusive sovereignty over all economic resources in the zone, both living and non-living, 
either on the water surface or within the water column, or on the soil or sub-soil of the seabed 
up until 200 M from the coast.74 Colombia commented that the African proposal, which sought 
to establish a balance between the interests of coastal States and the interest of the international 
community in area to be declared the common heritage of mankind, might be compatible with 
the traditional concept of the continental shelf, provided the exploitability criteria was omitted 
from the latter.75 
The inclusion of seabed and subsoil resources under the EEZ proposal meant there 
would be an overlap between that regime and the continental shelf regime. Chile, however, 
viewed that the creation of an EEZ was compatible with the concept of the continental shelf, 
stating that the two regimes were complementary. Chile argued that by including the seabed 
and subsoil up to 200 M into the EEZ regime, the concept of the continental shelf would not 
be made redundant. Moreover, Chile affirmed that a regime based on the existing law of the 
continental shelf could apply beyond the 200 M limit.76 
When the second Sub-Committee presented its report, two items were submitted as 
requiring resolution at UNCLOS III. They were: (i) the EEZ beyond the territorial sea; and (ii) 
coastal State preferential rights or other non-exclusive jurisdiction over resources beyond the 
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territorial sea. By the end of the preparatory sessions in 1973, and before UNCLOS III had 
even commenced, there was growing momentum for the forthcoming Conference to expand 
the national sovereignty of States to a distance of 200 M.77 As the discussion above has shown, 
many of the elements of the EEZ (as it is currently known) had actually been introduced in the 
preparatory meetings of the Seabed Committee. These included the exclusive nature of coastal 
States’ rights in the zone, the scope of the zone as comprising the water column as well as the 
seabed and subsoil, the limit of the zone (which extends to a distance of 200 M from the coast), 
as well as the interplay of the regime with the continental shelf regime. All of these elements 
were debated during UNCLOS III, as will be discussed below. 
 
3.4. UNCLOS III 
UNCLOS III began in 1973 and lasted for nine years. Although the Conference set out to 
comprehensively address a variety of issues, it specifically sought to resolve the two major 
issues outstanding from the first two conferences: the breadth of the territorial sea and the limits 
of the fishing zone. The list of issues and subjects prepared by the Seabed Committee – which 
included the proposal related to the EEZ beyond the territorial sea – was ratified by the 
Conference in its second session in 1974.78  The discussions on the territorial sea, the EEZ and 
the continental shelf were assigned to the Second Committee of the Conference.79 In its first 
meeting in 1974, the Chairman of the Second Committee stressed that the Second Committee 
should “consider each of the items, to identify the principal trends and reduce them to generally 
acceptable formulae”.80  
 
3.4.1. The Breadth of the EEZ 
At the conclusion of the preparatory meetings for UNCLOS III, there seemed to be a movement 
towards extending the national jurisdiction of States to 200 M from their coasts. Indeed, by the 
time the Second Session of UNCLOS III was in progress, Chile claimed that the concept of a 
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200 M economic zone was no longer an abstract concept, as its proposal had been supported in 
the general debate by more than a hundred States.81 Only two groups of States were opposed 
to establishing the new regime: distant-water fishing States – such as Japan and the Soviet 
Union – which were concerned that their traditional fishing grounds would be greatly reduced 
if the EEZ was adopted; and landlocked and geographically disadvantageous States – which 
were worried that the 200 M zone would render obsolete the idea of areas beyond national 
jurisdiction as the common heritage of mankind.  
The issue regarding traditional fishing grounds was raised during the preparatory 
meetings for UNCLOS III. At the Second Session, distant-water fishing States tried to stem 
support for a 200 M exclusive fisheries zone. The United Kingdom, for example, challenged 
Iceland’s move in claiming a 50 M exclusive fishing zone off its coast.82 In delivering its 
judgment in the dispute, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) acknowledged Iceland’s right 
to establish a 50 M fishing zone, but at the same time recognised that the United Kingdom had 
historic rights and economic dependency on certain fish stocks located in such a fishing zone.83 
Hence, in obliging Iceland to recognise the traditional rights of other States (such the United 
Kingdom), the Court implied that Iceland did not have the right to claim an exclusive fishing 
zone.  
The ICJ’s decision in the Icelandic Fisheries Jurisdiction Case was widely criticised 
on the basis that the Court had ruled on an issue that was under discussion at UNCLOS III.84 
Indeed, the ICJ’s decision did not find favour with the majority of negotiating States at 
UNCLOS III. During the Second Session – and in contradiction to the ICJ’s ruling – there was 
widespread support for coastal States possessing sovereign or exclusive rights for the purpose 
of exploring and exploiting living resources within the 200 M economic zone.85 By this point 
in time, some of the distant-water fishing States seemed willing to accept the idea of a 200 M 
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zone in which fish stocks would be managed, conserved and harvested by the coastal State. For 
example, Poland – despite its distant-water fishing interests – was prepared to concede that 
developing coastal States and States with economies dependent on coastal fisheries, should 
have the right to establish an economic zone where special rights with respect to living marine 
resources could be exercised.86 This progress was coupled with the concession offered by the 
coastal States – namely, to allow fishermen from other countries to enter the 200 M zone – on 
reasonable terms and conditions – to take the balance of the allowable catch not harvested by 
the local industry.87  
Similarly, the Soviet Union – one of the main opponents to the idea of 200 M EEZ from 
the baselines – signalled its softening position during the 28th meeting of the Second Session 
in 1974.  Acknowledging the desire of many coastal developing countries to raise their living 
standards and strengthen their national economies, the Soviet Union expressed its support for 
the establishment of such a zone. However, the Soviet’s readiness to recognise an economic 
zone of up to 200 M, as well as the right of coastal States to control the living and mineral 
resources of the zone, was conditional on the simultaneous adoption of mutually acceptable 
decisions on other issues relating to the law of the sea. One such issue was that in circumstances 
where a coastal State could not itself take 100 percent of the allowable catch of a species within 
the zone, the coastal State would have to authorise the entry of foreign fishermen to take the 
remainder of the stock.88 In return for granting such authorisation, the coastal State would 
receive reasonable payment or some other form of remuneration.89 
 Landlocked and geographically disadvantaged States had also moved towards 
accepting the 200 M limit of the economic zone. Landlocked Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) 
stated that it fully understood the motives of those States advocating for the EEZ, labelling the 
establishment of such a zone an economic necessity.90 In return for its support, however, Upper 
Volta asked that access to the sea for landlocked countries be established as a sacrosanct right, 
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and that landlocked countries be entitled to participate in the exploitation of the resources in 
the economic zone.91 Upper Volta also stressed that the economic zone should not extend for 
more than 200 M, which was a major concession on the part of those countries that wanted to 
retain the high seas as an international area.92  
Another landlocked country, Paraguay, also maintained that the economic zone should 
not extend beyond 200 M, and that for uniformity, this outer limit should also apply to the 
continental shelf.93 Zaire also would not support the concept of EEZ unless the rights of 
landlocked and geographically disadvantaged States to exploit EEZ resources was 
guaranteed.94 These conditions were indeed accepted by supportive coastal States, with such 
States acknowledging that landlocked and geographically disadvantaged States “should be 
entitled to participate in the exploitation of the living resources of neighbouring economic 
zones on an equal footing”.95 
At the 22nd meeting of the Second Committee, Yugoslavia asserted that the Conference 
had then reached the stage where legal norms should be formulated to delineate the economic 
zone 200 M from the coast, and for the EEZ to encompass the sea-bed and its subsoil, as well 
as the superjacent water column.96 Yugoslavia also added that within this zone, coastal States 
should be obligated to take all necessary measures to protect the marine environment from 
pollution, regardless of its source.97 On 24 July 1974, nine countries – Canada, Chile, Iceland, 
India, Indonesia, Mauritius, Mexico, New Zealand and Norway – produced a working paper 
containing draft articles on the territorial sea, the economic zone and the continental shelf. The 
articles – known as the ‘nine-Power working paper’ 98  – defined the economic zone as 
follows:99 
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ECONOMIC ZONE 
 
Article 12 
The coastal State exercises in and throughout an area beyond and 
adjacent to its territorial sea, known as the Exclusive Economic 
Zone: (a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and 
exploiting the natural resources, whether renewable or non-
renewable, of the sea-bed and subsoil and the superjacent waters; (b) 
the other rights and duties specified in these articles with regard to 
the protection and preservation of the marine environment and the 
conduct of scientific research. The exercise of these rights shall be 
without prejudice to article 19 of this convention. 
 
Article 13 
The outer limit of the economic zone shall not exceed 200 nautical 
miles from the applicable baselines for measuring the territorial sea. 
 
The working paper received wide support, despite some of the more intricate details 
needing to be finalised. Argentina and the Ivory Coast, for example, stated that the working 
paper could be used as a basic document for the work of the second committee.100 At this point, 
however, there were still some States that were hesitant to accept the concept of the EEZ. Even 
so, resistance to the EEZ was gradually decreasing. In response to the claim by some States 
that establishing a 200 M EEZ limit would drain the resources comprising the common 
heritage, Tanzania responded that the zone was intended to replace the legal continental shelf 
and the concept of fishery zones.101 Furthermore, Tanzania pointed out that none of the critics 
to the economic zone concept could accuse the continental shelf of draining the common 
heritage with regard to resources, and that the economic zone would leave at least some of the 
continental shelf in the international area.102  
The United Kingdom, despite its initial reluctance to embrace the EEZ, stated in the 
25th meeting that it would accept the concept, provided the exclusive rights conferred by the 
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zone extended only to resources, with the waters of the economic zone continuing to be high 
seas where the freedoms of navigation and overflight were maintained.103 Even the United 
States, which was reluctant to support the concept of EEZ during the preparatory meetings, had 
softened its position at the Second Session of UNCLOS III. In response to the nine-Power 
working paper, the United States indicated that it was willing to support a 200 M economic 
zone, but that specific negotiation on various aspects of the economic zone proposal – such as 
high seas freedoms as well as environmental rights and duties within the zone – still needed to 
be resolved.104 On 8 August 1974, the United States submitted draft articles on the economic 
zone and the continental shelf, acknowledging the exclusive rights of coastal States for the 
purpose of exploring and exploiting the natural resources of the sea-bed and subsoil and the 
superjacent waters up to 200 M from the baselines from which the territorial sea is measured.105 
 Towards the end of the Second Session, the officers of the Second Committee 
summarised the main trends of the various subjects that were proposed not just during the 
Second Session, but also from the Seabed Committee meetings (including the EEZ).106 The 
debate about the breadth of the EEZ was summarised in Provision 99 of the Main Trends 
Paper:107 
 
Provision 99 
Formula A 
The outer limit of the patrimonial sea shall not exceed 200 [M] from the 
applicable baselines for measuring the territorial sea. 
 
Formula B 
The limits of the economic zone shall be fixed in [M] in accordance 
with criteria in each region, which take into consideration the resources 
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of the region and the rights and interests of developing landlocked, near 
landlocked, shelf-locked States and States with narrow shelves and 
without prejudice to limits adopted by any State within the region. The 
economic zone shall not in any case exceed 200 [M], measured from 
the baselines for determining the territorial sea. 
 
At this point of UNCLOS III, it was becoming clear that a 200 M EEZ limit would be adopted 
in the final convention. Even opponents to the EEZ concept were reluctantly accepting that the 
EEZ regime represented the will of the majority of negotiating States. 108  Thus, the only 
remaining questions concerned the exact wording of the provisions and how the new regime 
would interact vis-à-vis the other regimes, such as the contiguous zone and the continental 
shelf.  
 
3.4.2. Discussions on the Interplay between the EEZ and the Continental Shelf  
When UNCLOS III began in 1973, there was little doubt that some form of economic zone 
beyond the territorial sea would be adopted.109 While the delegates were debating the details 
of the new concept, a lingering question remained over the fate of the continental shelf regime. 
Based on the discussions during the preparatory meetings, most of the area that would become 
the new economic zone would overlap with the existing continental shelf regime. Some States 
considered that the two items should be dealt with separately for the time being. This was 
because the economic zone concept was still being formulated, and its full development would 
require time and experience. Meanwhile, the continental shelf was an established institution.110 
However, at UNCLOS III, it was acknowledged that the concepts were interdependent, and 
thus needed to be dealt with together.  
In the Second Session of UNCLOS III, Austria argued that if the Conference reached 
agreement on the establishment of an economic zone, there was no need to retain the concept 
of the continental shelf, and that the legal content of the latter term should be absorbed by the 
former. This, Austria argued, would clarify the legal framework on matters relating to the 
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seabed.111 Paraguay also agreed that a 200 M economic zone would make the rules governing 
the continental shelf redundant, since the shelf area would be covered by the new zone.112 
Likewise, Zaire acknowledged that a 200 M economic zone, if established, would not differ in 
substance from the concept of the continental shelf, as the rights of a coastal State over the 
exploration and exploitation of the resources within the relevant economic zone would cover 
the mineral resources of the continental shelf.113 
Lebanon pointed out that the exploitability and depth criteria for the limit of the 
continental shelf conflicted with the notion of the international seabed representing the 
common heritage of mankind.114 Lebanon was of the view that to retain the shelf concept would 
be unfair and undemocratic, and that the concept of the continental shelf should be replaced by 
that of the economic zone.115 Switzerland also propounded that the two concepts could not be 
combined, and that the establishment of an EEZ should inevitably result in the disappearance 
of the continental shelf regime.116 Similarly, Gambia viewed that the economic zone should 
replace the continental shelf, as it would be unfair to reserve large portions of the seabed 
beyond the 200 M limit for the exclusive use of a few States at the expense of the common 
heritage of mankind.117 
 However, Nicaragua disagreed, arguing that it was “inconceivable that the economic 
zone or patrimonial sea could be interpreted as including areas of the sea-bed which formed 
part of a country's continental shelf”.118 According to Nicaragua, dismantling the continental 
shelf regime would make the problem more complicated; instead, Nicaragua suggested that the 
economic zone be limited to certain resources and to the water column only.119 Similarly, South 
Korea expressed support for the ipso facto and ab initio rights of coastal States over the 
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submerged natural prolongation of their land territory known as the continental shelf, adding 
that any infringement of the sovereign rights legitimately exercised by a State over the 
resources adjacent to its continental shelf would be unacceptable.120 
Finland reminded the Conference that the concept of the continental shelf embodied in 
the Continental Shelf Convention was widely accepted and applied by States, including States 
not party to the Convention.121 Finland then stressed that the function of UNCLOS III was not 
to abolish the continental shelf concept, but rather seek agreement on a definition for the outer 
limit of the continental shelf.122 To that end, Finland submitted that even though part of the 
continental shelf situated within the proposed 200 M economic zone would be absorbed into 
that zone (and thus no longer exist as a special regime), some States might not wish to establish 
economic zones over the whole area of their continental shelf. Instead, Finland proffered that 
some States may wish to establish zones of a limited economic nature, such as fishery zones.123 
According to Finland, it was imperative to avoid a situation where current agreements needed 
to be renegotiated simply because the continental shelf concept had ceased to exist within an 
area now covered by the economic zone.124 
Australia was of the view that, assuming an economic zone was established, it was 
essential to retain the concept of the continental shelf.125 Australia argued that it was necessary 
to respect the existing sovereign rights of coastal States over the resources of the natural 
prolongation of their land territories.126 Australia also pointed out that the submerged land mass 
of certain States extended beyond 200 M, and that there was no reason why a coastal State 
should be deprived of an area over which it had existing rights, particularly while areas under 
the jurisdiction of other States were being maintained or even extended.127 Any diminution of 
the rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf, Australia continued, would be 
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inequitable to a significant number of States that possessed those rights and were already 
exercising them.128  
Lebanon responded by saying that even though the rights over the continental shelf 
were acquired rights, such rights had impeded the progressive development of international 
law, pointing out that “[i]f a mistake had been made in 1958, there was no need to perpetuate 
it”.129 Uganda also viewed the concept of a 200 M economic zone as being more practical (and 
thus worthy of replacing the continental shelf regime), adding that in the cases where the 
continental shelves of States extend beyond 200 M, a system of equitable compensation should 
be devised.130 Nepal questioned the claim that the continental shelf regime had formed part of 
customary international law, noting that most of the States at UNCLOS III were not party to 
the Continental Shelf Convention.131 Nepal then suggested that the concept of the continental 
shelf be abandoned altogether in favour of the economic zone.132  
Tunisia also viewed that countries claiming a continental shelf over 200 M should 
modify their position – namely, by adopting a conciliatory attitude to the proposed economic 
zone concept and leaving the area beyond that limit to the yet-to-be-established International 
Seabed Authority (ISA).133 The Federal Republic of Germany – concerned about the possibility 
of new claims being created on the grounds of the natural prolongation theory – also preferred 
that a 200 M limit be set for both the EEZ and the continental shelf (resulting in the continental 
shelf regime being absorbed into the EEZ).134  
At this point of UNCLOS III, however, most States were reluctant to abandon the 
concept of the continental shelf. For example, Venezuela pointed out that retaining the 
continental shelf concept was a fundamental element of the mandate sought at UNCLOS III.135 
Venezuela argued that as a natural prolongation of the continental and island territory of the 
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coastal State, the continental shelf was a geographical and geological reality that should be 
reflected in the new convention. 136  Pakistan was also sympathetic to this view, despite 
favouring a single regime of the economic zone which covered the seabed and the subsoil, as 
well as the superjacent waters not exceeding 200 M from the coast.137 Pakistan nonetheless felt 
that coastal States with continental shelves extending beyond 200 M were justified in insisting 
that the rights they already enjoyed be safeguarded.138  
Turkey also stated that the mere fact of the continental shelf encompassing the 
economic zone in certain cases did not diminish the importance of the former.139 In a good 
number of cases, Turkey added, the jurisdiction of the coastal State over the continental shelf 
and the economic zone would be complementary.140 Thailand also believed that recognising 
the economic zone entailed no legal or logical requirement to exclude the concept of the 
continental shelf.141 On the contrary, Thailand was of the view that the two regimes could 
coexist in a new convention on the law of the sea.142  
Norway also viewed that the retention of the continental shelf concept must form part 
of the package solution devised by the Conference.143 It proposed both a distance criterion of 
200 M and provisions for those States with continental shelves extending beyond 200 M (and 
over which they already possessed sovereign rights by virtue of the exploitability criterion).144  
Norway stated that general agreement at UNCLOS III would best be ensured by marrying the 
old concept of the continental shelf to the new concept of the economic zone, thus serving to 
reassure all concerned that the new convention would not amount to an abolition of the existing 
rights of coastal States.145 
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In the 22nd plenary meeting of UNCLOS III, the Soviet Union indicated that it was 
prepared to recognise the right of coastal States to establish an economic zone of up to 200 M, 
as well as the rights of coastal States with continental shelves extending beyond 200 M.146 The 
Soviet Union, however, felt that establishing the outer limit of the shelf along the outer limit 
of the continental margin would leave almost nothing for the common heritage.147 Thus, it 
proposed the 500 metre isobath line as the outer limit for continental shelf beyond 200 M.148 
Zaire was also prepared for a compromise provision. According to Zaire, the continental shelf 
should end at the 200 M distance which coincides with the limit of the economic zone. 
However, Zaire was prepared to take into account certain established cases where coastal States 
had claimed or exercised jurisdiction over the resources of the seabed beyond the 200 M 
limit.149  
This compromise view continued to garner support during UNCLOS III, as it was seen 
as striking a balance between the demands of broad-shelf States and those States which 
supported the EEZ. In an effort to keep both regimes, the Republic of Korea (South Korea) 
stated that the concept of the continental shelf was not at all incompatible with the concept of 
a 200 M economic zone.150 South Korea indicated that it was supportive of using the distance 
criterion of 200 M as the outer limit of national jurisdiction in the first place, as well as the 
outer edge of the continental margin when the natural prolongation of the land mass extended 
over that limit.151 Thus, it was decided that the EEZ regime would not replace the continental 
shelf regime, and that both regimes – to an extent – would coexist in the same space.152 Once 
the Conference had agreed on the breadth of the EEZ, as well as the need to maintain the 
continental shelf regime, the next order of business was the precise wording of the EEZ 
provisions. This will be discussed in the following section. 
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3.4.3. The Drafting of EEZ Provisions  
After establishing of the concept of EEZ, its breadth and relationship with the continental shelf 
regime, the negotiating States moved swiftly to draft the other principles governing the new 
maritime zone. Australia, in the 26th meeting of the Second Session, laid down its approach for 
the management of fisheries in the economic zone:153 
 
… that a coastal State should have the right and duty to conserve and 
manage stocks of fish in the 200-mile zone. The coastal State should 
have the exclusive right to determine the allowable catch and the 
proportion of that catch, up to 100 per cent, which its own fishermen 
had the capacity to harvest. If a State's own fishermen were not in a 
position to take the full optimum yield, then the coastal State should 
have a duty to grant fishermen from other countries permission, under 
equitable conditions, to take the balance of the allowable catch. The 
extent to which preferences might be given to fishermen of countries 
which had traditionally fished in those waters or to neighbouring States 
would need careful definition. 
 
The United States also proposed the following draft articles on the economic zone and 
continental shelf:154 
 
PART III. THE CONTINENTAL SHELF 
Article 22 
GENERAL 
1. The coastal State exercises sovereign rights over the continental 
shelf for the purpose of exploring and exploiting its natural 
resources. 
2. The continental shelf is the sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine 
areas adjacent to and beyond the territorial sea to the limit of the 
economic zone or, beyond that limit, throughout the submerged 
natural prolongation of the land territory of the coastal State to the 
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outer limit of its continental margin, as precisely defined and 
delimited in accordance with article 23. 
3. The provisions of this article are without prejudice to the question 
of delimitation between adjacent and opposite States. 
 
Both proposals were noteworthy because they were submitted by States originally opposed to 
the establishment of the EEZ. Indeed, both nations ended up tabling provisions that influenced 
the wording of the final articles regarding the EEZ in the LOS Convention. Numerous 
proposals – analogous to the two above – were submitted during the Second Session of the 
UNCLOS III.  
 At the 55th meeting of the General Committee during the Third Session of UNCLOS 
III in 1975, the Chairman of each Committee was asked to prepare a single negotiating text 
covering the issues assigned to their respective committee. 155  By this time, most of the 
negotiations in the Second Committee took place in informal meetings.156 Based on these 
meetings, the Rapporteur of the Second Committee, Ambassador Satya Nandan of Fiji, had 
already started drafting a single negotiating text. The EEZ provisions contained in what is 
known as the Informal Single Negotiating Text (ISNT) were the origin for the provisions 
ultimately adopted in the LOS Convention. The author had the opportunity to partake in a series 
of discussions with Ambassador Nandan in Singapore in 2015, and he recounted the process 
of drafting the text, which will be the focus of the next section.  
 
Informal Single Negotiating Text157 
In the informal group meetings at the Third Session of UNCLOS III, Ambassador Nandan 
talked to all the delegates on various issues, including the EEZ, carefully considering all 
viewpoints. Ambassador Nandan credited his willingness to listen for the good-will he received 
from the delegates, which in turn allowed him to revert back to them to propose various 
compromise provisions. As the Rapporteur of the Second Committee, Ambassador Nandan 
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summarised these meetings for each Chairman of the informal group. Since Ambassador 
Nandan had already worked on the draft single negotiating text, he incorporated parts of this 
text into the summary reports of these informal meetings, making slight adjustments to 
accommodate the topics under discussion. The particular strategy deployed by Ambassador 
Nandan can be described in this way: attend all the informal group meetings, listen to the 
concerns of the delegations, incorporate the issues raised in the meetings into a set of draft 
provisions, and then present them to the various informal groups.  
Ambassador Nandan continued this strategy while trying to reach a compromise on 
various issues. He noted that in both the informal groups and the general sessions, there was 
much talk of the economic zone and the need to accord equal rights within the zone. 
Ambassador Nandan thus realised there was a trend towards establishing a larger economic 
zone for coastal States – one which was proving unpopular with landlocked States. Since the 
group of landlocked and geographically disadvantaged States was large enough to block any 
vote at the general session, Ambassador Nandan saw the importance of ensuring that the EEZ 
provisions would be acceptable to such States. Thus, in drafting the ISNT, Ambassador Nandan 
sought to use the language of the 1958 Geneva Conventions as much as possible. Due to the 
familiarity of the language, the ISNT received less resistance from landlocked and 
geographically disadvantaged States. Ambassador Nandan presented the ISNT at the end of the 
Third Session, with Part III of the text dealing with the EEZ:158 
 
Part III: The Exclusive Economic Zone 
 
Article 45 
1. In an area beyond and adjacent to its territorial sea, described as the 
Exclusive Economic Zone, the coastal State has: 
(a) Sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, 
conserving and managing the natural resources, whether renewable 
or non-renewable, of the sea-bed and subsoil and the superjacent 
waters; 
(b) Exclusive rights and jurisdiction with regard to the establishment 
and use of artificial islands, installations and structures; 
(c) Exclusive jurisdiction with regard to: 
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(i) Other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration 
of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, 
currents and winds; and 
(ii) Scientific research; 
(d) Jurisdiction with regard to the preservation of the marine 
environment, including pollution control and abatement; 
(e) Other rights and duties provided for in the present Convention. 
2. In exercising its rights and performing its duties under the present 
Convention in the Exclusive Economic Zone, the coastal State shall 
have due regard to the rights and duties of other States. 
3. The rights set out in this article shall be without prejudice to the 
provisions of part IV. 
 
 
Article 46 
The Exclusive Economic Zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical 
miles from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is 
measured. 
 
The EEZ provisions contained in the ISNT were met with little controversy, and they remained 
largely intact when revised in the Fourth Session of the Conference in 1976.159  
 
Informal Composite Negotiating Text  
At the end of the Sixth Session in 1977, the President of UNCLOS III and the Chairman of the 
three main Committees integrated the various parts of the Revised Single Negotiating Text into 
a single document: the Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT).160 Although only a few 
changes had been made to the EEZ provisions in the Revised Single Negotiation Text, one 
important addition was a provision on the legal status of the EEZ. In addition to the breadth of 
the EEZ and its relationship to the continental shelf regime, the legal status of the EEZ was 
another issue that was heavily debated during the drafting of the ICNT.161  These intense 
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debates focused on the relationship between the legal nature of coastal States’ rights and their 
relationship with the rights of other States in the EEZ.162 
In the end, it was agreed that the EEZ would neither represent an extension of coastal 
State jurisdiction from the territorial sea, nor form part of the high seas.163 Instead, the EEZ 
would be a specific legal regime under the LOS Convention, or a ‘sui generis’ regime.164 This 
meant that non-resource high seas freedoms – such as navigation and overflight, as well as the 
right to lay pipeline and submarine cables – would be preserved in the EEZ.165 Thus, the EEZ 
provisions appearing in the ICNT were as follows:166 
 
Part V. Exclusive Economic Zone 
Article 55. Specific legal regime of the Exclusive Economic Zone 
The Exclusive Economic Zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the 
territorial sea, subject to the specific legal regime established in this 
Part, under which the rights and jurisdictions of the coastal State and 
the rights and freedoms of other States are governed by the relevant 
provisions of the present Convention. 
 
Article 56. Rights, Jurisdiction and Duties of the Coastal State in the 
Exclusive Economic Zone 
1. In the Exclusive Economic Zone, the coastal State has: 
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, 
conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-
living, of the sea-bed and subsoil and the superjacent waters, and with 
regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration 
of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents 
and winds; 
(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of the present 
Convention with regard to:  
                                                 
Law of the Sea: State Practice in Zones of Special Jurisdiction (The Law of the Sea Institute: University of 
Hawaii, 1982), 57-78. 
162 J Ashley Roach and Robert W Smith, Excessive Maritime Claims (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 3rd ed, 2012), 
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(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and 
structures; 
(ii) marine scientific research; 
(iii) the preservation of the marine environment; 
(c) other rights and duties provided for in the present Convention. 
2. In exercising its rights and performing its duties under the present 
Convention in the Exclusive Economic Zone, the coastal State shall 
have due regard to the rights and duties of other States and shall act in 
a manner compatible with the provisions of the present Convention. 
3. The rights set out in this article with respect to the sea-bed and subsoil 
shall be exercised in accordance with Part VI of the present Convention. 
 
Article 57. Breadth of the Exclusive Economic Zone 
The Exclusive Economic Zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical 
miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is 
measured. 
 
The Conference had thus addressed the main objection from broad-shelf States - 
namely, that the EEZ regime would replace the continental shelf regime. The compromise was 
to recognise the inherent jurisdiction of coastal States over the natural prolongation of their 
land territories that extends beyond the 200 M limit of the EEZ to the outer edge of the 
continental margin.167 The concern of landlocked and geographically disadvantaged States had 
also been addressed. The Conference agreed to establish a system of revenue sharing with 
regard to the exploitation of the mineral resources of the continental shelf beyond 200 M.168 
These compromises culminated in the adoption of EEZ provisions that balanced the interests 
of the major maritime powers, coastal States (particularly developing coastal States), as well 
as landlocked and geographically disadvantaged States.169  
 
EEZ Provisions in the LOS Convention  
By 1977, the negotiating States at UNCLOS III had mostly agreed on the breadth and legal 
status of the EEZ. With the major hurdles to the establishment of the EEZ regime now cleared, 
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the EEZ provisions in the ICNT were given to the Drafting Committee to finalise the wording 
for the convention. The Drafting Committee did not undertake any major revision to the EEZ 
provisions, with those ultimately adopted in the LOS Convention being almost identical to the 
ones appearing in the ICNT:170 
 
PART V EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE 
 
Article 55 Specific Legal Regime of the Exclusive Economic Zone 
The Exclusive Economic Zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the 
territorial sea, subject to the specific legal regime established in this 
Part, under which the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the 
rights and freedoms of other States are governed by the relevant 
provisions of this Convention. 
 
Article 56 Rights, Jurisdiction and Duties of the Coastal State in the 
Exclusive Economic Zone 
1. In the Exclusive Economic Zone, the coastal State has: 
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, 
conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-
living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its 
subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation 
and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the 
water, currents and winds; 
(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this 
Convention with regard to: 
(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and 
structures; 
(ii) marine scientific research; 
(iii) the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment; 
(c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention. 
2. In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this 
Convention in the Exclusive Economic Zone, the coastal State shall 
                                                 
170 LOS Convention, Arts 55-57. 
 
86 
 
have due regard to the rights and duties of other States and shall act in 
a manner compatible with the provisions of this Convention. 
3. The rights set out in this article with respect to the seabed and subsoil 
shall be exercised in accordance with Part VI. 
 
Article 57 Breadth of the Exclusive Economic Zone 
The Exclusive Economic Zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical 
miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is 
measured. 
 
The final provisions in the LOS Convention make it clear that within their EEZ, coastal 
States have an exclusive right to fisheries and other living resources of the sea, as well as to oil 
and gas resources of the seabed and subsoil. Importantly, coastal States do not have any 
‘residual’ jurisdiction in the EEZ; only such jurisdiction as the LOS Convention provides, 
including with regard to artificial islands, installations, marine scientific research and the 
protection and preservation of the marine environment.171 Coastal States also possess such 
jurisdiction as is necessary for them to exercise their sovereign rights as provided for in the 
Convention.172 
The discussions during UNCLOS III also made it clear that any claims to 
historic/traditional fishing rights by non-coastal States are incompatible with the concept of the 
EEZ.173 Indeed, Article 62 of the LOS Convention represents the compromise solution for 
those States that stood to lose their traditional fishing grounds due to the enactment of the EEZ. 
Article 62 allows other States to access the surplus of an allowable catch of living resources in 
the EEZ of a coastal State. In granting this access, the coastal State must take into account the 
States whose nationals have habitually fished in the zone.174 However, such access is dependent 
on the coastal State’s consent – consent which may be granted or denied to other States at the 
sole discretion of the coastal State.175 Therefore, a coastal State’s sovereign rights over all 
living resources in the EEZ has completely superseded the traditional fishing rights of other 
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States, as well as any other freedom of fishing beyond the territorial sea within 200 M from the 
coast.176 
Third States, however, have the right to exercise other high seas freedoms in the EEZ 
of coastal States, such as the freedoms of navigation and overflight. 177  Other principles 
governing the high seas jurisdiction (apart from economic activities or those specifically 
provided for in the LOS Convention), also apply in the EEZ of a coastal State.178 Thus, ships 
in the EEZ are subject to the flag State principle – whereby ships are subject to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the State under which they are registered. 179  The application of high seas 
principles in the EEZ also means that warships of any State may seize pirates in the EEZ.180 
The relationship between the EEZ and the continental shelf regime is reflected in 
paragraph 3 of Article 56 (quoted above). That paragraph expressly states that coastal States’ 
rights in the EEZ with respect to the seabed and subsoil are as provided under Part VI of the 
LOS Convention, which deals with the continental shelf. The relationship between these two 
regimes will be discussed further in Chapter 6. However, it is clear from the discussions during 
UNCLOS III and from Article 56(3) of the LOS Convention that both regimes are autonomous 
but intimately linked.181 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
The establishment of the EEZ regime was a major turning point in the development of the 
continental shelf regime. The EEZ regime was formed in response to coastal States extending 
their jurisdiction beyond the territorial sea. Indeed, coastal States were not satisfied with the 
continental shelf regime as laid down in the Continental Shelf Convention, mainly due to the 
uncertainty provided by the depth and exploitability criteria, as well as the fact that such criteria 
did not benefit States with narrow shelves. Thus, some coastal States extended their jurisdiction 
based on distance – mostly 200 M from the coast – which covered not only the seabed but also 
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the water above the seabed.182 By giving coastal States exclusive jurisdiction over the seabed 
and the water above it to a distance of 200 M from the coast, the EEZ regime was initially 
conceived to address the shortcomings of the continental shelf regime, and ultimately even 
replace it.183  
The EEZ was also intended to absorb any claims to historic fishing rights beyond the 
territorial sea.184 The proposal of an EEZ for 200 M from the baselines was widely accepted 
by States which had claimed historic fishing rights beyond the territorial sea, as this limit had 
the effect of placing most of the fisheries resources within their jurisdiction. As a result, the 
need for these States to make excessive claims to historic waters or to the territorial sea beyond 
12 M was nullified.185 The EEZ has thus completely superseded any historic fishing rights 
within 200 M from the coast. The EEZ, however, was not successful in replacing the 
continental shelf regime, as this idea was resisted by a group of broad-shelf States on the basis 
that their entitlement over the seabed resources would have been reduced by the distance 
criterion.186 
UNCLOS III reached a compromise between the opposing views by maintaining the 
continental shelf regime alongside the EEZ regime. Thus, within 200 M from the coast, the 
EEZ regime ‘overlaps’ with the continental shelf regime, with both regimes granting coastal 
States sovereign rights over the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil up to 200 M from 
the shore.187 Beyond that distance, the rights of coastal States possessing actual or physical 
continental shelves extending more than 200 M are also recognised in the LOS Convention.188 
Moreover, the nature of the continental shelf as an ‘inherent right’ is maintained in the LOS 
Convention.189 Thus, although coastal States do not need to make any formal claim to have 
rights under the continental shelf regime,190 a claim is required to possess rights under the EEZ 
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regime.191 This means there can be a continental shelf without an EEZ, but there cannot be an 
EEZ without a continental shelf.192 
UNCLOS III was thus successful in finding a compromise between the interests of 
developing coastal States, broad-shelf States, landlocked and geographically disadvantaged 
States, as well as the major maritime States.193 The EEZ is a specific legal regime whereby 
coastal States have sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the natural resources in the water 
column, seabed and subsoil up to 200 M from the shore; and where other States have certain 
rights and freedoms as provided for in the LOS Convention.194 The only outstanding issue that 
required resolution during UNCLOS III was the limits of coastal States’ rights over the 
continental shelf beyond 200 M. This will be discussed in the next Chapter. 
 
                                                 
191 Surya P Sharma, ‘The Single Maritime Boundary Regime and the Relationship between the Continental 
Shelf and the Exclusive Economic Zone’ (1987) 2 International Journal of Estuarine and Coastal Law 203, at 
210. 
192 Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Merits, Judgment, 3 June 1985, (1985) ICJ Reports 13, at 
33.  
193 Roach and Smith, supra note 162.  
194 LOS Convention, Arts 56 and 57. 
 
90 
 
4. Limits of the Continental Shelf 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The 1958 Continental Shelf Convention was the first international instrument to codify State 
practice on the continental shelf, thus providing the legal basis for the concept.1 The 1969 ruling 
of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases 
strengthened the continental shelf concept, declaring it part of customary international law.2 
However, neither the Convention nor the ICJ ruling clearly articulated the extent of the legal 
continental shelf, with the notions of ‘exploitability’ and ‘natural prolongation’ seemingly 
allowing for the continental shelf to expand indefinitely.3 The expansion of the legal concept 
of the continental shelf, however, was halted by the idea of the international seabed area 
constituting the common heritage of mankind – as acknowledged by Ambassador Pardo in his 
speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) in 1967.4 Following Ambassador 
Pardo’s speech, the UN General Assembly called for the:5 
 
[e]xamination of the question of the reservation exclusively for peaceful 
purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, 
underlying the high seas beyond the limits of present national 
jurisdiction, and the uses of their resources in the interests of mankind.  
 
This led to a call to clarify the outer limits of the continental shelf in order to preserve the 
international seabed beyond it.6  
 This Chapter will trace the development of the various legal limits that were proposed 
for the continental shelf regime. The Chapter starts by examining the outer edge limit of the 
                                                 
1 Convention on the Continental Shelf, done at Geneva on 29 April 1958, UNTS 499, at 311 (entered into force 
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geomorphological continental shelf – which represented the physical limit when the concept 
was first introduced. The discussion will then move onto the depth exploitability criteria, which 
were used in the Continental Shelf Convention. The Chapter then will describe the other 
alternative limits debated during the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS III) – including distance, edge of the slope, as well as the edge of the continental 
margin – before analysing the legal limits provided in Article 76 of the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention). By analysing the various limits 
considered for the continental shelf regime, a more nuanced understanding can be gained on 
where and how these limits interact with the limits of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 
regime. 
 
4.2. The Various Limits Considered for the Continental Shelf Regime  
Determining the precise outer limits of the legal continental shelf was inextricably linked to the 
debates on the definition of the shelf itself. The emergence of the legal concept of the 
continental shelf, as distinct from the geomorphological concept, resulted from the lack of 
uniform geomorphological limits to the continental shelf.7 There was a general consensus that 
the Continental Shelf Convention had failed to adequately define the outer limits of the 
continental shelf, and this issue continued to be a flash point during both the Seabed Committee 
meetings and UNCLOS III.  
At UNCLOS III, some States opined that delineating the limits of the continental shelf 
was a task properly undertaken pursuant to the Continental Shelf Convention, while other States 
not party to that Convention asserted that “the discussion should proceed on the basis of 
customary international law, jurisprudence and other internationally accepted rules”. 8  El 
Salvador, for example, pointed out that “the customary law which had developed over the 
previous thirty years was largely in conformity with the rules in the Continental Shelf 
Convention”.9 El Salvador argued that the Continental Shelf Convention should merely be 
regarded as a useful instrument of comparison in negotiating UNCLOS III, particularly in light 
of the “imprecise and unclear” definition of the continental shelf in the Continental Shelf 
                                                 
7 International Law Commission, 'Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1951 Vol I: Summary 
Records of the Third Session 16 May - 27 July 1951' (UN Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1951, United Nations, 1957), at 
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Convention.10 According to El Salvador, it was necessary to find other sources of international 
law to supplement the Continental Shelf Convention.11  
Thus, UNCLOS III debated the definition and limits of the continental shelf not only 
with reference to the criteria laid down in the Continental Shelf Convention, but also with regard 
to technological developments in the oil and gas industry, the actual practice of States on the 
issue, as well as recent jurisprudence. The debates over the outer limits of the continental shelf, 
however, can be traced back to the introduction of the continental shelf concept itself, and 
evolved in parallel with the debates over the legal definition of the shelf.  
   
4.2.1. The Geomorphological Edge of the Shelf 
When the concept of the continental shelf first emerged in international law, it referred to the 
physical, geomorphological continental shelf – that is, a continuation of land extending from 
the low water line to a depth where there is a marked increase in slope to a greater depth.12 The 
point where this increase occurs is known as the ‘shelf edge’, and can generally be found at a 
depth of 200 metres.13 Although the shelf edge represents a natural end to the geomorphological 
continental shelf, it was considered inadequate as a legal limit when the International Law 
Commission (ILC) was codifying the legal rules on the continental shelf regime prior to the 
First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I).14 As the geomorphology 
of the seabed differs between coastal States, the limit of each coastal State’s continental shelf 
would also vary. For this reason, the ILC rejected the notion of a natural limit.15 
At UNCLOS I, this natural limit was also found to be unsatisfactory, as most of the shelf 
edge was located at a distance less than 10 nautical miles (M) from the shore.16 This did not 
appeal to those coastal States which were seeking to expand their jurisdiction beyond 12 M.17 
Moreover, most of the economic resources lie beyond the shelf edge - either on the continental 
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slope or the deep sea floor.18 Following the ICJ’s decision in the 1969 North Sea Continental 
Shelf Cases, coastal States started to assert their jurisdiction over the seabed beyond the 
geomorphological continental shelf.19 This course of action created uncertainty, hence the need 
to both redefine and extend the legal concept of the continental shelf beyond its 
geomorphological boundaries.20  
Using the shelf edge as the legal limit of the continental shelf regime, however, was 
briefly reconsidered at the preparatory meetings for UNCLOS III. At the 65th meeting of the 
Seabed Committee, the Soviet Union suggested delineating the continental shelf in accordance 
with scientific and technical guidelines, and fixing the limit of the continental shelf along the 
beginning of the continental slope.21 This solution would have rendered the shelf edge the outer 
limit of the continental shelf regime, thus making the legal concept of the continental shelf 
correspond with the geomorphological concept. Such a proposal would also have left the 
continental slope and the upper part of the continental rise – which have some oil and gas 
reserves attached to them – part of the international seabed area.22 However, in the end, the 
Soviet Union opposed the resurrection of the shelf edge as the legal limit of the continental 
shelf.23 Instead, it was proposed that the legal limit be fixed in consideration for leaving some 
of the hydrocarbon resources on the area beyond the shelf edge to the international 
community.24 Ultimately, the legal limit adopted in the LOS Convention bears no relation to 
the shelf edge, as will be discussed in Part 4.3 below. 
  
4.2.2. The Depth Criterion 
The depth criterion was first introduced in the press release accompanying the 1945 Truman 
Proclamation, and was stated to be 100 fathoms deep.25 This depth criterion was linked to the 
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location of the shelf edge, which was usually found around 100 fathoms or 200 metres deep. 
However, the depth of shelf edge actually ranges from 20 to 550 metres, with an average depth 
of 133 metres.26 It was this irregularity which prompted legal scholars like Young and Francois 
to propose a uniform depth limit of 200 metres for the continental shelf.27  
Although the 200-metre depth limit did not precisely represent the actual shelf edge, it 
was chosen as the legal limit in order to bring certainty to the term ‘continental shelf’. Indeed, 
Gidel has argued that “the concept of the continental shelf should be associated with a 
geophysical formation in which the test of depth plays an essential role”.28 The depth criterion 
of 200 metres was then adopted in the Continental Shelf Convention as one of the limits of the 
shelf - a criterion which still corresponds with the actual geomorphological continental shelf. 
As Brownlie has pointed out, although the legal definition of the continental shelf (as provided 
in the Continental Shelf Convention) departs from the geological and geomorphological 
concept, it continues to bear a close relation to it.29  
Even so, the depth criterion was considered unsatisfactory to the majority of negotiating 
States at UNCLOS III, as it had the effect of excluding important resources located beyond the 
relevant depth. Austria pointed out that “the inequity of the depth criterion had been an 
important reason why a number of States had extended their jurisdiction into the high seas”.30 
Libya also viewed the depth limit to be inadequate and inequitable, since in some countries the 
limit fell within the territorial waters, and in others, the sea was so shallow that the isobath was 
at a distance exceeding 200 M.31 
Indonesia also asserted that it would not be feasible or realistic to define the continental 
shelf only up to the depth of the 200-metre isobath.32 Indeed, Indonesia highlighted that many 
countries had already exercised jurisdiction over the shelf beyond the 200-metre depth limit, 
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concluding boundary agreements with their neighbours on the strength of such criterion.33 Thus, 
for Indonesia, it would be impossible to deprive these States of what they considered their 
sovereign rights under international law. 34  Indonesia then stressed that the task of the 
Conference was to define how far beyond the 200-metre depth coastal States could extend their 
jurisdiction over the seabed.35 
At the same session, the Soviet Union suggested modifying the depth limit to 500 
metres.36 For some coastal States, however, such limit was still not deep enough to include all 
their shelves, while at the same time excluding areas already under exploration.37 Japan then 
proposed a depth limit of 2,500 or 3,000 metres. The problem with this approach was that it 
would have included a vast area of the ocean floor, and thus it received little support.38 Critics 
of the depth criterion at UNCLOS III – such as Gardiner – argued that “water depths [are] 
merely a geological accident” unrelated to the continents and the ocean floor, and thus for these 
critics, any limit using bathymetry was unacceptable.39 At the conclusion of UNCLOS III, it 
was agreed that depth would no longer be used to determine the limits of the continental shelf 
under the LOS Convention, although a depth criterion was still used as a cut-off for the 
continental shelf beyond 200 M, as will be discussed in Part 4.3 below. 
 
4.2.3. The Exploitability Criterion 
Prior to UNCLOS I, the 200-metre depth limit (as discussed above) was seen by coastal States 
as inadequate to secure fisheries and valuable mineral resources. The United States, for 
example, briefly considered extending its jurisdiction to a depth of 1,000 metres, to avoid the 
imprecision of the shelf edge and to include some of the resources in the continental slope.40 
To address this limitation, the Continental Shelf Convention included a wider definition of the 
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shelf – one that embraced both the seabed and subsoil adjacent to the coast, and where the 
depth of the waters admits the exploitation of the natural resources in the relevant area.41  
This expanded definition, adopted from the draft prepared by the ILC,42 was heavily 
criticised by some international law scholars following UNCLOS I. Emery interpreted the 
definition as open-ended, arguing that coastal States could theoretically continue mining down 
the continental slope, across the continental rise and into the abyssal plains of the ocean floor, 
provided the technology was available to achieve such a feat.43 Gidel stated that the definition 
left the extent of the continental shelf both uncertain (because the potential for exploitation 
depends on technological development), and variable (because the extent of the continental 
shelf would have to be continually modified according to improvements in the methods of 
exploitation).44 Gardiner went further and claimed that under the depth and exploitability 
criteria, “all relationship with the natural physical continental shelf had been lost”.45 
Other international scholars, however, did not see the exploitability criterion as vague 
or open-ended. Henkin, for example, commented that the ‘free-for-all’ interpretation ignored 
the adjacency element of the definition in Article 1 of the Continental Shelf Convention.46 For 
Henkin, the Convention sought to provide a legal limit to the geomorphological continental 
shelf.47 Brownlie was also of the opinion that the exploitability criterion did not provide for 
“an uncontrolled ambulatory limit”, pointing out that such criterion is qualified by a 
requirement of adjacency.48 Similarly, Jennings viewed that the exploitable area beyond the 
200-metre depth limit must always be “adjacent to the coast”, and the exploitability criterion 
complementary to the 200-metre depth requirement.49  
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42 See Part 2.6 of Chapter 2. 
43 Emery, supra note 16, at 155. 
44 Gidel wrote that “the criterion proposed by the International Law Commission does not furnish the qualities 
of uniformity, fixity, and certainty which are indispensable in law”, see Gidel, supra note 28, at 89-90. 
45 Gardiner, supra note 37, at 149. 
46 Louis Henkin, 'Law for the Sea's Mineral Resources' (1968) 1 ISHA Monograph 14, at 18.  
47 Ibid. 
48 Brownlie, supra note 19, at 137. 
49 Robert Y Jennings, 'The Limits of Continental Shelf Jurisdiction: Some Possible Implications of the North 
Sea Case Judgment' (1969) 18(4) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 819, at 829. 
 
97 
 
Indeed, when preparing the draft convention, the ILC also seemed to view the adjacency 
requirement as serving as a qualification to the exploitability criterion. As stated by the 
Chairman of the ILC when presenting the ILC’s definition of the continental shelf:50 
 
The words ‘adjacent to the coastal State’…placed a very clear limitation 
on the submarine areas covered by the article. The adjacent areas ended 
at the point where the slope down to the ocean bed began, which was 
not more than 25 miles from the coast. 
 
Some States noted this qualification when adopting the Continental Shelf Convention. 
For example, France – when submitting the instrument of accession to the Convention – 
declared that “the expression ‘adjacent areas’ implies a notion of geophysical and geographical 
dependence which ipso facto rules out an unlimited extension of the continental shelf”.51 Thus, 
it was argued that the adjacency requirement limited the exploitability criterion to the edge of 
the geomorphological continental shelf. 
During the preparatory meetings of UNCLOS III, Chile – while advocating for the 
exploitability criterion to be replaced with a more precise delineation between the continental 
shelf and the international zone of the seabed – acknowledged that the exploitability criterion 
was closely intertwined with the depth criterion established by the 1958 Continental Shelf 
Convention. Chile thus understood that dispensing with one criterion necessarily involved 
forfeiting the other.52 Argentina, however, noted that:53  
 
the existing legal concept of the continental shelf, in which coastal 
States had the possibility of extending their sovereignty over the sea-
bed and subsoil thereof to the limits of exploitability, was at variance 
with the scientific and geomorphological concept, which restricted the 
meaning of the term ‘continental shelf’ to sea-bed and subsoil areas 
within the 200-metre isobath. 
                                                 
50 International Law Commission, 'Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1956 Vol I: Summary 
Records of the Eight Session' (United Nations, 1956), at 135. 
51 Quoted in Shigeru Oda, 'Regime of the Continental Shelf' (1969) 127(II) Hague Recueil 433, at 443 
52 Sub-Committee II, Summary Record of the Seventy-Fourth Meeting, UN Doc A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.74, 14 
August 1973, at 6. 
53 Sub-Committee II,, Summary Record of the Fifty-Fifth Meeting, UN Doc A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.55, 20 March 
1973, at 237. 
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At UNCLOS III, the exploitability criterion was still seen as ambiguous by many States. 
In the Second Session in 1974, Austria pointed out that it could not reconfirm the exploitability 
criterion on the basis that it voided much of an area where the resources should comprise the 
common heritage of mankind.54 Bangladesh also viewed the exploitability criterion as being 
open to various interpretations, with the State calling for a more precise definition.55  
During UNCLOS III, it was clear that technological advancement in the oil and gas 
industry had already invalidated the 200-metre depth and exploitability criteria, as Libya had 
submitted at the Second Session.56 There were also discussions at the Conference about the 
possibility of exploiting nodules from the ocean floor at depths greater than 3,000 metres.57 As 
technological innovation had allowed States to venture deeper and further to exploit the 
resources of the seabed, a more precise limit for the continental shelf regime was needed. 
Furthermore, the argument that the adjacency requirement limited the exploitability criterion 
to the geomorphological continental shelf became irrelevant when the Conference redefined 
the legal continental shelf to include the slope and the rise. This will be discussed below. 
 
4.2.4. The Base of the Continental Slope 
The continental slope lies beyond the shelf edge, where the shelf slopes down to a greater depth 
of the ocean.58 Some consider the continental slope the true limit of the continents, as the slope 
is the general boundary between the rocks of the continents and those of the sea floor.59 The 
depth of the base of the slope ranges from 1,000 to 4,000 metres.60 On the seaward side, the 
continental slope is bounded by the continental rise. The boundary between the slope and the 
rise, however, is not always clearly distinguishable, as the sediments of the rise overlap with 
those of the slope.61  
                                                 
54 Summary Records of 16th Meeting of the Second Committee, supra note 30, at 143. 
55 Ibid, at 144. 
56 Ibid, at 145. 
57 Gardiner, supra note 37, at 149. 
58 See Philip A Symmonds, et al, 'Characteristics of Continental Margins' in PJ Cook and Chris Carleton (eds), 
Continental Shelf Limits: The Scientific and Legal Interface (Oxford University Press, 2000) 25, at 29.  
59 Emery, supra note 16. 
60 Ibid, at 150. 
61 Hartley Hoskins, 'Seismic Reflection Observations on the Atlantic Continental Shelf, Slope, and Rise 
Southeast of New England' (1967) 75(5) Journal of Geology 598, at 601. 
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The base of the continental slope was never considered the limit of the continental slope 
by either the ILC or UNCLOS I. Indeed, the legal limits of the continental shelf adopted by 
both the ILC and UNCLOS I were based on a geomorphological continental shelf,62 which is 
clearly distinguishable from the continental slope. However, when UNCLOS I qualified the 
exploitability criterion by adding the adjacency requirement to the definition of the continental 
shelf,63 it led to the shelf limit being extended to include the slope. Indeed, Jennings argued 
that:64  
 
both in terms of geology and in terms of geomorphology there would 
seem to be little room for doubt that the continental slope is just as much 
a part of and a prolongation of the continental land mass as the 
continental shelf is. 
  
Jennings further explained that the underlying rock structure of the shelf and the slope is 
identical, with the only difference between the two being one of relative gradient.65  
In the preparatory meetings of the second Sub-Committee prior to UNCLOS III, Ireland 
agreed with the idea of the slope representing the limit of national jurisdiction of the continental 
shelf. Ireland viewed that the edge of the continental shelf should be the line along which the 
shelf meets the ocean floor – which is the base of the continental slope.66 Ireland thus proposed 
that the outer limit of the continental shelf be at the bottom of the continental slope.67 As 
submitted by Ireland, this would take into account those coastal States that had already 
conducted exploratory drilling at depths significantly greater than 200 metres since the adoption 
of the Continental Shelf Convention.68 Indeed, Ireland argued that it was not realistic to expect 
these States to retreat from the position established under the Continental Shelf Convention.69 
                                                 
62 Brownlie, supra note 19, at 139. 
63 Continental Shelf Convention, Art 1. 
64 Jennings, supra note 49. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Sub-Committee II, supra note 53, at 187. 
67 Ireland also proposed that in the alternative, the limit could be set at 200 M measured from the baseline, or at 
a depth of 3,000 metres, see ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
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Hedberg was also of the view that the foot of the slope marks the limit of the natural 
prolongation of a nation’s land territory, and thus the “natural outer limit of national 
jurisdiction”. 70  For Hedberg, this natural boundary should have served as the guide for 
determining jurisdictional limits, “not the shore line, or edge of the shelf, or some purely 
arbitrary distance from shore”.71 Hedberg proposed the creation of a zone extending a certain 
distance from the base of the slope, within which the precise boundary would be fixed. He 
explained that creating such zone would “allow for the frequent lack of a very sharp base to the 
slope” and “allow for the common overlap of the true base of the continental block by 
sedimentary aprons such as the continental rise”.72 Hedberg later suggested a width of 100 
kilometres or around 54 M for the boundary zone, or even a wider zone provided consensus 
could be reached.73 The upshot of Hedberg’s proposal was that the outer limit of the continental 
shelf would be related to geomorphology.74  
Hedberg’s suggestion to establish a zone at the bottom of the slope was considered at 
UNCLOS III, as this would have given coastal States some flexibility in fixing the actual limit.75 
However, this proposal did not include the continental rise and thus the mineral resources 
contained in the seabed located further seaward.76 The continental rise was already considered 
by broad margin States as part of the natural prolongation of the landmass, and thus these States 
were not supportive of Hedberg’s proposal. 77  However, a modified version of Hedberg’s 
proposal to create a zone at the base of the slope (known as the ‘Hedberg Formula’) was adopted 
in the continental shelf provisions in Article 76 of the LOS Convention. 
 
4.2.5. The Distance Criterion 
                                                 
70 Hollis D Hedberg, 'Limits of National Jurisdiction over Natural Resources of the Ocean Bottom' in Lewis M 
Alexander (ed), National Policy Recommendation (The University of Rhode Island, 1969) 159, at 163. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid, at 164.  
73 Hollis D Hedberg, 'Geomorphic Basis for National-International Boundaries on Ocean Floor' in Michel T 
Halbouty (ed), Energy Resources of the Pacific Region (The American Association of Petroleum Geologists, 
1981), 441-464, at 445. 
74 Gardiner, supra note 37, at 156. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid, at 157.  
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To remove the inequity between broad-shelf States and coastal States with narrow shelves, a 
distance cut-off point was proposed. In 1969, the United States Commission on Marine 
Science, Engineering and Resources suggested a 50 M limit, which when combined with the 
200-metre depth limit, was thought to remedy the inequity between the two groups of States.78 
Brownlie endorsed this proposal, describing it as “an eminently moderate and practical 
solution” which would “eliminate all but minor uncertainties from the delimitation regime of 
the shelf”. 79  Hedberg, however, argued that the 50 M limit would not only lead to the 
exploitability limit set by the Continental Shelf Convention being abandoned (thus removing 
resources which the Convention had granted to States), but would also create boundaries 
resulting in conflicts between existing national claims and offshore lease agreements already 
concluded by coastal States.80 
 Setting a distance-based limit for the legal continental shelf was also considered at 
UNCLOS III. Libya, for example, considered both the depth and exploitability criteria in the 
Continental Shelf Convention to be inadequate and inequitable.81 In Libya’s view, only the 
distance criterion of 200 M would give the same breadth of sea to varying coastal States.82 
Japan also preferred the criterion of distance, as it was simple to apply and would ensure a 
more equitable solution than other criteria based on depth, geomorphology or topography, 
especially given the complex nature of the geology and topography of the seabed areas of the 
world.83 Japan added that:84  
 
it would be wrong to perpetuate the inequity of nature that would entitle 
some States to coastal seabed areas extending only a few miles from the 
coast while entitling others to such areas extending for several hundred 
miles. 
 
                                                 
78 United States Commission on Marine Science Engineering and Resources, 'Our Nation and the Sea, A Plan 
for National Action' (US Government Printing Office, 1969), at 146. 
79 Brownlie, supra note 19, at 143. 
80 Hedberg, supra note 70, at 160-161. 
81 Summary Records of 16th Meeting of the Second Committee, supra note 30, at 145. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Summary Records of 17th 
Meeting of the Second Committee, UN Doc A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.17, 26 July 1974, at 147. 
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Iraq also submitted that the limit of the continental shelf should be “determined by a 
distance criterion which would be fair to all States and to mankind as a whole”.85 In doing so, 
Iraq focused attention on the fact that “the international sea-bed area beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction should be economically viable”.86 Malta also viewed that allowing coastal 
States to extend their jurisdiction beyond 200 M “would make a mockery of the principle of 
the common heritage of mankind”. 87  Zaire agreed that the continental shelf should be 
delineated not in accordance with the exploitability criterion, but with a distance criterion of 
200 M, beyond which the continental margin would fall within the jurisdiction of the proposed 
international authority.88  
There were two opposing views to the 200 M distance limit at UNCLOS III. The first 
view, held by one group of States, considered the distance criterion excessive. For example, at 
the preparatory meetings of UNCLOS III, the Soviet Union stated that a 200 M area would 
include 87 percent of the total volume of hydrocarbon resources under the ocean floor.89 This, 
the Soviet Union argued, would reduce the idea of an “international area of the seabed” to “an 
empty shell”.90  
The second view considered the 200 M limit inadequate for coastal States, as the base 
of their continental shelves was located beyond this distance.91Myanmar, for example, rejected 
the proposal to establish a uniform distance criterion for determining the outer limits of the 
continental shelf, as such a plan “would [have] divest[ed] many coastal States of their 
primordial rights over a portion of the submerged part of their continental land mass, which 
rights were recognised under the existing law”.92  Ecuador also highlighted that it was a 
geographic reality that the continental shelf of some States extended beyond the 200 M of the 
proposed EEZ, and thus “it was unjust to deprive those States of rights which they had 
acquired”.93 
                                                 
85 Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Summary Records of 19th 
Meeting of the Second Committee, UN Doc A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.19, 30 July 1974, at 159. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Summary Records of 20th Meeting of the Second Committee, supra note 32, at 168. 
88 Summary Records of 17th Meeting of the Second Committee, supra note 83, at 146. 
89 Sub-Committee II, supra note 21, at 17. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Hollis D Hedberg, 'Ocean Boundaries and Petroleum Resources' (1976) 191(4231) Science 1009, at 1010. 
92 Summary Records of 18th Meeting of the Second Committee, supra note 8, at 155. 
93 Summary Records of 19th Meeting of the Second Committee, supra note 85, at 158. 
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Hedberg criticised the 200 M limit for “its purely artificial character and its fundamental 
lack of relation in principle to the natural rights and real needs of the countries with respect to 
jurisdiction over mineral resources under the oceans”.94 Gardiner was also critical of the 200 
M limit, asserting that the 200 M distance beyond the baseline was totally unrelated to the 
natural features of the seabed.95 However, it was hard to argue against the practicality of a 200 
M limit. As Jamaica remarked, having a cut-off point at 200 M from the coast “had the merits 
of simplicity and precision”.96 Furthermore, it was more consistent with the principle of the 
common heritage of mankind, as opposed to granting coastal States jurisdiction or sovereign 
rights “over a shelf extending to the outer edge of the continental margin”.97 
It was clear during UNCLOS III, however, that the establishment of the EEZ regime 
was inevitable.98 Ultimately, a suggestion made by Austria during the preparatory meetings of 
UNCLOS III was seen as the best compromise. Austria suggested that a 200 M limit be fixed, 
but that States with broad shelves extending beyond that distance be allowed to maintain their 
jurisdiction over such shelves.99 Even so, Austria conceded the need for contributions to be 
paid by coastal States for the benefits derived from the resources exploited within those 
extended limits.100 This solution, Austria added, would give effect to the principle of equitable 
sharing of resources.101 Afterwards, the discussion at the Conference turned to the limits of 
coastal State jurisdiction where the continental margin of a coastal State goes beyond 200 M.  
This will be discussed below. 
 
4.2.6. The Edge of the Continental Rise (Continental Margin) 
                                                 
94 Hedberg, supra note 73, at 441. 
95 Gardiner, supra note 37, at 152. 
96 Summary Records of 20th Meeting of the Second Committee, supra note 32, at 167. 
97 Ibid. 
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The continental rise is a vast apron of debris derived from the continent and from material near 
the sea surface located seaward of the continental slope.102 The role of the continental rise as 
the outer limit of the legal continental shelf was considered by Emery in 1967.103 Emery viewed 
the edge of the continental rise as a potential boundary for national jurisdiction, one which 
would put the resources in the rise under the sovereignty of coastal States.104 Indeed, this 
suggestion had the effect of placing the whole of the continental margin - the shelf, slope and 
rise - under the jurisdiction of coastal States. Similarly, Menard and Smith considered all or 
most of the continental rise as a natural prolongation of the submerged portion of the 
continent.105 
Furthermore, the 1969 decision of the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases106 
influenced the development of the continental shelf regime in another less publicised aspect: its 
limit. In its decision, the Court defined the shelf area as a natural prolongation of a coastal 
State’s land mass.107 Khan has argued that the concept of natural prolongation:108  
 
…provided a nexus between the extent of the geological shelf and the 
legal powers exercisable with respect to it and the shelf was thus 
extended to the foot of the continental slope or the toe of the continental 
rise. 
  
Thus, the ICJ’s decision was viewed by some States as a justification for coastal States 
including the continental slope and rise within their jurisdiction. At the preparatory meetings 
for UNCLOS III in 1973, Australia and Norway proposed that:109  
                                                 
102 For more details on the sediment distribution of the continental rise, see Bruce C Heezen, Marie Tharp and 
Maurice Ewing, The Floors of the Oceans: The North Atlantic (The Geological Society of America, Special 
Paper 65, 1959), at 53.  
103 Emery, supra note 16. 
104 Ibid, at 150. 
105 HW Menard and Stuart M Smith, 'Hypsometry of Ocean Basin Provinces' (1966) 71 Journal of Geophysical 
Research 4305, at 4308.  
106 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 2. 
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the coastal [S]tate has the right to retain, where the natural prolongation 
of its land mass extends beyond the (economic zone – patrimonial sea), 
the sovereign rights with respect to that area of the seabed and the 
subsoil thereof which it had under international law before the entry 
into force of this convention: such rights to not extend beyond the outer 
edge of the continental margin. 
 
Jennings, however, was doubtful whether the rise could clearly be considered part of 
the natural prolongation of the land mass.110 His reasoning was based on geology, as the rock 
underlying the sediments of the rise may in part be related to the rock underlying the deep sea 
rather than the continent.111 Jennings also pointed out that there was still no definite formula for 
determining the geological outer edge of the continental rise, which also meant there could be 
no certainty in the legal definition of the shelf.112 
Singapore also opposed the proposal put forward by Australia and Norway. Indeed, 
Singapore did not view the ICJ’s decision in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases as 
supporting the argument that the continental shelf also covered the continental slope and rise.113 
Malta also had some reservations regarding the proposal by Australia and Norway.114 Malta 
argued that the concept of natural prolongation was unsupported by any reliable scientific 
facts,115 and that in most parts of the world, the edge of the geomorphological continental 
margin could not be determined with any degree of accuracy.116 Such a proposal would thus 
bring the bulk of seabed resources under the sovereignty or exclusive jurisdiction of coastal 
States.117 The Soviet Union also raised a similar point, stating that such a proposal would make 
coastal States the owner of almost all potential oil and gas reserves of the seabed.118 Moreover, 
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Austria argued that fixing the outer edge of the continental margin as the limit of the continental 
shelf would undermine the concept of the international seabed as the common heritage area, 
with barely half of the entire seabed and ocean floor falling within the common heritage zone.119  
At UNCLOS III, the proposal to include the entire continental margin as part of the legal 
continental shelf was strongly resisted by landlocked and geographically disadvantaged States. 
Singapore gave a passionate rebuttal to the attempt to expand the limit of the continental shelf 
to the edge of the continental margin. 120  Singapore declared that the Continental Shelf 
Convention was “unjust in that it sought to confer upon a small minority of privileged coastal 
States which accidentally bordered broad continental shelves the sovereign right to exploit the 
natural resources thereof”.121  Singapore emphasised that the Continental Shelf Convention 
“referred to ‘continental shelf’ and not to ‘continental slope’, ‘continental rise’ or ‘continental 
margin’”.122 Singapore also affirmed that the fundamental limitation of adjacency (as laid down 
in Article l of the Continental Shelf Convention and affirmed by the ICJ in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases), meant that the continental shelf lying hundreds of miles off the coast 
could not conceivably be regarded as ‘adjacent’ to the coast.123 Singapore thus concluded that 
if coastal States were granted the right to the continental margin beyond the EEZ, the concept 
of the common heritage of mankind would be meaningless.124 
Switzerland also posited that the continental shelf regime should not apply in the area 
extending to the edge of the continental margin.125 Like Singapore, Switzerland viewed that the 
goals of establishing an area for the common heritage of mankind “would not be attained if the 
continental shelf regime were retained beyond the proposed [EEZ]”.126 Switzerland was also 
unconvinced by the argument that the ‘natural prolongation’ doctrine was implicit in the 
Continental Shelf Convention, or had been ‘crystallised’ by the ICJ in the North Sea Continental 
Shelf Cases.127  On the contrary, Switzerland “found hardly any support in the text of the 
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Convention” for that doctrine, especially since “Article 1 gave no importance to the 
geomorphological configuration of the seabed”. 128  Furthermore, Switzerland declared that 
although the ICJ had referred to the continental shelf as a prolongation of the territory of the 
coastal State, the “extent of the shelf was limited by the notion of adjacency”. This notion, 
Switzerland argued, “clearly contradicted the idea that the seabed extending beyond 200 [M] to 
the outer limit of the continental margin…belonged to the continental shelf adjacent to the 
territorial sea”.129 
For a similar reason, Japan was also opposed to coastal States claiming sovereignty over 
resources till the end of the continental margin.130 For Japan, such a proposal would not only 
have reserved a disproportionate amount of resources for coastal States, but also reduced the 
revenue of the International Seabed Authority to the detriment of developing countries.131 
Kenya agreed with Japan, propounding that the continental margin concept “could not be 
justified by existing rules of international law”, as neither the Truman Proclamation nor the 
legislative history of the Continental Shelf Convention mentioned the continental slope or 
rise.132 Kenya also declared that “neither the scientists nor [the] proponents [of the continental 
margin concept] were in a position to state with any degree of certainty where the margin 
ended”.133  
The pleas of landlocked and geographically disadvantaged States, however, failed to 
persuade the group of broad-shelf States. According to the latter group, incorporating the 
continental margin into the legal definition of the continental shelf was supported by geological 
considerations.134 Bangladesh, for example, stated that the continental shelf should include the 
continental slope and rise.135 Bangladesh based this view on the ICJ’s decision in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases, where the Court found that a coastal State's jurisdiction over 
submerged areas extends over the natural prolongation of a coastal State's territory – which 
                                                 
128 Ibid. 
129 Ibid, at 158. 
130 Summary Records of 17th Meeting of the Second Committee, supra note 83, at 148. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Summary Records of 20th Meeting of the Second Committee, supra note 32, at 161. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Khan, supra note 164, at 32. 
135 Summary Records of 16th Meeting of the Second Committee, supra note 30, at 144. 
 
108 
 
according to Bangladesh included the continental slope and rise.136Similarly, Mexico stated 
that:137  
 
the geological unity [between the submerged area and the continent] 
was a geographical fact which applied not only to the shelf but also to 
the other submerged areas between the coast and the oceanic basin, such 
as the continental slope and rise, as was proved not only by 
geomorphology but also by the structure of the subsoil.  
 
Mexico argued that adopting the edge of continental margin as the outer limit of the 
legal continental shelf “would preserve [that] geological unity and overcome the disadvantages 
of the definition contained in the [Continental Shelf Convention]”.138 New Zealand commented 
that due to its remoteness and isolation in the vast ocean, “it was not unreasonable to ask that 
the new law of the sea confirm the existing rights of the coastal State to its continental 
margin”.139  
Even Austria, a prominent voice within the landlocked and geographically 
disadvantaged State group, acknowledged that “geophysical research had shown that the 
continental margin was an extension of the same nature as the continent itself”.140 The problem 
with this proposal was that the limit of the continental rise could not be precisely determined, 
as the sediments of the continental rise at the outer limit would merge with the sediment cover 
of the deep ocean floor.141 Thus, there was a reluctance during UNCLOS III to support a limit 
that would allow coastal States to claim jurisdiction to “the last grain of sand” – as Gardiner so 
evocatively expressed.142 
Portugal was one of the States concerned about the accuracy of using the edge of the 
continental margin as the limit for the legal continental shelf. Despite agreeing that the outer 
limit of the shelf should be fixed at the lower edge of the continental margin contiguous to the 
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abyssal plain, Portugal did not encourage the adoption of a geological or morphological 
criterion.143 Rather, Portugal expressed that the inaccuracy of such criterion made it necessary 
to use numerical equivalents instead.144 Portugal thus proposed to set the legal edge of the 
continental margin at a 4,000-metre depth.145 El Salvador also accepted that the limit of the 
continental shelf should be set at the outer edge of the continental rise where continental rocks 
could still be found.146 However, El Salvador disagreed with Portugal in that it considered the 
geomorphological criterion to be more reliable, since it was based on the types of rocks which 
constituted the shelf.147 
Responding to Portugal’s concern, Australia reported the results of a detailed survey of 
the outer areas of its continental margin, which indicated that it was entirely feasible to plot the 
outer edge of that margin.148 Australia argued that there was no great difficulty in delineating 
the margin of other coastal States, but admitted that such mapping activity would need to be 
done on a wide scale in order to clearly delineate the limits of national jurisdiction of coastal 
States throughout the world.149 Argentina also noted the concern of Portugal and other States 
regarding the difficulties of defining the continental margin. 150  However, Argentina was 
convinced by Australia’s argument that the continental margin was easily determinable.151 
Argentina thus argued that:152  
 
the concept of the natural prolongation of the territory of the coastal 
State should allow for the extension of the sovereignty of such States at 
least as far as the lower outer edge of the continental margin adjoining 
the abyssal plains.  
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Ireland also strongly advocated for the continental margin to be the limit of the legal 
continental shelf, claiming that the continental margin is essentially the boundary between the 
continental crust and the oceanic crust.153 At the Fourth Session of UNCLOS III in 1976, Ireland 
presented a sediment thickness formula to determine the edge of the continental rise (first 
proposed by Gardiner and known as the ‘Gardiner Formula’), which was based on the fact that 
continental rises are usually composed of sediments that thin seawards at the foot of the 
continental slope.154  
The Gardiner formula provided that the distance cut-off point would be proportional to 
the thickness of the sediment of the continental rise, with the outer limit located “where the 
thickness of sediment is at least 1% of the shortest distance between it and the foot of the slope” 
[emphasis added].155 Thus, the outer limit would always fall within the continental margin, 
while also taking into account the various geographical breadths and thickness of the continental 
rise around the globe.156 Gardiner explained that unlike the formula using arbitrary indicators 
such as distance or depth, his formula would restrict coastal States’ claims naturally, as the rise 
thins away from the foot of the slope until it disappears altogether.157 Gardiner further stated 
that the 1% figure was chosen so that coastal States would retain a significant part of the rise, 
while ensuring that a substantial area with hydrocarbon potential remains part of the common 
heritage of mankind.158 
  The Gardiner Formula (as proposed by Ireland) was integral to the negotiating States 
accepting the continental margin as the outer limit of the legal continental shelf, and thus 
reaching a consensus at UNCLOS III. This formula – and the Hedberg formula mentioned in 
Part 4.2.4 above – form part of the provisions on the limits of the continental shelf as laid down 
in Article 76 of the LOS Convention.  
 
4.3. Article 76 of the LOS Convention 
Although various options for the outer limits of the continental shelf had been discussed at 
UNCLOS III, combining both distance and edge criteria with regard to the continental margin 
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ultimately found favour with a majority of the negotiating States. This formula was considered 
as early as 1973, before UNCLOS III had even commenced. At the 62nd preparatory meeting of 
the second Sub-Committee of the Seabed Committee, Argentina opined that a single criterion 
to define the limits of the continental shelf would neither guarantee the equality of all States nor 
establish the dimensions of the international seabed area. 159  Argentina thus suggested a 
combination of two criteria:160  
 
firstly, the geomorphological criterion, according to which the coastal 
State would be entitled to extend its sovereignty over the seabed and 
subsoil to the lower edge of the continental rise adjoining the abyssal 
plain; secondly, the distance criterion, according to which the coastal 
State would be entitled to extend its sovereignty over the sea-bed and 
subsoil to a maximum limit of 200 [M], in cases where the application 
of the geomorphological criterion would result in a narrower limit.  
 
The establishment of the EEZ was a high priority at UNCLOS III. Against this 
backdrop, and the insistence of broad-shelf States to extend their jurisdiction over the seabed to 
the edge of the continental margin, an increasingly number of States were acclimating to the 
proposal advanced by Argentina during the Seabed Committee meeting. Spain, for example, 
submitted that the distance criterion alone would not adequately protect the legitimate interests 
of coastal States with continental shelves extending beyond 200 M, adding that “the lower outer 
edge of the continental rise should be taken into account as well”. 161 El Salvador also stated 
that “there was no reason why the natural prolongation of its territory should end at any fixed 
distance regardless of the nature of the seabed”.162 Thus, El Salvador suggested that:163 
 
within the 200 [M] zone, the rights of the coastal State in its economic 
zone would extend to the subjacent sea-bed; when it extended beyond 
                                                 
159 Sub-Committee II, Summary Record of the Sixty-Second Meeting, UN Doc A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.62, 5 April 
1973, at 237. 
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161 Summary Records of 17th Meeting of the Second Committee, supra note 83, at 148. 
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the 200 [M] zone, the coastal State would retain its rights, over the 
continental shelf only. 
 
South Korea submitted that the 200 M distance criterion apply in the first instance and, 
“when the natural prolongation of the continental shelf extend[s] beyond 200 [M], the 
continental margin should be the limit of national jurisdiction”.164 Uruguay also agreed that the 
legal concept of the continental shelf should extend to the edge of the continental margin, but 
remarked that a distance criterion was necessary “to take account of the situation of coastal 
States with little or no shelf or with a geologically narrow shelf less than 200 [M] wide”.165 
Uruguay thus proposed that the continental shelf encompass:166  
 
the sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the 
territory of the coastal State, but beyond the external limit of its 
territorial sea, comprising the whole prolongation of the submerged 
territory of the State up to the lower external edge of the continental 
margin bordering on the ocean floor; or, when that edge was situated 
at a distance of less than 200 [M] from the applicable baselines used 
for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea, then up to that 
distance, provided the territorial sea was less than 200 [M] wide. 
 
Although other possible limits were considered at the Second Session of UNCLOS III, 
it appeared that two elements in particular had the capacity to garner general agreement. They 
were: (i) an EEZ up to 200 M; and (ii) sovereign rights over the natural prolongation of a coastal 
State’s land territory where such prolongation extended beyond 200 M.167 At the 19th meeting, 
Iceland commented that it was necessary to start drafting a basic framework for the future 
convention.168 Thus, together with eight other States, Iceland submitted a working paper which 
included the compromise of distance and natural prolongation to the edge of continental 
margin:169 
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CONTINENTAL SHELF 
Article 19 
1. The coastal State exercises sovereign rights over the continental 
shelf for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural 
resources. 
2. The continental shelf of a coastal State extends beyond its 
territorial sea to a distance of 200 [M] from the applicable baselines 
and throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory where 
such natural prolongation extends beyond 200 [M]. 
3. Paragraph 2 of this article shall be without prejudice to the 
provisions concerning delimitation between adjacent and opposite 
States contained in articles and other rules of international law. 
 
The working paper acknowledged that additional provisions were required to cover the 
precise delineation of the limits of the continental margin beyond 200 M.170 Even so, Article 
19 embodied a compromise that was acceptable to those States in favour of a distance criterion, 
as well as those which supported the ‘natural prolongation’ requirement. 
The method to determine the exact location of the outer limit of the continental margin, 
however, was still debated during the Seventh Session in 1977. At the 50th meeting of the 
Seventh Session, Japan stated its opposition to using the sediment thickness method, as it 
considered the method difficult to measure.171 However, Ireland argued that the method was 
entirely practicable, as technology was “available for that purpose and the data…present[ly] 
available had confirmed that such determination was possible”. 172  Nevertheless, Ireland 
acknowledged the reluctance of some States to do the work required by such a method.173 For 
this reason, Ireland included the Hedberg Formula as an alternative method of delineation in its 
proposal, with the result that coastal States would be able to choose the method which they 
preferred.174  
                                                 
170 Ibid. 
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173 Ibid. 
174 Ibid; see also Gardiner, supra note 37, at 159. 
 
114 
 
During the resumed Seventh Session in 1978, the debate on the outer limit of the 
continental shelf centred on the following:175 
1. The Arab Group proposal, which argued that the legal limit of the continental shelf 
should be set at 200 M, resulting in the continental shelf being absorbed into the EEZ 
regime; 
2. The Irish proposal, which included the Gardiner Formula and the Hedberg Formula as 
alternative methods in determining the outer limit of the continental margin; and 
3. The Soviet proposal, which acknowledged that coastal States have jurisdiction over the 
continental margin, but that the legal limit should be artificially set at a distance of 100 
M from the outer limit of the EEZ. 
The Soviet proposal was considered too restrictive by broad-shelf States.176 Thus, at the 
Eighth Session in 1979, the Soviet Union amended its proposal so that the outer limit of the 
continental shelf would not exceed 100 M from the outer limit of the EEZ or 60 M from the 
2,500 metre isobath.177 These cut-off limits to the continental shelf beyond 200 M proved to be 
an important factor in landlocked and geographically disadvantaged States accepting the 
continental margin concept, with a modified version of the cut-off limits later incorporated into 
the LOS Convention.178 
Another compromise benefitting landlocked and geographically disadvantaged States, 
as well as developing States, was the requirement for coastal States to share the revenue derived 
from the exploitation of resources in their continental shelves beyond 200 M.179 This view was 
expressed, for example, by Trinidad and Tobago, which stated that coastal States “should share 
with the international community a portion of the natural resources of their continental shelves 
lying beyond 200 [M]”.180 Mauritius also suggested that for the exploitation of resources in the 
continental shelf beyond 200 [M], “provision could be made for the requirements of developing 
                                                 
175 Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Reports of the Committees 
and Negotiating Groups on Negotiations at the Resumed Seventh Session Contained in a Single Document Both 
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176 Satya N Nandan and Shabtai Rosenne, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 : A 
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landlocked States and developing geographically disadvantaged States by using a revenue-
sharing system”.181  
At the end of the Eighth Session, all of the compromise proposals were incorporated 
into a single draft article:182 
 
Article 76. Definition of the continental shelf 
1. The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the sea-bed and 
subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial 
sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the 
outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 [M] 
from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is 
measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does 
not extend up to that distance. 
1 bis.  The continental shelf of a coastal State shall not extend beyond 
the limits provided for in paragraphs 3 and 3 bis below. 
2. The continental margin comprises the submerged prolongation 
of the land mass of the coastal State, and consists of the sea-bed 
and subsoil of the shelf, the slope and the rise. It does not include 
the deep ocean floor nor the subsoil thereof.  
3. For the purpose of the present Convention, the coastal State shall 
establish the outer edge of the continental margin wherever the 
margin extends beyond 200 [M] from the baselines from which 
the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, by either: 
(a) A line delineated in accordance with paragraph 4 by reference 
to the outermost fixed points at each of which the thickness of 
sedimentary rocks is at least 1 per cent of the continental 
slope; or, 
(b) A line delineated in accordance with paragraph 4 by reference 
to fixed points not more than 60 [M] from the foot of the 
continental slope. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, 
the foot of the continental slope shall be determined as the 
point of maximum change in the gradient at its base. 
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3 bis.  The fixed points comprising the line of the outer limits of the 
continental shelf on the sea-bed, drawn in accordance with 
paragraph 3(a) and (b), shall not exceed 350 [M] from the 
baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured 
or shall not exceed 100 [M] from the 2,500 metre isobath, which 
is a line, connecting the depth of 2,500 metres. 
4. The coastal State shall delineate the seaward boundary of its 
continental shelf where that shelf extends beyond 200 [M] from 
the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is 
measured by straight lines not exceeding 60 [M] in length, 
connecting fixed points, such points to be defined by co-ordinates 
of latitude and longitude. 
5. Information on the limits of the continental shelf beyond the 200 
[M] economic zone shall be submitted by the coastal State to the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf set up under 
annex.., on the basis of equitable geographic representation. The 
Commission shall make recommendations to coastal States on 
matters related to the establishment of the outer limits of their 
continental shelf. The limits of the shelf established by a coastal 
State taking into account these recommendations shall be final 
and binding. 
6. The coastal State shall deposit with the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations charts and relevant information, including 
geodetic data, permanently describing the outer limits of its 
continental shelf. The Secretary-General shall give due publicity 
thereto. 
7. The provisions of this article are without prejudice to the question 
of delimitation of the continental shelf between opposite or 
adjacent States. 
 
The draft article incorporated the distance criterion (200 M), the Irish proposal and a 
modified version of the Soviet proposal, setting the cut-off limit at 350 M from the baseline.183 
It also required the establishment of a Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
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(CLCS) – originally proposed by the United States in 1971 at one of the earlier sessions of the 
Seabed Committee.184  
The compromise position (as reflected in the draft article above) received widespread 
support and was incorporated in the revised Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT) 
distributed in 1980.185 The ICNT also contained a draft article 82, which established a profit 
sharing system for any exploitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 M. This draft article 
allowed landlocked and geographically disadvantaged States, as well as developing States, to 
share in the wealth derived from this area.186 The text of Article 76, as contained in the revised 
ICNT, was adopted almost unchanged in the LOS Convention.  
The first paragraph of Article 76 of the LOS Convention makes clear the entitlement of 
coastal States to a continental shelf:187  
 
1. The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed and 
subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea 
throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer 
edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 [M] from the 
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured 
where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up 
to that distance. 
 
This paragraph provides an entitlement to a continental shelf based on distance and 
natural prolongation, thus striking a compromise between broad-shelf States and those States 
which preferred the continental shelf regime to be absorbed into the EEZ regime. The reference 
to ‘natural prolongation’ was clearly influenced by the ICJ’s decision in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases.188  
The paragraph also provides the legal definition for the continental shelf – one which 
includes not just the geomorphological continental shelf but the whole continental margin. If 
the continental margin of a State does not reach 200 M from its coast, the State would 
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automatically be entitled to a legal continental shelf up to that distance, which corresponds with 
the breadth of the EEZ. If the continental margin extends beyond 200 M, the second paragraph 
of Article 76 establishes the legal limits of the coastal State’s jurisdiction:189 
 
2. The continental shelf of a coastal State shall not extend beyond the 
limits provided for in paragraphs 4 to 6. 
 
Paragraph 3 of Article 76 defines the continental margin – which includes the 
geomorphological continental shelf, slope and rise – while making clear that it does not include 
oceanic ridges:190 
 
3. The continental margin comprises the submerged prolongation of 
the land mass of the coastal State, and consists of the seabed and 
subsoil of the shelf, the slope and the rise. It does not include the 
deep ocean floor with its oceanic ridges or the subsoil thereof. 
 
Figure 1: The Continental Margin 
 
The outer limits of the continental margin beyond 200 M are drawn in accordance with 
the fourth paragraph of Article 76, which includes both the Gardiner and Hedberg Formulas:191 
 
4. (a) For the purposes of this Convention, the coastal State shall 
establish the outer edge of the continental margin wherever the 
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margin extends beyond 200 [M] from the baselines from which the 
breadth of the territorial sea is measured, by either: 
(i) a line delineated in accordance with paragraph 7 by 
reference to the outermost fixed points at each of which 
the thickness of sedimentary rocks is at least 1 per cent of 
the shortest distance from such point to the foot of the 
continental slope; or 
(ii) a line delineated in accordance with paragraph 7 by 
reference to fixed points not more than 60 [M] from the 
foot of the continental slope. 
(b) In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the foot of the 
continental slope shall be determined as the point of maximum 
change in the gradient at its base. 
 
Coastal States may use either or both methods to draw the outer limits of their continental 
margin, whichever is most advantageous to them.  
To guard against a large part of the deep seabed coming under the national jurisdiction 
of States, paragraph 5 of Article 76 adopted the Soviet’s proposal and establishes cut-off limits 
for the continental shelf beyond 200 M:192 
 
5. The fixed points comprising the line of the outer limits of the 
continental shelf on the seabed, drawn in accordance with 
paragraph 4 (a)(i) and (ii), either shall not exceed 350 [M] from the 
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured 
or shall not exceed 100 [M] from the 2,500 metre isobath, which is 
a line connecting the depth of 2,500 metres. 
 
Paragraph 5 provides two cut-off points based on distance and depth criteria. As a result, 
most of the continental margin falls under the jurisdiction of coastal States, while ensuring that 
the resources of the deep seabed are left for the international community. The sixth paragraph 
of Article 76 deals with submarine ridges, limiting national jurisdiction to a distance of 350 
M:193 
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6. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 5, on submarine 
ridges, the outer limit of the continental shelf shall not exceed 350 
[M] from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea 
is measured. This paragraph does not apply to submarine elevations 
that are natural components of the continental margin, such as its 
plateaux, rises, caps, banks and spurs. 
 
It is important to note, however, that the terms ‘submarine ridges’ and ‘submarine 
elevations’ are not defined in the LOS Convention. Thus, both terms are contested among 
members of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS).194  
Paragraph 7 provides that the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 M are 
connected by straight lines not more than 60 M in length, thereby linking the requirements of 
paragraphs 4 to 6:195 
 
7. The coastal State shall delineate the outer limits of its continental 
shelf, where that shelf extends beyond 200 [M] from the baselines 
from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, by straight 
lines not exceeding 60 [M] in length, connecting fixed points, 
defined by coordinates of latitude and longitude. 
 
Paragraph 8 of Article 76 establishes the CLCS, which is authorised to give 
recommendations to coastal States in establishing the outer limits of their continental shelves:196 
 
8. Information on the limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 [M] 
from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is 
measured shall be submitted by the coastal State to the Commission 
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf set up under Annex II on the 
basis of equitable geographical representation. The Commission 
shall make recommendations to coastal States on matters related to 
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the establishment of the outer limits of their continental shelf. The 
limits of the shelf established by a coastal State on the basis of these 
recommendations shall be final and binding. 
 
Once the coastal State has adopted the recommendation of the CLCS, the outer limits are final 
and binding. This provision, however, has been the subject of differing interpretations. 
According to some commentators, such limits are only final and binding on the coastal State, 
while another school of thought considers other States to also be bound.197  
Once the recommendation of the CLCS is adopted, coastal States are required to deposit 
the information of such outer limits with the Secretary General of the United Nations, as 
provided in paragraph 9 of Article 76:198 
 
9. The coastal State shall deposit with the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations charts and relevant information, including geodetic 
data, permanently describing the outer limits of its continental 
shelf. The Secretary-General shall give due publicity thereto. 
 
The process of delineating the outer limits of the continental shelf establishes the limit 
of a State’s entitlement, but does not establish a boundary between States. Indeed, the 
entitlement of States over the continental shelf may overlap, in which case the relevant States 
must come to an agreement as to how to delimit a continental shelf boundary between them. 
Paragraph 10 of Article 76 confirms that the delineation process does not affect delimitation of 
the continental shelf between neighbouring States:199 
 
10. The provisions of this article are without prejudice to the question 
of delimitation of the continental shelf between States with 
opposite or adjacent coasts. 
 
This paragraph confirms that the role of the CLCS is a technical one, scientifically evaluating 
whether coastal States, through their submissions, have fulfilled the requirements of Article 76. 
                                                 
197 Alex G. Oude Elferink, 'Do the Coastal States in the South China Sea Have a Continental Shelf Beyond 200 
Nautical Miles?' in S. Jayakumar, Tommy Koh and Robert C. Beckman (eds), The South China Sea Disputes 
and Law of the Sea, NUS Centre for International Law (Edward Elgar, 2014) 164, at fn 16. 
198 LOS Convention, Art 76(9). 
199 LOS Convention, Art 76(10). 
 
122 
 
 Thus, Article 76 of the LOS Convention fully establishes the legal concept of the 
continental shelf. The article was agreed upon following extensive debates between broad-shelf 
States and other States which were reluctant to expand coastal State jurisdiction beyond 200M. 
In this way, Article 76 embodies a compromise position between the two groups of States - one 
that is complex and highly technical in establishing the outer limits of national jurisdiction over 
the continental shelf.  
 Another compromise that was essential for the passage of Article 76 during UNCLOS 
III appears in Article 82. This article concerns the revenue sharing regime for the exploitation 
of continental shelf resources beyond 200 M. Article 82 of the LOS Convention has also been 
the subject of intense study and debate, as the article does not clearly indicate whether the onus 
to make payments falls to the coastal State or the companies exploiting the resources. An 
examination of the revenue sharing regime established by Article 82 is beyond the purview of 
this thesis.200 However, another important element of Article 76 is the establishment of the 
CLCS, which is authorised to issue recommendations to coastal States in determining the outer 
limits of their continental shelves. This will be discussed briefly in the next section. 
 
4.4. The Role of the CLCS 
As mentioned above, Article 76 of the LOS Convention permits coastal States to extend their 
jurisdiction over their continental shelf beyond 200 M201 by submitting technical information 
to the CLCS.202 Article 76 provides that the CLCS shall make recommendations to coastal 
States on matters related to the establishment of the outer limits of their continental shelves.203 
Any outer limit to the continental shelf beyond 200 M must be made in accordance with the 
CLCS’ recommendation. The outer limits established by a coastal State on the basis of these 
recommendations shall be final and binding.204  
The CLCS was established under Annex II of the LOS Convention and is one of three 
legal bodies established under the Convention, along with the International Seabed Authority 
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(ISA) and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS).205 Unlike the other two 
entities, however, the CLCS does not have an international legal personality or even a budget. 
Members of the CLCS are not employees of the United Nations, but are instead paid by their 
respective States.206 This setup has made it difficult for the Commission to perform its duties, 
as it lacks dedicated premises and is reliant on the Secretariat of the United Nations for support 
– notably secretarial/administrative support but also technical support such as IT and 
geographical information systems (GIS) support. Members of the Commission have even had 
to queue alongside tourists to enter the United Nations building for their plenary sessions.207  
The CLCS consists of 21 members who are experts in the fields of either geology, 
geophysics or hydrography.208 This narrow field of expertise also poses a challenge, as the 
Commission does not have access to legal advice in discharging its duties.209 Indeed, unlike 
the ISA, the CLCS does not have access to ITLOS to request an advisory opinion.210 The lack 
of legal support for the CLCS certainly represents a handicap, especially when a submission is 
disputed by another State and this has been critiqued in the scholarly literature.211  
State Parties to the LOS Convention must submit information concerning the outer 
limits of their continental shelves beyond 200 M to the CLCS within 10 years of the entry into 
force of the Convention; or if a State became a party after the Convention came into force, 10 
years after having become a party to the Convention.212 The LOS Convention came into force 
in 1994, and thus the deadline for submissions by State Parties to the CLCS was supposed to 
be 2004. However, at the 11th Meeting of States Parties to the LOS Convention in 2001, it was 
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decided that for States which became a party to the Convention before 13 May 1999, the 10 
year period would start to run from that date.213 Thus, the deadline was revised to 13 May 2009.  
Due to ongoing challenges in meeting the 10-year limit time period – especially for 
developing States – it was agreed in 2008 that States could meet the 2009 deadline by 
submitting preliminary information to the CLCS.214 The preliminary information did not need 
to contain exact information on the location of the outer limits of the continental shelf, and the 
CLCS would not consider the preliminary submission until the State made a full submission.215 
The CLCS will consider all the information and other material submitted by coastal 
States in proposing the outer limits of their continental shelf beyond 200 M.216 If the coastal 
State disagrees with the recommendations of the CLCS, the coastal State can make a new or 
revised submission within a reasonable time.217 Importantly, the CLCS will not consider any 
submission in which a land or maritime dispute exists218 unless prior consent is given by all 
States that are party to the dispute.219 
That the CLCS lacks a legal personality as compared to other institutions established 
by the LOS Convention (such as ITLOS and the ISA) – as well as its inability to access 
administrative, technical and legal support – was not an oversight by the drafters of the LOS 
Convention. When the establishment of the CLCS was discussed at UNCLOS III, the 
negotiating States did not expect many coastal States to possess continental shelves beyond 
200 M. For example, at the Second Session of UNCLOS III in 1974, Lebanon declared that if 
the idea of the economic zone were adopted, “the concept of the continental shelf would 
become meaningless, except beyond the 200 [M] limit – in which only three or four privileged 
States could exercise sovereign rights”.220 In the same session, Trinidad and Tobago stated that 
“very few States had natural prolongations or continental margins which went beyond 200 
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[M]”.221 This has not proved to be the case, as at the time of writing, the CLCS has received 
84 submissions from over 70 coastal States (with the total number of coastal States exceeding 
80 if we include preliminary information).222 Furthermore, the CLCS is ill-equipped to deal 
with such a large number of submissions, as none of the negotiating States at UNCLOS III 
envisioned the CLCS to be a permanent body.  
The CLCS – or at least the submissions that it has received from coastal States – play 
an important role in assessing whether the continental shelf beyond 200 M may overlap with 
the EEZ of another State, which is the main research question of this thesis. These submissions 
demonstrate how coastal States treat the outer limit of their neighbours’ EEZ, which will be 
analysed in further detail in Chapter 6. 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
Determining the legal limits for the continental shelf regime under international law is closely 
linked to the development of the legal definition of the shelf itself. This Chapter has examined 
the various arguments that were proposed both in support of, and against, the different limits 
considered by the ILC, UNCLOS I and finally UNCLOS III. What started as a reference to the 
physical and geomorphological continental shelf later turned into a legal concept when the ILC 
sought to establish a uniform outer limit for the shelf. This legal concept was expanded further 
after the ICJ introduced the ‘natural prolongation’ doctrine,223 which was used by broad-shelf 
States at UNCLOS III in support of a more extensive jurisdiction over the seabed beyond the 
geomorphological continental shelf. Judge de Aréchaga acknowledged this reality in 1982, 
stating that:224 
 
the [natural prolongation] formula, with a meaning different from that 
attributed to it in the 1969 Judgment, became a trump card for the States 
which were successful in advocating at [UNCLOS III] what has been 
described as the ‘broad shelf school’. 
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222 Submissions, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf, pursuant to article 76, paragraph 8, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
of 10 December 1982, last updated on 25 May 2019, available at 
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/commission_submissions.htm>.  
223 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 2, at para 19. 
224 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Separate Opinion of Judge Jiménez de Aréchaga, 
(1982) ICJ Reports 100, at para 50.  
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 This view, held by broad-shelf States, clashed with the desire of other States for the 
continental shelf regime to be absorbed into the newly established EEZ regime. Indeed, the 
latter group’s proposal would have limited the jurisdiction of coastal States to a distance of 200 
M from their coasts.  
 In order to reach a consensus at UNCLOS III, various compromises on the limits of the 
continental shelf were negotiated and incorporated into the final provisions of the Convention. 
As a compromise in favour of narrow-shelf States, all coastal States now possess jurisdiction 
over their continental shelves to a 200 M distance from the coast.225 This first limit is based 
purely on distance and does not take into account any geological or geomorphological factors. 
As a compromise benefitting broad-shelf States, coastal States have jurisdiction over the 
continental shelf beyond 200 M, provided their continental margins extend beyond that 
distance.226 This second limit is based on geology and geomorphology, and is described in the 
LOS Convention as the edge of the continental margin. As a compromise in favour of 
landlocked and geographically disadvantaged States – as well as developing States – coastal 
States must share the revenue derived from any exploitation of resources of the continental 
shelf beyond 200 M.227 
 To ensure that some resources of the seabed are reserved for the international 
community, UNCLOS III agreed to limit how far coastal States can extend their jurisdiction 
beyond 200 M.228 These ‘cut-off limits’ are distance and depth based, and serve as the final 
limit between national jurisdiction and the international seabed area. To establish the outer 
limits of their jurisdiction, coastal States must receive recommendations from the CLCS,229 a 
scientific body established under the Convention. This delineation process, however, is without 
prejudice to the question of delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite 
or adjacent coasts,230 which will be the focus of the next Chapter. 
 The historical development of the continental shelf regime is important to analyse in 
order to determine whether a coastal State’s continental shelf beyond 200 M may encroach into 
                                                 
225 LOS Convention, Art 76(1). 
226 Ibid. 
227 LOS Convention, Art 82. 
228 LOS Convention, Art 76(5). 
229 LOS Convention, Art 76(8). 
230 LOS Convention, Art 76(10). 
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the EEZ of another State. The delegates at UNCLOS III agreed that the exploitability and the 
depth criteria did not provide the legal certainty they desired with regard to the continental 
shelf limit. As the Conference was debating the limits of the newly established EEZ at the same 
time as the continental shelf, it was natural that the idea of using the same criterion to define 
the limits of the two regimes – that is, the 200 M distance from the baselines, appealed to the 
delegates. This would have simplified the interrelationship between the two regimes, as they 
would have existed within the same space with the same outer limit. However, the broad-shelf 
group was not ready to abandon the geomorphology criteria as their continental shelf (or 
continental margin, as they had successfully argued) extended beyond the 200 M distance limit 
of the EEZ.  
 After considering the various possible limits to the legal concept of the continental 
shelf, the Conference decided on two limits: a 200 M distance limit in the first instance, and 
beyond that, the edge of the continental margin. These dual limits create a complex and 
nuanced relationship between the continental shelf and the EEZ. Using geomorphology as a 
factor to determine the limit of continental shelf should properly have been presented in 
opposition to the distance criterion. Instead, by preserving the geomorphology factor on top of 
the distance factor, the Conference presented the two disparate factors as being complementary 
to each other. This is surely the case if viewed purely from the maritime zones that can be 
generated from a coastal State. Unfortunately, a State does not exist in vacuum, and must 
navigate its entitlements with the entitlements of its neighbours, which means the potential 
exists for overlapping entitlements between coastal States which use different limits from one 
another. In such situation, the dual limits of the continental shelf would become a point of 
contention rather than a complementary basis of maritime zone, as the LOS Convention does 
not place these two limits in order of priority. This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 
6. 
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5. Delimitation of the Continental Shelf and Exclusive Economic 
Zone 
 
5.1. Introduction 
The provisions on the delimitation of the continental shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 
were some of the most contentious to be negotiated during the course of the Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III).1 Unlike the delimitation provisions 
for the territorial sea – where the method of median line had already been established and was 
reaffirmed without much debate2 – the delegates could not agree to a compromise with regard 
to the other maritime zones until the later part of the Conference. The method for delimiting 
the continental shelf had always been a hot topic of debate, even from the negotiations of the 
First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I). This was partly because, 
in contrast to the territorial sea, the continental shelf regime commands a far greater ocean area. 
Indeed, the newly created EEZ regime posed similar challenges due to the vast areas of 
maritime space it could potentially generate for coastal States. Thus, due to the sheer extent of 
the maritime zones, and the contentious nature of dividing up jurisdictional rights over ocean 
space, the delimitation provisions of both regimes were negotiated together at UNCLOS III.3 
 This Chapter will analyse the history and development of the delimitation principles for 
both the EEZ and continental shelf regimes. The previous Chapters traced the history and 
development of the two regimes themselves. This Chapter, however, will focus on the 
operation of international rules and the practice of States when the entitlements of the two 
regimes overlap with each other. Early State practice on the delimitation of the continental 
shelf boundary, as well as the principles laid down in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf (Continental Shelf Convention),4 will be discussed. The influence of the 
1969 judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the North Sea Continental Shelf 
                                                 
1 See Robin R Churchill and Alan V Lowe, The Law of the Sea (Manchester University Press, 3rd ed, 1999), at 
191.  
2 The pattern of State practice relating to delimitation of the territorial sea, both prior to and after UNCLOS III, 
is consistent with the conventional rules laid down in Art 12 of the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention and Art 15 
of the LOS Convention, see ibid, at 183. Article 12 of the LOS Convention repeats almost verbatim Article 12 
of the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, see Donald R Rothwell and Tim Stephens, The International Law of the 
Sea (Hart Publishing, 2nd ed, 2016), at 421.  
3 Churchill and Lowe, supra note 1, at 195. 
4 Convention on the Continental Shelf, 29 April 1958, UNTS 499, at 311 (entered into force 10 June 1964) 
[Continental Shelf Convention].  
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Cases on continental shelf delimitation will then be analysed. The Chapter will then turn to the 
discussions at UNCLOS III, specifically the negotiations relating to the delimitation provisions 
for both the EEZ and the continental shelf. The Chapter concludes by discussing the 
jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals in developing the delimitation principles 
based on the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention). 
  
5.2. Delimitation of the Continental Shelf prior to UNCLOS III 
The Truman Proclamation of 1945 is one of the earliest documents containing a method for 
delimitation of the continental shelf. The relevant part of the declaration states:5 
 
In cases where the continental shelf extends to the shores of another 
State, or is shared with an adjacent State, the boundary shall be 
determined by the United States and the Sate concerned in accordance 
with equitable principles. 
 
When the International Law Commission (ILC) was discussing the continental shelf in 1951, 
it chose not to adopt the ‘equitable principles’ requirement used in the Truman Proclamation, 
instead allowing coastal States to pursue arbitration if they failed to reach a delimitation 
agreement:6 
 
Article 7 
Two or more States to whose territories the same continental shelf is 
contiguous should establish boundaries in the area of the continental 
shelf by agreement. Failing agreement, the parties are under the 
obligation to have the boundaries fixed by arbitration. 
 
 In 1953, the ILC amended the delimitation method it had finalised a few years earlier, 
instead proposing the use of the “principle of equidistance from the base lines from which the 
                                                 
5 1945 US Presidential Proclamation No 2667, Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural 
Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, (1945) 10 Fed Reg 12,305 [Truman 
Proclamation]. 
6 International Law Commission, ‘Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1951 Vol II: Documents of 
the Third Session including the Report of the Commission to the General Assembly’ (United Nations, 1957), at 
143.  The term ‘arbitration’ was used in the widest sense and included possible recourse to the International 
Court of Justice, see ibid. 
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width of the territorial sea of each of the two countries is measured”. 7  Although the 
equidistance principle was proposed as a general rule, the commentary on the article recognised 
that it was subject to modification where special circumstances were present, such as the 
particular configuration of the coast, as well as the presence of islands and navigable channels.8 
This formula was maintained when the ILC updated its draft articles in 1956 and presented 
them to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly,9 with the latter organisation deciding to 
convene UNCLOS I.10 
 
5.2.1. The 1958 Continental Shelf Convention 
The draft articles prepared by the ILC in 1956 were used as a negotiating text at UNCLOS I in 
1958. The provisions on the delimitation of the continental shelf are contained in article 72 of 
the ILC draft articles:11 
 
Article 72 
1. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two 
or more States whose coasts are opposite to each other, the boundary of 
the continental shelf appertaining to such States shall be determined by 
agreement between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless 
another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the 
boundary is the median line, every point of which is equidistant from 
the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each 
country is measured.  
2. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two 
adjacent States, the boundary of the continental shelf shall be 
determined by agreement between them. In the absence of agreement, 
and unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, 
                                                 
7 International Law Commission, ‘Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1953, Volume II: Documents 
of the fifth session including the report of the Commission to the General Assembly’ (United Nations, 1959), at 
213. 
8 Ibid, at 216. 
9 International Law Commission, ‘Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1956 Vol II: Documents of 
the eighth session including the report of the Commission to the General Assembly’ (United Nations, 1957), Art 
72, at 264. 
10 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1105 (XI), International Conference of Plenipotentiaries to 
Examine the Law of the Sea, 21 February 1957, UN Doc A/RES/1105 (XI).  
11 Ibid. 
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the boundary shall be determined by application of the principle of 
equidistance from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial 
sea of each of the two countries is measured. 
 
When the issue of delimiting the continental shelf was debated in the Fourth Committee at 
UNCLOS I, the equidistance method – that is, the median line every point of which is 
equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines – was seen as “[t]he fairest method of 
establishing a sea boundary”.12 
There were, however, some concerns about the equidistance method as proposed in the 
ILC draft articles. Venezuela, for example, did not consider the equidistance method to be a 
feasible solution in all cases, since the continental shelf could not simply be divided down the 
middle.13 For Venezuela, a more practical solution was to allow delimitation only by bilateral 
agreement, and by taking into account any special circumstances which may be present.14  
Yugoslavia, on the other hand, held a different view altogether. Yugoslavia viewed the 
equidistance method as being sufficient by itself, as it provided “a clearly understood method 
of solving the problem of delimitation”.15 According to Yugoslavia, the ‘special circumstances’ 
criterion was “vague and arbitrary, and likely to give rise to misunderstanding and 
disagreement”. Moreover, Yugoslavia submitted there was no established method for 
enumerating these special circumstances, or a governing authority to oversee their 
application.16  
By contrast, the United Kingdom proposed that both the equidistance method and the 
special circumstances criterion as provided in the ILC draft be maintained. The United 
Kingdom explained that:17 
 
                                                 
12 Official Records of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Volume VI (Fourth Committee 
(Continental Shelf)), Summary Records of the 31st to 35th Meetings of the Fourth Committee, UN Doc 
A/CONF.13/C.4/SR.31-35, at 93. 
13 Official Records of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Volume VI (Fourth Committee 
(Continental Shelf)), Summary Records of the 6th to 10th Meetings of the Fourth Committee, UN Doc 
A/CONF.13/C.4/SR.6-10, at 21. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid, at 91. 
17 Ibid. 
 
132 
 
if a divergence from the median line appeared to be indicated by special 
circumstances, another boundary could be established by negotiation, 
but the median line would still serve as the starting point.  
 
The United Kingdom further stated that such special circumstances could include:18 
 
the presence of a small or large island in the area to be apportioned…the 
possession by one of the two States concerned of special mineral 
exploitation rights or fishery rights, or the presence of a navigable 
channel. 
 
In all such cases, the United Kingdom argued, “a deviation from the median line would be 
justified, but the median line would still provide the best starting point for negotiations”.19  
Maintaining both the equidistance method and the special circumstances criterion as 
provided in the ILC draft was the approach favoured by the majority of negotiating States at 
UNCLOS I. Indonesia, for example, stated that article 72 of the ILC draft was “sufficiently 
flexible to provide all States, whatever their geographical situation, with the necessary 
safeguards”.20 Thus, UNCLOS I adopted the ILC draft on the delimitation of the continental 
shelf without any amendments, accepting the median line and the principle of equidistance in 
delimiting the continental shelf between two or more opposing coastal states.21  
 Although Article 6 of the Continental Shelf Convention does not mention any specific 
principle or rule in delimiting the continental shelf unless the Parties fail to reach an agreement, 
it does not automatically follow that the principles of equidistance and special circumstances 
are not relevant during the negotiation process. According to Judge Oda: “[UNCLOS I was] 
meant to provide guidance both before as well as after the ascertainment of any failure to agree”, 
adding that there is “an absence of agreement” in both phases.22 Judge Oda thus interpreted 
Article 6 as suggesting the ‘equidistance/special circumstances method’ as the basis for 
negotiating a continental shelf boundary agreement as well as for third party adjudication.23 
                                                 
18 Ibid, at 93. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid, at 98. 
21 Continental Shelf Convention, Art 6. 
22 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Oda, (1982) ICJ Reports 
157 [Oda], at para 55. 
23 Ibid. 
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This was the case for most of the continental shelf boundaries negotiated after the Continental 
Shelf Convention, at least until the ICJ issued its ruling in the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf 
Cases. 
 
5.2.2. The 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases 
The decision of the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases had a significant impact on 
the development of the doctrine of the continental shelf (see Part 2.7 in Chapter 2).24 Since one 
of the Parties to the dispute – the Federal Republic of Germany – was not a signatory to the 
Continental Shelf Convention, the ICJ had to articulate the criteria for delimiting the 
continental shelf involving States not bound by the Convention. In its judgment, the Court 
confirmed the concept of the continental shelf as having its basis in customary international 
law, stating that:25 
 
…the rights of the coastal State in respect of the area of continental 
shelf that constitutes a natural prolongation of its land territory into and 
under the sea ipso facto and ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty over 
the land, and as an extension of it in an exercise of sovereign rights for 
the purpose of exploring the seabed and exploiting its natural resources. 
 
Although the Court did not elaborate further on the concept of the continental shelf, its ruling 
confirmed the fundamental notion of the shelf area as being the natural prolongation of the land 
territory.26 This case, however, only concerned the issue of delimitation, not the outer limit of 
the continental shelf.27 
The ICJ had thus recognised that coastal States possess inherent sovereign rights to 
explore and exploit the natural resources in the area of the continental shelf that constitute a 
natural prolongation of their land territories into and under the sea.28 This, however, did not 
mean that all the provisions of the Continental Shelf Convention reflected customary 
                                                 
24 North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v the 
Netherlands), 20 February 1969, (1969) ICJ Reports 3 [North Sea Continental Shelf Cases]. 
25 Ibid, at para 19. 
26 Oda, supra note 22, at para 57. 
27 The North Sea is a shallow sea with a depth less than 200 metres, see North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 
supra note 24, at para 4. See also, ibid, at paras 84 & 89. 
28 Ibid, at para 19. 
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international law. Indeed, the Court had made it clear that only Articles 1-3 of the Convention 
were regarded “as reflecting, or as crystallizing, received or at least emergent rules of 
customary international law relevant to the continental shelf”.29 These articles read as follow:30 
 
Article 1 
For the purpose of these articles, the term "continental shelf" is used as 
referring (a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent 
to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 
metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent 
waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said 
areas; (b) to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent 
to the coasts of islands. 
 
Article 2 
1. The coastal State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign 
rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural 
resources. 
2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this article are exclusive in 
the sense that if the coastal State does not explore the continental 
shelf or exploit its natural resources, no one may undertake these 
activities, or make a claim to the continental shelf, without the 
express consent of the coastal State. 
3. The rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not 
depend on occupation, effective or notional, or on any express 
proclamation. 
4. The natural resources referred to in these articles consist of the 
mineral and other non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil 
together with living organisms belonging to sedentary species, that 
is to say, organisms which, at the harvestable stage, either are 
immobile on or under the seabed or are unable to move except in 
constant physical contact with the seabed or the subsoil. 
 
 
                                                 
29 Ibid, at para 63. 
30 Continental Shelf Convention, Arts 1-3. 
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Article 3 
The rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not affect 
the legal status of the superjacent waters as high seas, or that of the 
airspace above those waters. 
 
Regarding Article 6, which contains the application of the equidistance/special 
circumstances principle in cases where the disputing Parties cannot reach an agreement, the 
ICJ pointed out that the use of the equidistance principle can sometimes lead to an unnatural 
result. 31  The Court observed that in certain geographical circumstances, “the slightest 
irregularity in a coastline is automatically magnified by the equidistance line”. 32  This is 
especially the case in concave or convex coastlines (such as Germany’s concave coastline), 
where “if the equidistance method is employed, the results would be unreasonable”.33  
Moreover, the ICJ doubted the customary law status of Article 6 of the Continental 
Shelf Convention. The ICJ pointed out that the equidistance principle was not used in the 
Truman Proclamation; instead, the Proclamation used the equitable principle.34 Furthermore, 
the fact that State Parties to the Continental Shelf Convention can make reservations and 
choose not to be bound by Article 6 led the ICJ to indicate that the Article was not a norm-
making one.35 The Court also found that there were “still unresolved controversies as to the 
exact meaning and scope of the notion [of special circumstances]” relative to the principle of 
equidistance as embodied in Article 6 of the Continental Shelf Convention.36  This issue, 
according to the ICJ, “raised further doubts as to the potentially norm-creating character of the 
rule”.37  
The Court instead stressed the importance of agreement between the disputing Parties, 
as required by Article 6, as well as equitable principles. The Court highlighted that in the draft 
of what would become article 6 prepared by the ILC, the Commission gave priority to 
                                                 
31 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 24, at para 24. 
32 Ibid, at para 89. 
33 Ibid. 
34 See Wolfgang Friedman, ‘The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases – A Critique’ (1970) 64(2) American 
Journal of International Law 229, at 233. 
35 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 24, at para 72. 
36 Ibid, at para 72. 
37 Ibid. 
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delimitation by agreement.38 Article 6, the Court argued, is “so framed as to put second the 
obligation to make use of the equidistance method, causing it to come after a primary obligation 
to effect delimitation by agreement”.39 The Court concluded that the equidistance method could 
not be regarded as a rule of law, since if the method was applied in all situations, it would not 
accord with the basic legal notion that “delimitation must be the object of agreement between 
the States concerned, and that such agreement must be arrived at in accordance with equitable 
principles”.40  
The ICJ thus confirmed that the provisions relating to the delimitation of continental 
shelf did not “embody or crystallize any pre-existing or emergent rule of customary law”.41 
Since the equidistance principle was not considered a rule of law, the ICJ needed to formulate 
an alternative rule.42 The Court then stated that there was no one single criterion to be applied 
in delimiting the continental shelf, and further, that such delimitation should be effected by an 
agreement that is equitable.43  
In his dissenting judgment for the Tunisia/Libya Case, however, Judge Oda criticised 
the Court’s solution in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, labelling it “no solution at all”.44 
Judge Oda propounded that the rule requiring delimitation by agreement was simply a 
procedural rule and not a principle rule of delimitation.45 For Judge Oda, simply because a rule 
does not apply in all situations does not preclude the rule from being a rule. Indeed, such a rule 
may even be of paramount importance.46  
Judge Oda further stated that even Germany, a party which rejected the notion of Article 
6 embodying customary law rules, was not necessarily against the ‘equidistance/special 
circumstances’ method.47 In its pleadings, Germany had conceded that despite it not being 
bound by Article 6 of the Continental Shelf Convention, the Article nonetheless represented “a 
                                                 
38 Ibid, at para 55. 
39 Ibid, at para 72. 
40 Ibid, at para 85. 
41 Ibid, at para 69. 
42 Ibid, at para 83. 
43 Ibid, at para 92. 
44 Oda, supra note 22, at para 60. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid, at para 63. 
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facet of international law by virtue of the high sentiment which it embodies”.48 Instead of 
dismissing the equidistance method altogether, Judge Oda suggested that some of the 
exceptions contemplated by the Article should have been applied by the Court. Indeed, it was 
for this very reason that the Continental Shelf Convention suggested the concept of ‘special 
circumstances’, in which case the coastal front of Germany would most certainly have 
qualified:49 
 
The problem was that in certain cases the application of the equidistance 
method might bring about some effect of distortion contrary to the 
notion of equity. Thus the Convention on the Continental Shelf 
suggested the concept of special circumstances, although what was 
meant by this was not clearly indicated. 
 
According to Oda, the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases did not properly appreciate 
the equidistance method and ignored the full potential of the formula contained in Article 6 of 
the Continental Shelf Convention.50 
Still, the decision of the ICJ influenced the negotiation of continental shelf boundaries 
around the world. Shortly after the decision was handed down, a seabed boundary was 
negotiated between Indonesia and Australia.51 During the negotiation, Indonesia argued that 
the boundary should be the equidistance line, but Australia argued that using such a line was 
inappropriate, as there was a clear break between the continental shelves of Australia and 
Indonesia in the form of the Timor Trough.52 Australia, encouraged by the decision in the North 
Sea Continental Cases, insisted that the natural prolongation of its land goes out until the Timor 
Trough, which at its furthest point is almost 300 M from the coast. Recognising that the law on 
this subject was not in its favour (at least at the time), Indonesia eventually agreed on a 
boundary located at the southern end of the trough. However, with the adoption of the LOS 
                                                 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid, at para 64. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Agreement between the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia and the Government of the Republic of 
Indonesia Establishing Certain Seabed Boundaries in the Area of the Timor and Arafura Seas, Supplementary to 
the Agreement of 18 May 1971, 9 October 1972 (entered into force 8 November 1973), 974 UNTS 319. 
52 Madeleine J Smith, ‘Australian Claims to the Timor Sea’s Petroleum Resources: Clever, Cunning, or 
Criminal?’ (2011) 37(3) Monash University Law Review 42, at 48. 
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Convention in 1982, and the advent of the EEZ regime, the legal landscape in this area would 
undergo a dramatic change. 
  
 
139 
 
 
5.3. The Debates on the Delimitation of the EEZ and Continental Shelf at UNCLOS III 
The rise of the EEZ regime during UNCLOS III had a significant impact on the development 
of the continental shelf regime. While the shelf regime seeks to reserve mineral resources in 
the seabed and subsoil for coastal States, the EEZ regime focuses on the exploitation of 
fisheries resources. 53  Ultimately, Article 56 of the LOS Convention gives coastal States 
sovereign rights to explore and exploit the resources of the seabed and subsoil within the EEZ 
(see the discussion in Part 3.4 of Chapter 3). This means that the same resources can be 
exploited under two different regimes, though it is important to note that rights over the seabed 
resources must be exercised in accordance with Part VI of the LOS Convention on the 
continental shelf.54  
UNCLOS III did not discuss the consequences of the EEZ regime subsuming the 
mineral resources under the continental shelf regime.55 This was because it was unnecessary to 
determine whether mineral resources exploited within 200 M was done under the continental 
shelf regime or the EEZ regime. The way in which the two regimes overlap and operate in 
parallel to each other was the reason why the delimitation provisions of the regimes were jointly 
considered at UNCLOS III.56 This scenario influenced the negotiations of the EEZ delimitation 
provisions, because despite there being no precedent for the delimitation of the EEZ, the 
continental shelf regime had a predecessor in Article 6(1)-(2) of the Continental Shelf 
Convention (where delimitation was based on equidistance and special circumstances, 
respectively).57  
By combining two sets of negotiations into one, the delimitation of the EEZ was 
subjected to the same debates as those of the continental shelf. Indeed, these debates were 
rooted not only in the Continental Shelf Convention but also the 1969 decision of the ICJ in 
the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases. This led to two divergent approaches to delimitation 
being proposed. The first advocated for the application of the median or equidistance line, with 
an exception being made for special circumstances (an approach based on the Continental Shelf 
                                                 
53 According to Judge Oda, both regimes derogated from traditional international law, but were able to be 
justified on the basis of developing international law. See Oda, supra note 22, at para 126. 
54 LOS Convention, Art 56(3). 
55 Oda, supra note 22 at para 128. 
56 Myron H Nordquist (ed), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982: A Commentary, Volume 2 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993) [UNCLOS Commentary Vol 2], at 954. See also Oda, ibid, at para 131. 
57 UNCLOS Commentary Vol 2, ibid. 
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Convention). The second advanced the view that delimitation should apply equitable principles 
(an approach undoubtedly influenced by the ICJ’s decision in the North Sea Continental Shelf 
Cases).58  
The group of States preferring the application of equitable principles was critical of 
Article 6 of the Continental Shelf Convention. Romania, for example, asserted that the 
Convention rules on delimitation between neighbouring States required a plethora of 
amendments to operate practicably and effectively.59 Romania emphasised that:60  
 
delimitation should be effected exclusively by agreement between two 
neighbouring States in accordance with equitable principles, taking into 
account all the circumstances affecting the marine or ocean area 
concerned and all relevant geographical, geological or other factors. 
 
This statement shows that Romania was clearly influenced by the judgment of the ICJ in the 
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases.  
Thailand also considered the Convention to offer little practical guidance. 61  For 
Thailand, the application of the equidistance line was only valid in the absence of special 
circumstances. However, the definition of ‘special circumstances’, and the criteria for 
determining the boundary line in such a case, were all left to the Parties concerned to 
negotiate. 62  Thailand also argued that the equidistance rule gave importance to some 
geographical features or circumstances that were purely accidental, while completely ignoring 
other features and circumstances of greater relevance. 63  Thus, the application of the 
equidistance rule, according to Thailand, did not necessarily guarantee an equitable division of 
the area but frequently led to the opposite result.64 Thailand then concluded that no system of 
law could disregard equitable principles, which in its view meant that “the [P]arties were free 
                                                 
58 Ibid. 
59 Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Summary Records of 19th 
Meeting of the Second Committee, UN Doc A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.19, 30 July 1974, at para 5. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid, at para 55. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid, at para 56. 
64 Ibid. 
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to apply a combination of different methods, rather than a rigid mathematical or cartographical 
formula”.65 
Denmark, on the other hand, viewed the equidistance principle in Article 6 of the 
Continental Shelf Convention as having “won general recognition based on law and practice”.66 
Indeed, Denmark ventured further, stating that without such a rule “there would be no objective 
criteria on which to base a delimitation: everything would be open to negotiation and ad hoc 
solutions”.67 Italy agreed with Denmark, submitting that the equidistance criteria embodied in 
the Continental Shelf Convention remained valid.68 Malta asserted that the Court’s ruling in 
the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases applied exclusively to the question of delimitation 
between adjacent States, and did not affect the validity of the median line principle in cases of 
opposite coasts. For this reason, Malta argued that “the principle of the median line constituted 
an old-established rule of international law, especially as between opposite States”, and should 
thus be embodied in the new convention.69 
Turkey took a more conciliatory approach, stating that States should be able “to use the 
most appropriate method, or combination of methods, in accordance with the particular 
circumstances and equity”, including that of equidistance.70 Turkey pointed out that although 
the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases stated that the application of the equidistance 
principle was not mandatory, it did not abandon the principle altogether. 71  Thus, while 
conceding that the equidistance principle could not be applied unilaterally, Turkey submitted 
that States could apply the principle by agreement in their delimitation.72  
Similarly, Libya opined that to guarantee greater flexibility, the delimitation method 
should be “agreed on by the various [P]arties concerned, having due regard to prevailing 
conditions and special circumstances”.73  The Netherlands also stressed the importance of 
                                                 
65 Ibid, at para 57. 
66 Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Summary Records of 20th 
Meeting of the Second Committee, UN Doc A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.20, 30 July 1974, at para 23. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid, at para 89. 
69 Ibid, at para 105. 
70 Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Summary Records of 27th 
Meeting of the Second Committee, UN Doc A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.27, 5 August 1974, at para 38. 
71 Ibid, at para 39. 
72 Ibid, at para 40. 
73 Ibid, at para 45. 
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special circumstances, asserting that such circumstances would have to be considered in order 
to correct the application of the equidistance principle (and thus arrive at an equitable solution 
for all). For this reason, the Netherlands proposed the phrase "equitable principles, taking into 
account all relevant circumstances".74 
There was a strong willingness on both sides of the debate to clarify the ‘special 
circumstances’ that may affect the delimitation method, whether in the form of the equidistance 
rule or the equitable principle. France, for example, proposed a draft article that treated the 
existence of islands or islets as a special circumstance.75 The full draft article read as follows:76 
 
1. The delimitation of the continental shelf or of the economic zone 
between adjacent and/or opposite States shall be effected by 
agreement between them; in accordance with an equitable dividing 
line, the median or equidistance line not being the only method of 
delimitation. 
2. For this purpose, account shall be taken, inter alia, of the special 
nature of certain circumstances, including the existence of islands 
or islets situated in the area to be delimited or of such a kind that 
they might affect the delimitation to be carried out. 
 
The United Kingdom, however, objected to France’s proposal to treat the presence of islands 
as a special circumstance. This was because Article 6 of the Continental Shelf Convention did 
not isolate islands as being subject to special treatment.77 
In addition to France’s proposal, a group of African States proposed a draft article that 
included geological and geomorphological factors as an example of special circumstances for 
the delimitation of the EEZ.78 The full draft article is provided below:79 
                                                 
74 Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Summary Records of 28th 
Meeting of the Second Committee, UN Doc A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.28, 6 August 1974, at para 13. 
75 France: draft article on the delimitation of the continental shelf or of the economic zone, UN Doc 
A/CONF.62/C.2/L.74, 22 August 1974. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Gambia, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Mali, 
Mauritania, Morocco, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tunisia, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of 
Tanzania and Zaire: Draft Articles on the Exclusive Economic Zone, UN Doc A/CONF.62/C.2/L.82, 26 August 
1974. 
79 Ibid. 
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Article 8 
1. The delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone between adjacent 
or opposite States shall be done by agreements between them on 
the basis of principles of equity, the median line not being the only 
method of delimitation. 
2. For this purpose, special account shall be taken of geological and 
geomorphological factors as well as other special circumstances 
which prevail. 
 
The negotiating States, however, failed to agree on which factors should considered special 
circumstances. This led some States to question whether it was necessary to include such a 
criterion at all. Thus, when the Informal Single Negotiating Text (ISNT) was presented in 1975, 
it omitted all reference to factors deemed special or relevant circumstances80 (as had been 
proposed by various delegates in the previous sessions).  
The delimitation provisions for both the EEZ and the continental shelf in the ISNT are 
identical, and echo Article 6(1)-(2) of the Continental Shelf Convention:81 
 
Articles 61 / 70 
1. The delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone/the continental 
shelf between adjacent or opposite States shall be effected by agreement 
in accordance with equitable principles, employing, where appropriate, 
the median or equidistance line, and taking account of all the relevant 
circumstances. 
 
At the Sixth Session in 1977, the delimitation proposals continued to emphasise either the 
equidistance rule or equitable principles. The articles from the ISNT were renumbered as 
                                                 
80 International jurisprudence tends to consider the terms ‘special’ and ‘relevant’ circumstances interchangeable, 
see for example Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, and the French Republic (UK, France), Award, 14 March 1978, XVIII Reports of 
International Arbitral Awards 3, at para 148. For a more detailed discussion on the terms ‘special’ and ‘relevant’ 
circumstances, see Malcolm D Evans, Relevant Circumstances and Maritime Delimitation (Clarendon Press, 
1989), at 78-83. 
81 Informal Single Negotiating Text, UN Doc A/CONF.62/WP.8/Part II, 7 May 1975, at 162 & 163. 
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Articles 74 and 83 and incorporated into the Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT).82 
However, no changes were made to the substance of the articles, as “it had not been possible 
to devise a formula which would narrow the differences between the opposing points of view” 
– namely, the equidistance method and the equitable principle.83 
At the Seventh Session in 1978, the General Committee identified seven outstanding 
core issues and appointed negotiating groups to discuss each issue. The seventh negotiating 
group was tasked with the issue of “[d]elimitation of maritime boundaries between adjacent 
and opposite States and settlement of disputes thereon”.84 Negotiating Group 7 considered two 
main proposals for the first paragraph of Articles 74 and 83, which concerned the delimitation 
of the EEZ and continental shelf. The first was proposed by a group of States supporting the 
equidistance method, and read as follows:85 
 
The delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone/continental Shelf 
between adjacent or opposite States shall be effected by agreement 
employing, as a general principle, the median or equidistance line, 
taking into account any special circumstances where this is justified.  
 
The second proposal was submitted by a group of States that supported the equitable principle 
as the method of delimitation. The proposal read as follows:86 
 
The delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone (or Continental Shelf) 
between adjacent or/and opposite States shall be effected by agreement, 
in accordance with equitable principles taking into account al1 relevant 
circumstances and employing any methods, where appropriate, to lead 
to an equitable solution. 
                                                 
82 Informal Composite Negotiating Text, UN Doc A.CONF.62/WP.10, 15 July 1977, Arts 74 & 83. 
83 Memorandum by the President of the Conference on document A/CONF.62/WP.10, UN Doc 
CONF.62/WP.10/Add.1, 22 July 1977, at 69.  
84 Organization of work: Decisions taken by the Conference at its 90th meeting on the report of the General 
Committee, UN Doc A/CONF.62/62, 13 April 1978, at 8.  
85 Informal suggestions by the Bahamas, Barbados, Canada, Colombia, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Gambia, 
Greece, Guyana, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Malta, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom 
and Yugoslavia (joined later by Cape Verde, Chile, Denmark, Guinea-Bissau, and Portugal), UN Doc NG 7/2. 
86 Informal suggestions by Algeria, Bangladesh, Benin, Burundi, Congo, France, Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, 
Kenya, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nicaragua, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Romania, Senegal, Syrian Arab Republic, Somalian Democratic 
Republic, Turkey, Venezuela and Viet Nam, UN Doc NG 7/10. 
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In order to reach a consensus between the two groups, the Chairman of the Negotiating 
Group 7 proposed a compromise formula:87 
 
Articles 74/83 
1. The delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone/Continental 
Shelf between opposite or adjacent States shall be effected by 
agreement with a view of reaching a solution based upon equitable 
principles, taking account of all the relevant circumstances, and 
employing, where local conditions do not make it unjustified, the 
principle of equidistance. 
 
However, the Chairman’s proposal did not garner acceptance as neither side was willing to 
deviate from their initial positions.88 Although the two groups could not agree on a compromise 
formulation, they were nonetheless determined to reach consensus. To this end, there was a 
general understanding that the following four elements would form part of the final solution:89  
 
(1) a reference to the effect that any measure of delimitation should be 
effected by agreement;  
(2) a reference to the effect that all relevant or special circumstances are 
to be taken into account in the process of delimitation;  
(3) in some form, a reference to equity or equitable principles;  
(4) in some form, a reference to the median or equidistance line.  
 
The first two elements of delimitation were generally agreed by the delegates, but the third and 
fourth elements were subject to controversy.90  
                                                 
87 Report of the Chairman of Negotiating Group 7, UN Doc NG 7/11 (1978, mimeo.), Articles 74/83 (Chairman, 
NG7), reproduced in Renate Platzöder (ed), Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: 
Documents, vol IX (Oceana Publications, 1982), at 405.  
88 Report of the Chairman of Negotiating Group 7, UN Doc NG 7/21 (1978, mimeo.), Articles 74/83 (Chairman, 
NG7), reproduced in Platzöder, ibid, at 425. 
89 Report by the Chairman of Negotiating Group 7 on the work of the Group at its 7th-27th meetings, UN Doc 
NG 7/24, 14 September 1978, quoted in Oda, supra note 22, at para 137.  
90 Ibid. 
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 In the following sessions, Negotiating Group 7 repeatedly failed to reach a compromise 
between equitable principles and the equidistance rule. Ambassador Satya Nandan of Fiji, who 
served as the Rappertour of the Second Committee, recalled that the negotiation had become 
so toxic at this point that the mere mention of the phrase ‘equitable principles’ or ‘equidistance 
line’ would result in the proposal being rejected.91 The Chairman of Negotiating Group 7 
outlined this impasse in his report to the Second Committee during the Eight Session:92  
  
From the outset the negotiations were characterized by the opposing 
positions of delegations supporting the equidistance rule and those 
specifically emphasizing delimitation in accordance with equitable 
principles…[T]he necessary compromise might be within reach if 
the Group could agree upon a 'neutral' formula avoiding any 
classification or hierarchy of the elements concerned…[P]ersonally 
I doubt, whether, in view of our lengthy deliberations and taking into 
account the controversies still prevailing, the Conference may ever 
be in a position to produce a provision which would offer a precise 
and definite answer to the question of delimitation criteria. 
 
At the Ninth Session, the chairman of Negotiating Group 7 suggested the following 
articles be incorporated into the revised ICNT:93  
 
Articles 74/83 
1. The delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone/the continental 
shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be 
effected by agreement in conformity with international law. Such 
an agreement shall be in accordance with equitable principles, 
employing the median or equidistance line, where appropriate, and 
taking account of al1 circumstances prevailing in the areas 
concerned. 
                                                 
91 Personal conversation between the author and Ambassador Satya Nandan of Fiji. The discussions were 
conducted in Singapore between 2 March and 1 April 2015. Transcripts of the discussions are available from the 
author. 
92 Report of the Chairman of Negotiating Group 7, UN Doc NG 7/39 (1978, mimeo.), Articles 74/83(1) and (3) 
(Chairman, NG7), reproduced in Platzöder, supra note 87, at 459-61. 
93 Report of the Chairman of Negotiating Group 7, UN Doc A/CONF.62/L.47, 24 Mach 1980, at 77-78. 
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However, Ireland (representing the equitable principles group), stated it could not accept the 
reformulated articles because they did not “emerge from negotiations themselves” and lacked 
“the widespread and substantial support” in the plenary “to offer a substantially improved 
prospect of consensus”.94 
At the Tenth Session, Conference President Tommy Koh directly negotiated with Spain 
and Ireland (representatives of the equidistance and equitable principles groups respectively) 
with the help of the Rapporteur of the Second Committee.95 Based on these negotiations, the 
President introduced a new compromise text, which read as follows:96 
 
Articles 74/83. Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone/ 
Continental Shelf between States with Opposite or Adjacent Coasts 
1. The delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone/ the continental 
shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected 
by agreement on the basis of international law as referred to in Article 
38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve 
an equitable solution. 
 
This formulation, which eschewed any mention of a delimitation method, gained the support 
of the two delimitation groups. In light of such agreement, the text was eventually adopted and 
incorporated into the LOS Convention.  
 The Conference had thus managed to agree on a method for delimiting the EEZ and 
continental shelf - one that was based on equity but did not rule out the element of equidistance. 
It is clear from even a cursory reading of this compromise provision that no guidance is 
provided on what delimitation method should be used. Even the reference to agreement being 
effected “on the basis of international law as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice” does not provide any real or practicable solution.97 Nor does it 
                                                 
94 Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Volume XIV (Summary 
Records, Plenary, General Committee, First and Third Committees, as well as Documents of the Conference, 
Resumed Ninth Session), 130th Plenary Meeting, UN Doc A.CONF.62/SR.130, 28 July 1980, at para 59. 
95 UNCLOS Commentary Vol 2, supra note 56, at 979. 
96 Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Volume XIV (Documents of 
Resumed Tenth Session), UN Doc A/CONF.62/WP.11, 3-28 August 1981, reproduced in Platzöder, supra note 
87, at 474. 
97 Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides that: 
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offer any suggestion as to what form the “equitable solution” might take.98 Even so, this 
formulation was the only one acceptable to both groups in Negotiating Group 7. Despite the 
vague nature of the articles, it is clear that the rules and principles applicable to the delimitation 
of the continental shelf also apply to the EEZ, even if the application of the principles differs 
between the two regimes. 
 
5.4. The Influence of the EEZ on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf 
Following the adoption of the delimitation provisions on overlapping EEZ and continental shelf 
claims at UNCLOS III, the ICJ and other international Tribunals started to apply the principles 
laid down in Articles 74 and 83 of the LOS Convention.99 A few years after UNCLOS III, the 
ICJ issued its decision in the Libya/Malta Continental Shelf Case. This was the first 
delimitation case considered by the ICJ following the adoption of the LOS Convention, and the 
Court’s first delimitation case exclusively between States with opposite coasts.100 Unlike the 
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases in 1969, the Court in this case had to consider not only the 
delimitation of a new maritime zone – the EEZ – but also how to apply the new definition of 
the continental shelf. The distance between Libya and Malta is less than 400 M, which means 
that there was overlapping EEZ and continental shelf entitlements between the two States. Thus, 
the Court had to decide whether to apply the circumstances relevant to the delimitation of the 
EEZ or those for the delimitation of the continental shelf in drawing the maritime boundary in 
the disputed area. 
                                                 
 1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as 
are submitted to it, shall apply: 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting states; 
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law. 
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the 
parties agree thereto. 
98 Oda, supra note 22, at para 144. 
99 See Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Merits, Judgment, 3 June 1985, (1985) ICJ Reports 
13 [Libya/Malta], at 51; Second Stage of the Proceedings between Eritrea and Yemen (Maritime Delimitation), 
Award, 17 December 1999, XXII Reports of International Arbitral Awards 335, at 116; Maritime Delimitation 
in the Black Sea (Romania v Ukraine), Judgment, 3 February 2009, (2009) ICJ Reports 61 [Black Sea Case], at 
120.  
100 Libya/Malta, ibid, at para 62. 
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Malta argued that the ICJ should only consider the circumstances relevant to the 
delimitation of the EEZ. Malta submitted that the genesis of the EEZ concept, and its inclusion 
in the LOS Convention, confirmed the “importance of the ‘distance principle’ in the law of the 
continental shelf and the detachment of the concept of the shelf from any criterion of physical 
prolongation”.101 Libya, on the other hand, contended that the circumstances relevant to the 
delimitation of the continental shelf should be taken into account. Libya stated that:102 
 
the continental shelf has not been absorbed by the concept of [the EEZ] 
under present international law; and that the establishment of…[the 
EEZ] has not changed the law of maritime zone delimitation, or given 
more prominence to the criterion of distance from the coast.  
 
The ICJ, though agreeing with Libya that the EEZ had not absorbed the continental 
shelf concept, pointed out that the two concepts are inextricably linked:103 
 
In the view of the Court, even though the present case relates only to 
the delimitation of the continental shelf and not to that of the Exclusive 
Economic Zone, the principles and rules underlying the latter concept 
cannot be left out of consideration. As the 1982 Convention 
demonstrates, the two institutions - continental shelf and Exclusive 
Economic Zone – are linked together in modern law. Since the rights 
enjoyed by a State over its continental shelf would also be possessed by 
it over the sea-bed and subsoil of any Exclusive Economic Zone which 
it might proclaim, one of the relevant circumstances to be taken into 
account for the delimitation of the continental shelf of a State is the 
legally permissible extent of the Exclusive Economic Zone 
appertaining to that same State. This does not mean that the concept of 
the continental shelf has been absorbed by that of the Exclusive 
Economic Zone; it does however signify that greater importance must 
be attributed to elements, such as distance from the Coast, which are 
common to both concepts. 
                                                 
101 Ibid, at para 31. 
102 Ibid, at para 32. 
103 Ibid, at para 33. 
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 The Court further stated that the 200 M distance criterion must now apply to the continental 
shelf as well as to the EEZ:104 
 
…where the continental margin does not extend as far as 200 miles 
from the shore, natural prolongation, which in spite of its physical 
origins has throughout its history become more and more a complex 
and juridical concept, is in part defined by distance from the shore, 
irrespective of the physical nature of the intervening sea-bed and 
subsoil. 
  
Thus, in this instance the Court observed that the legal development of the continental 
shelf concept (as reflected on the LOS Convention), establishes the continental shelf of a 
coastal State to the outer edge of the continental margin or to a distance of 200 M from the 
baselines. 105  This definition represents a significant departure from the water depth and 
exploitability criteria in the Continental Shelf Convention. 106  Since the LOS Convention 
enables a State to extend its shelf jurisdiction as far as 200 M from its coast, regardless of the 
geological characteristics of the corresponding seabed and subsoil, the ICJ found that “there 
[was] no reason to ascribe any role to geological or geophysical factors within that distance 
either in verifying the legal title of the States concerned or in proceeding to a delimitation as 
between their claims”.107 This judgment clarifies that for areas situated at a distance less than 
200 M from the coasts, title to the continental shelf depends solely on the distance from the 
coasts of the relevant coastal States.108 Thus, for delimitation between opposing coastal States 
where the distance is less than 400 M, the geological or geomorphological characteristics are 
“completely immaterial”.109 
                                                 
104 Ibid, at para 34. 
105 LOS Convention, Art 76(1). 
106 Continental Shelf Convention, Art 1. 
107 Libya/Malta, supra note 99, at para 39. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Ibid, 
 
151 
 
 This precedent continues to be followed today,110 not only by the ICJ but by other 
Tribunals as well. In the continental shelf and EEZ delimitation case between Denmark 
(Greenland) and Norway (Jan Mayen) in 1992, none of the disputing Parties couched their 
arguments in terms of geological or geomorphological factors.111 In the arbitration award on 
the maritime delimitation dispute between Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago in 2006, the 
Tribunal noted that after the adoption of the LOS Convention and the emergence of the EEZ 
regime, a new entitlement based on distance was introduced.112 The Tribunal in that case 
reiterated the ICJ’s finding in the Libya/Malta case – that is, within 200 M from a State’s 
baseline, distance is the basis for entitlement to both the EEZ and the continental shelf.113  
The ICJ confirmed its earlier ruling in the 2012 delimitation dispute between Nicaragua 
and Colombia, stating that “geological and geomorphological considerations are not relevant 
to the delimitation of overlapping entitlements within 200 nautical miles of the coasts of 
States”.114 Thus, the precedent set by international courts and tribunals has been consistent in 
this instance, putting beyond question the proposition that for boundary delimitation between 
opposing States less than 400 M apart, distance – and not geological or geomorphological 
factors – is the relevant consideration.  
 
5.5. The Three-Stage Approach in Drawing Maritime Boundaries 
Having established that geological and geomorphological factors no longer play a role in 
maritime delimitation between two coastal States less than 400 M apart in the Libya/Malta case, 
the ICJ remained reluctant to use equidistance as the only method in delimiting the boundary 
                                                 
110 Note that the term ‘precedent’ is being used throughout this Thesis in a practical sense rather than in the 
formal common law sense. The ICJ does not create formal ‘precedents’; and although the ICJ may refer to its 
precedent in developing its jurisprudence, it has no binding character. See Gilbert Guillaume, ‘The Use of 
Precedent by International Judges and Arbitrators’ (2011) 2(1) Journal of International Dispute Settlement 5, at 
9. 
111 The ICJ considered the following factors in drawing the boundary: “geography, population, constitutional 
status of the respective territories of Jan Mayen and Greenland, socio-economic structure, cultural heritage, 
proportionality, the conduct of the Parties, and other delimitations in the region”, see Maritime Delimitation in 
the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v Norway) Judgment, 14 June 1993, (1993) ICJ Reports 
38 [Jan Mayen case], at para 60. 
112 Barbados v Trinidad & Tobago, Award, 11 April 2006, XXVII Reports of International Arbitral Awards 147 
[Barbados v Trinidad and Tobago], at para 224. 
113 Ibid, at para 226. 
114 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v Colombia), Judgment, 19 November 2012, (2012) ICJ 
Reports 624 [Nicaragua v Colombia], at para 214. 
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between the disputing Parties. In its judgment, the Court noted that the equidistance method 
had failed to gain acceptance at UNCLOS III.115 The ICJ stated that:116  
 
…a coastal State may be entitled to continental shelf rights by reason 
of distance from the coast, and irrespective of the physical 
characteristics of the intervening sea-bed and subsoil, does not entail 
that equidistance is the only appropriate method of delimitation, even 
between opposite or quasi-opposite coasts, nor even the only 
permissible point of departure. The application of equitable principles 
in the particular relevant circumstances may still require the adoption 
of another method, or combination of methods, of delimitation, even 
from the outset. 
 
Even so, the Court affirmed that the equidistance method could still lead to an equitable result, 
particularly when the delimitation involved States with opposite coasts.117 This was also the 
view of the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, where the equidistance method was 
not entirely rejected. Indeed, the Court noted that:118 
 
The continental shelf area off, and dividing, opposite States, can be 
claimed by each of them to be a natural prolongation of its territory. 
These prolongations meet and overlap, and can therefore only be 
delimited by means of a median line; and, ignoring the presence of islets, 
rocks and minor coastal projections, the disproportionally distorting 
effect of which can be eliminated by other means, such a line must 
effect an equal division of the particular area involved. 
 
Thus, in the Libya/Malta case, the ICJ found that the equidistance/median line method 
was appropriate for delimitation between opposite coasts. However, in order to achieve an 
equitable result in these types of cases, an additional step must be taken – namely, “applying 
                                                 
115 Libya/Malta, supra note 99, at para 43.  
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid, at para 62. 
118 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 24, at para 57. 
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equitable principles to the relevant circumstances”.119 The ICJ thus conducted the delimitation 
in stages, first by drawing a provisional line using the equidistance line, and secondly, by 
examining the provisional line “in the light of the requirements derived from other criteria, 
which may call for a correction of [the] initial result”.120 
Even though the ICJ did not consider it obligatory to use the equidistance or median 
line method to draw the provisional line,121 when a Chamber of the ICJ issued its decision in 
the delimitation between the United States and Canada in the Gulf of Maine in 1984, it used 
the same method.122 In its judgment, the Chamber stated that where a two-stage operation is 
necessitated, first stage involves “the choice and concrete utilization of the practical method” 
in the disputed area. In the context of the case, the chamber found that the median delimitation 
line was the most appropriate one.123 The second stage calls for a more thorough examination 
of the provisional median line to ensure its equitable character.124 The Chamber confirmed that 
this is a “fundamental rule of general international law governing maritime delimitations”.125 
In the intervening years, the ICJ has consistently followed this two-stage approach 
when constructing maritime boundaries in delimitation disputes, and has come to accept the 
equidistance/median line method as the appropriate method to draw the provisional line. This 
was articulated by the ICJ in the 1993 Jan Mayen delimitation case between Norway and 
Denmark. The Court declared that there was an established precedent “to begin with the median 
line as a provisional line and then to ask whether ‘special circumstances’ require any 
adjustment or shifting of that line”.126 The ICJ adopted the same approach in the 2001 decision 
on the maritime boundary dispute between Qatar and Bahrain. In its decision, the ICJ stated 
that for the delimitation of maritime zones beyond 12 M, it would first draw the provisional 
equidistance line before considering whether any circumstances required an adjustment of that 
                                                 
119 Libya/Malta, supra note 99, at para 63. 
120 Ibid, at para 60. 
121 Ibid, at para 43.  
122 Case Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada v United States 
of America), Judgment, 12 October 1984, (1984) ICJ Reports 246. 
123 Ibid, at para 216. 
124 Ibid, at para 217. 
125 Ibid, at para 230 
126 Jan Mayen case, supra note 111, at para 51. 
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line.127 Accordingly, this approach became known as the ‘equidistance/relevant circumstances’ 
method.128 
The two-stage approach became a more clearly defined three-stage approach when the 
ICJ issued its decision in the 2009 Black Sea Case between Romania and Ukraine. In its 
decision, the ICJ laid down a three-stage approach in delimiting maritime boundaries as 
follows:129  
(i) establish the provisional equidistance line;130 
(ii) consider whether any factors call for an adjustment of the equidistance line to reach 
an equitable result; and,  
(iii) verify that that line does not lead to an inequitable result by reason of any marked 
disproportion between the ratio of the respective coast lengths and the ratio between 
the relevant maritime area of each State by reference to the delimitation line.  
In its ruling in the delimitation dispute between Nicaragua and Colombia in 2012, the 
ICJ stated that unless it is unfeasible to do so,131 the Court would normally use the three-stage 
approach to effect delimitation between overlapping EEZ or continental shelf claims.132 In its 
2014 judgment on the delimitation dispute between Peru and Chile, the Court again confirmed 
that the three-stage approach is the preferred method to seek an equitable solution in maritime 
delimitation. In that case, the ICJ stated that:133 
 
The methodology which the Court usually employs in seeking an 
equitable solution involves three stages. In the first, it constructs a 
provisional equidistance line unless there are compelling reasons 
preventing that. At the second stage, it considers whether there are 
                                                 
127 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, Merits, Judgment, 16 March 
2001, (2001) ICJ Reports 40 [Qatar v Bahrain], at para 230. 
128 Ibid, at para 231. 
129 Black Sea Case, supra note 99, at paras 116-122.  
130 Note the strong language in favour of the application of equidistance for construction of a provisional 
delimitation line at the first stage “unless there are compelling reasons that make this unfeasible”, see ibid, at 
para 116.  
131 Nicaragua argued strongly that this was the case – that the three-stage process was unfeasible given the 
proximity of the Colombian islands to the Nicaraguan mainland coast, but the ICJ nonetheless proceeded with 
the three-stage approach, despite the existence of unpromising geographical circumstances, see Nicaragua v 
Colombia, supra note 114, at para 194.  
132 Ibid, at paras 190-199. 
133 Maritime Dispute (Peru v Chile), Judgment, 27 January 2014, (2014) ICJ Reports 3, at para 180. 
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relevant circumstances which may call for an adjustment of that line to 
achieve an equitable result. At the third stage, the Court conducts a 
disproportionality test in which it assesses whether the effect of the line, 
as adjusted, is such that the Parties’ respective shares of the relevant 
area are markedly disproportionate to the lengths of their relevant coasts 
 
This multi-stage approach (which is also known as the equidistance/relevant 
circumstances method) is used in maritime delimitation cases not only by the ICJ, but also by 
other international Tribunals. The Arbitral Tribunal in the case between Barbados and Trinidad 
and Tobago followed this approach, though the second and third stages were condensed into 
one, resulting in a two-stage approach:134  
 
The determination of the line of delimitation thus normally follows a 
two-step approach. First, a provisional line of equidistance is posited as 
a hypothesis and a practical starting point. While a convenient starting 
point, equidistance alone will in many circumstances not ensure an 
equitable result in the light of the peculiarities of each specific case. The 
second step accordingly requires the examination of this provisional 
line in the light of relevant circumstances, which are case specific, so 
as to determine whether it is necessary to adjust the provisional 
equidistance line in order to achieve an equitable result. 
 
Thus, in substance, the Arbitral Tribunal in the Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago case still 
followed the three-stage approach set by the ICJ. The International Tribunal for the Law of the 
Sea (ITLOS) also confirmed the three-stage approach as the preferred method for delimitation 
not only for the EEZ, but also for the outer continental shelf.135 It is therefore clear that 
international courts and tribunals have settled on a preferred method for delimiting maritime 
zones, including the EEZ and continental shelf, in order to achieve an equitable solution as 
required by Articles 74 and 83 of the LOS Convention.136 
                                                 
134 Barbados v Trinidad and Tobago, supra note 112, at para 242. 
135 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar), Judgment, 14 March 
2012, (2012) ITLOS Reports 4 [Bangladesh/Myanmar] at paras 239 & 455.  
136 Note, however, that in the first stage, the provisional lines drawn by the Court or Tribunal were not strict 
equidistance lines, as the adjudicating authority was selective in choosing the base points to be used. Thus, in 
the first stage, the Court or Tribunal had already drawn an adjusted provisional equidistance line. See for 
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5.6. The Relevance of the ‘Natural Prolongation’ Concept 
After the adoption of the LOS Convention and the EEZ regime, it was necessary to consider 
whether the concept of natural prolongation was still relevant in maritime delimitation. The 
concept of natural prolongation was not used by either the ILC or the framers of the Continental 
Shelf Convention,137 but was rather introduced by the ICJ in 1969.138 Since the ICJ mentioned 
the concept in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases,139 it has been frequently cited in the 
decisions of international courts and tribunals on the delimitation of continental shelves.140 In 
that case, the concept of natural prolongation was not only considered a fundamental basis of 
entitlement, but also crucial to the delimitation of the continental shelf itself.141  
The use of natural prolongation as the method for delimiting the continental shelf was 
criticised by Brown, who stated that “the concept...was irrelevant to the delimitation of lateral 
boundaries of the continental shelf under international customary law”.142 Brown argued that 
Article 6(2) of the Continental Shelf Convention does not mention natural prolongation, and 
that “the concept...belongs to the problem of the seaward extension of the continental shelf, not 
to its delimitation as between opposite or adjacent States”.143 Brown further stated that natural 
prolongation concept would only be relevant to delimitation if there is “a major and persistent 
structural discontinuity of the seabed and subsoil of such a kind as to interrupt the essential 
geological continuity of the continental shelf”.144 In such a case, however, Brown considered 
                                                 
example, Black Sea Case, supra note 99, at para 149; and ibid, at para 265. See also Clive Schofield, ‘One Step 
Forwards, Two Steps Back?: Progress and Challenges in the Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries since the 
drafting of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’, in Guifang (Julia) Xue and Ashley White 
(eds), 30 Years of UNCLOS (1982-2012): Progress and Prospects (China University of Political Science and 
Law Press, 2013), 217-239.  
137 Prosper Weil, The Law of Maritime Delimitation – Reflections (Grotius Publications, 1989) at 22. 
138 See Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Merits, Judgment, 24 February 1982, (1982) ICJ 
Reports 18, at para 43.  
139 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 24, at para 19. 
140 Hyun Jung Kim, ‘Natural Prolongation: A Living Myth in the Regime of the Continental Shelf’ (2014) 45 
Ocean Development & International Law 374, at 377. 
141 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 24, at para 43. Note however, that neither the ICJ in the North 
Sea Continental Cases nor the LOS Convention defines the term ‘natural prolongation’. See Lindsay Parson, 
‘Article 76: Definition of the Continental Shelf’, in Alexander Proelss (ed), United Nations Conventions on the 
Law of the Sea: A Commentary (CH Beck, 2017), 587-599, at 592 & 593. 
142 Edward D Brown, ‘The Anglo-French Continental Shelf Case’ (1979) 16 San Diego Law Review 461, at 476. 
143 Ibid, at 477. 
144 Ibid, quoting the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 24, at para 104. 
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that it would be more accurate “to describe the situation in terms of two separate continental 
shelves”.145 
The LOS Convention, as well as the development of the continental shelf doctrine 
following the adoption of the LOS Convention, seemed to support Brown’s view.146  The 
establishment of the EEZ regime in the LOS Convention caused a conceptual shift in the 
understanding of the natural prolongation concept. The EEZ regime covers not only the column 
of water, but also the seabed and subsoil up to 200 M from the coast. Indeed, this led to the 
definition of the continental shelf in the LOS Convention being adjusted. Article 76(1) of the 
LOS Convention expressly states that the natural prolongation of a coastal State’s territory 
extends to a distance of 200 M from the baselines,147 regardless of the edge of the continental 
margin.148 This is a significant departure from the natural prolongation concept introduced in 
the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, where a connection to the geological and 
geomorphological elements of the seabed played an integral role.149 
Following the adoption of the LOS Convention, the ICJ also restricted the concept of 
natural prolongation to its role as a basis of entitlement only.150 In the Tunisia/Libya case, the 
ICJ stated that the concept of natural prolongation can be taken into account during the 
delimitation process as one of the relevant circumstances.151 In his separate opinion, Judge 
Aréchaga made it clear that in its 1969 decision, the ICJ did not intend for ‘natural prolongation’ 
to be “interpreted as requiring the existence of certain facts of geology or geomorphology in 
order to define the nature of the continental shelf”.152 He went on to state that the new definition 
in Article 76(1) of the LOS Convention, providing as it does a 200 M distance criterion, “even 
                                                 
145 Ibid, at 477. 
146 See LH Legault and Blair Hankey, ‘From Sea to Seabed: The Single Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of 
Maine Case’ (1985) 79 American Journal of International Law 961, at 966; see also Tunisia/Libya, Judgment, 
supra note 138, at para 48.  
147 LOS Convention, Art 76(1). 
148 LOS Convention, Arts 76(1) & 77(2)-(3). 
149 Philip A Symonds, et al, 'Characteristics of Continental Margins' in P. J. Cook and Chris Carleton (eds), 
Continental Shelf Limits: The Scientific and Legal Interface (Oxford University Press, 2000) 25, at 27; Jianjun 
Gao, 'The Seafloor High Issue in Article 76 of the LOS Convention: Some Views from the Perspective of Legal 
Interpretation' (2012) 43(2) Ocean Development & International Law 119, at 124. 
150 Mahdi Zahraa, ‘Natural Prolongation and Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries’ (1996) 7 Finnish Yearbook 
of International Law 378, at 385. 
151 Tunisia/Libya, Judgment, supra note 138, at para 68.  
152 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Separate Opinion of Judge Jiménez de Aréchaga, 
(1982) ICJ Reports 100, at para 47. 
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more categorically than did Article 1 of the 1958 Convention, [does] away with the requirement 
of a geological or geomorphological continental shelf”.153 Judge Oda in his dissenting opinion 
also viewed that the introduction of the 200 M distance overrode the traditional concept of 
continuity or contiguity that had been introduced by the natural prolongation principle.154 
Three years later, in the Libya/Malta case, the ICJ restricted the use of the natural 
prolongation concept even further. In that case, Libya argued that the prolongation of the land 
territory of a State into and under the sea was a ‘geological fact’, and that geological and 
geomorphological aspects remain a fundamental basis of legal entitlement to a continental 
shelf.155 Malta, on the other hand, argued that “prolongation is no longer defined by reference 
to physical features, geological or bathymetric, but by reference to a certain distance from the 
coasts”. 156  Within 200 M from the coast, Malta propounded that the concept of natural 
prolongation had become:157 
 
a purely spatial concept which operates independently of all 
geomorphological or geological characteristics, only resuming a 
physical significance beyond 200 miles from the coast, since States 
which possess a more extensive physical natural prolongation enjoy 
continental shelf rights to the edge of their continental margin. 
 
In this respect, the ICJ agreed with Malta, finding that:158 
 
…the law applicable to the present dispute, that is, to claims relating to 
continental shelves located less than 200 miles from the coasts of the 
States in question, is based not on geological or geomorphological 
criteria, but on a criterion of distance from the Coast or, to use the 
traditional term, on the principle of adjacency as measured by distance. 
 
                                                 
153 Ibid, at para 51. 
154 Oda, supra note 22, at para 146. 
155 Libya/Malta, supra note 99, at para 30.  
156 Ibid. 
157 Ibid. 
158 Ibid, at para 61. 
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Following on from this decision, the ICJ delivered its judgment in the continental shelf 
delimitation dispute between Denmark and Norway (known as the Jan Mayen case). It was 
indeed significant that in handing down its decision in this case, the ICJ did not make a single 
reference to the natural prolongation concept.159 Thus, a well-established line of cases, as well 
as Article 76(1) of the LOS Convention, confirm that within areas up to 200 M from the coast, 
legal title to a continental shelf is based not on natural prolongation but distance.160 For this 
reason, the principle of natural prolongation has certainly become less relevant in the 
delimitation of maritime areas where the Parties are less than 400 M apart. 
It does not automatically follow, however, that the principle of natural prolongation has 
lost its relevance completely. Indeed, the ICJ still insisted that the concept of natural 
prolongation and distance were complementary.161 In the Libya/Malta case, the ICJ explained 
that:162 
 
This is not to suggest that the idea of natural prolongation is now 
superseded by that of distance. What it does mean is that where the 
continental margin does not extend as far as 200 [M] from the shore, 
natural prolongation...is in part defined by distance from the shore, 
irrespective of the physical nature of the intervening sea-bed and 
subsoil. The concept of natural prolongation and distance are therefore 
not opposed but complementary; and both remain essential elements in 
the juridical concept of the continental shelf. 
 
In the same year as the Libya/Malta decision, an Arbitral Tribunal consisting of three of the 
then sitting ICJ judges issued an award in the maritime delimitation dispute between Guinea 
and Guinea-Bissau. In the award, the Tribunal stated that although the rule for determining the 
continental shelf is based on distance, this did not derogate from the natural prolongation rule, 
but rather “reduces its scope by substituting it in certain circumstances specified in the [first] 
                                                 
159 Jan Mayen case, supra note 111. 
160 Barbra Kwiatkowska, ‘Equitable Maritime Boundary Delimitation – A Legal Perspective’, (1998) 3(4) 
International Journal of Estuarine and Coastal Law 287, at 296. 
161 Libya/Malta, supra note 99, at para 34. 
162 Ibid. 
 
160 
 
paragraph of Article 76 of the [LOS] Convention”163 – a clear reference to areas within 200 M 
from the coast. 
Both the ICJ and the Arbitral Tribunal in the Guinea and Guinea-Bissau case have 
confirmed that the natural prolongation concept, though no longer relevant for the delimitation 
within 200 M, might still be relevant for delimitation and delineation of the continental shelf 
beyond 200 M. Even ITLOS has noted the relevance of the natural prolongation concept in 
delimiting the continental shelf beyond 200 M, affirming that:164  
 
…the reference to natural prolongation in article 76, paragraph 1, of 
the Convention, should be understood in light of the subsequent 
provisions of the article defining the continental shelf and the 
continental margin. Entitlement to a continental shelf beyond 200 [M] 
should thus be determined by reference to the outer edge of the 
continental margin, to be ascertained in accordance with article 76, 
paragraph 4. 
 
The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) also noted the 
importance of the natural prolongation concept in delineating the continental shelf beyond 200 
M:165  
 
The “natural prolongation of [the] land territory” is based on the 
physical extent of the continental margin to its “outer edge” (article 76, 
paragraph 1) i.e. “the submerged prolongation of the land mass...” 
(article 76, paragraph 3).  
 
The CLCS thus defines ‘natural prolongation’ – in relation to the continental shelf beyond 200 
M – as “natural components of the continental margin”,166 and will look at the geological and 
                                                 
163 Arbitration Tribunal for the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, 
Award, 14 February 1985, XX Reports of International Arbitral Awards 119, at para 115. 
164 Bangladesh/Myanmar, supra note 135, at para 437. 
165 The CLCS, Summary of Recommendations of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in 
Regard to The Submission Made by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Respect of 
Ascension Island on 9 May 2008, adopted by the Commission on 15 April 2010, at para 22. 
166 The CLCS, Summary of Recommendations of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in 
Regard to The Submission Made by the Cook Islands in Respect of Manihiki Plateau on 16 April 2009, 
approved by the Commission, with amendments, on 19 August 2016, at para 88. 
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geophysical data to identify these ‘natural components’.167 In this way, the natural prolongation 
concept still plays a role in delineating the continental shelf beyond 200 M, with the concept 
now defined as the extent of the continental margin to its outer edge, in accordance with Article 
76(1) of the LOS Convention.  
 
5.7. Conclusion 
When coastal States started to extend their jurisdiction into the continental shelf, there was no 
uniform method on how overlapping entitlements were to be delimited. The 1945 Truman 
Proclamation stated that negotiation of boundary delimitation should be based on equitable 
principles.168  However, during UNCLOS I in 1958, coastal States desired a more precise 
method and selected the median line/equidistance principle in delimiting continental shelf 
boundaries.169 The situation was made more complex in 1969, when the ICJ stated that the 
median line/equitable principle did not represent a rule of customary international law.170 The 
Court instead reverted back to the Truman Proclamation, stating that agreement on delimitation 
should be effected by equitable principles.171  
The method of delimitation was highly debated at UNCLOS III, with coastal States 
seeking to devise a more precise formula to help States in delimiting not only their continental 
shelf, but also the newly established EEZ regime. 172  The deep fracture between States 
advocating for the ‘equitable principles’ approach on the one hand, and those advancing the 
‘equidistance principle’ on the other, led to a set of compromise provisions that eschewed 
reference to either phrase.173 These compromise provisions for delimiting overlapping EEZ 
and continental shelf boundaries are set out in Articles 74 and 83 of the LOS Convention.  
Under the general principle for delimitation in the LOS Convention, EEZ and 
continental shelf boundaries are to be delimited by agreement and pursuant to international law 
in order to reach an equitable solution.174 The principles of maritime delimitation enshrined in 
                                                 
167 The CLCS, Recommendations of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in Regard to the 
Submission Made by Australia on 15 November 2004, adopted by the Commission on 9 April 2008, at para 222. 
168 Truman Proclamation, supra note 5. 
169 Continental Shelf Convention, Art 6. 
170 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 24, at para 72. 
171 Ibid, at para 85. 
172 UNCLOS Commentary Vol 2, supra note 56, at 954. 
173 Documents of Resumed Tenth Session, reproduced in Platzöder, supra note 87, at 474.  
174 LOS Convention, Arts 74 and 83. 
 
162 
 
Articles 74 and 83 of the LOS Convention have been recognised by the ICJ as reflecting 
customary international law.175 However, these provisions do not mandate any specific method 
for delimiting the EEZ or continental shelf. Instead, State practice and the decisions of 
international Courts or Tribunals are relied upon for delimitation purposes in order to achieve 
an equitable solution.  
 International courts and tribunals, and especially the ICJ, have interpreted Articles 74 
and 83 of the LOS Convention in a consistent way and developed a method of delimitation that 
is done in stages. The first stage involves drawing a provisional boundary line, which is effected 
using the equidistance method.176 In the second stage, relevant circumstances are taken into 
account to see if the provisional line should be adjusted.177  These relevant circumstances 
primarily concern geographical factors, but could also include socio-economic factors such as 
the population of a State or the presence of historical practices.178 Significantly, international 
courts and tribunals have all agreed that when delimiting an area within 200 M from the coast, 
geological and geomorphological factors are not a relevant consideration.179 During the third 
stage, the Court or Tribunal ensures that the adjusted provisional line does not lead to an 
inequitable result.180 
This multi-stage approach seems to have been followed by States when negotiating 
their boundaries. In this way, the development of the rules for delimiting the continental shelf 
(and later, the EEZ) has come full circle, with both State practice and jurisprudence favouring 
the use of the equidistance/median line to establish a provisional line – one which is then 
subject to adjustment according to relevant circumstances to achieve an equitable solution.  
Furthermore, the ICJ has clarified the role of natural prolongation in the delimitation of 
EEZ and continental shelf within 200 M. In the Libya/Malta decision, the ICJ ruled that where 
the distance between two opposing coastal States is less than 400 M, the distance factor, and 
not the geophysical factor, should be considered in determining the boundary.181 Thus, the 
concept of natural prolongation, which was a prominent feature in the delimitation of the 
continental shelf prior to the LOS Convention, is now only potentially relevant for shelf 
                                                 
175 Nicaragua v Colombia, supra note 114, at para 139; see also Qatar v Bahrain, supra note 127, at para 167. 
176 Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea, supra note 99, at para 116.  
177 Ibid, at para 120.  
178 Jan Mayen case, supra note 111. 
179 Libya/Malta, supra note 99, at para 39; Barbados v Trinidad and Tobago, supra note 112, at para 226. 
180 Black Sea Case, supra note 99, at para 122.  
181 Libya/Malta, supra note 99, at para 39-40. 
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delimitation beyond 200 M (but has not proved especially influential for delimitation beyond 
200 M). This creates difficulties where one State’s continental shelf extends beyond 200 M 
(and where natural prolongation is relevant for delimitation) into the EEZ of another State 
(where natural prolongation is not a relevant factor for delimitation). This issue will be 
discussed in the next Chapter. 
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6. Overlap of Entitlements between the Outer Continental Shelf 
and the Exclusive Economic Zone 
 
6.1. Introduction 
The establishment of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) regime has resulted in a complex 
interplay with the pre-existing continental shelf regime. Similar to its predecessor, the 1958 
Continental Shelf Convention, the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(LOS Convention or the Convention) recognises that coastal States have sovereign rights to 
explore and exploit the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil on their continental shelves.1 
In addition to creating the EEZ regime, the LOS Convention adopted by the Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) decided on a ‘legal limit’ for the 
continental shelf – 200 M from the baseline, which coincides with the limit of the EEZ.2  
In this way, the LOS Convention allows the two regimes to not only overlap with each 
other,3 but also incorporates aspects of each other into their definitions. The EEZ gives the 
coastal State exclusive jurisdiction over the resources in the water column, as well as on and 
within the seabed and subsoil.4 The limit of the continental shelf extends not just to the edge 
of the continental margin, but also to a distance of 200 M from the baselines5 – effectively 
granting all coastal States a minimum 200 M width continental shelf entitlement regardless of 
the geomorphological condition of their seabed.  
Even though the LOS Convention has established the legal limit of the continental shelf 
at 200 M, the extent of the actual or ‘physical’ continental shelf may be greater than 200 M.6 
                                                 
1 LOS Convention, Art 77.  
2 LOS Convention, Art 76(1). 
3 Some commentators have argued that because the EEZ and continental shelf are different maritime zones, they 
are not capable of overlapping, see for example Xuexia Liao, ‘Is There a Hierarchical Relationship between 
Natural Prolongation and Distance in the Continental Shelf Delimitation?’ (2017) 32 International Journal of 
Marine and Coastal Law 1-37, at 28. The present author disagrees. Both the EEZ and the continental shelf exist 
in the same space – at least within 200 M – even though they are distinct maritime zones. Liao has cited the 
decision of ITLOS in the Bangladesh/Myanmar case to support her theory. However, the decision in that case 
actually recognised that “the legal regime of the continental shelf has always coexisted with another legal 
regime in the same area”, Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar), 
Judgment, 14 March 2012, (2012) ITLOS Reports 4 [Bangladesh/Myanmar], at para 475.  
4 LOS Convention, Art 56(1)(a). 
5 LOS Convention, supra note 2. 
6 LOS Convention, Art 76(5). 
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Information on the limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 M (outer continental shelf)7 must 
be submitted to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS).8 The CLCS 
will then make a recommendation, on which basis the coastal State can establish the limits of 
its outer continental shelf.9 
 The possibility of extending the shelf regime beyond the 200 M limit has given rise to 
a new set of complications when delimiting maritime boundaries. Since the LOS Convention 
grants coastal States an entitlement over their continental shelves based on distance and 
geomorphological criteria, disputes are bound to arise between States with overlapping 
continental shelf entitlements based on different criteria. Nicaragua, for example, claims a 
continental shelf beyond 200 M based on the geomorphology of its seabed. However, this claim 
overlaps with that of Colombia, which has claimed a continental shelf based on the 200 M 
distance criteria from its baselines.10 China and South Korea also assert rights over continental 
shelf limits based on the geomorphology of their seabed, but such claims overlap with Japan’s 
200 M entitlement.11 
 As discussed in Chapter 5, international courts and tribunals have clarified the process 
for maritime delimitation for overlapping EEZ and continental shelf claims. However, neither 
the judicial precedents nor the relevant provisions in the LOS Convention lay out a process for 
boundary delimitation in circumstances where the overlapping continental shelf claims are 
based on two different sets of criteria. To further complicate the issue, it is quite common for 
a coastal State claiming a continental shelf based on the distance criterion to also claim an EEZ 
(as is the case with Colombia and Japan). Thus, such situations demand delimitation not only 
                                                 
7 Note that ‘outer continental shelf’ is not a term of art. See Chapter 1, footnote 2. 
8 Ibid, Art 76(8). As of 4 June 2019, the CLCS has received 84 submissions and issued 32 recommendations, see 
Submissions, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf, pursuant to article 76, paragraph 8, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
of 10 December 1982, available at <http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/commission_submissions.htm>.  
9 Ibid.  
10 The dispute is currently before the ICJ, with Nicaragua having submitted its written reply on 9 July 2018, and 
Colombia having filed its rejoinder on 11 February 2019; see Question of the Delimitation of the Continental 
Shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia beyond 200 nautical miles from the Nicaraguan Coast (Nicaragua v 
Colombia), Order of 8 December 2017, (2017) ICJ Reports 361 [Nicaragua v Colombia II]. 
11 For further reading on the maritime boundary disputes in the East China Sea, see Tara Davenport, ‘The 
China-Japan Dispute over Entitlement in the East China Sea: Legal issues and Prospects for Resolution’, in 
Clive Schofield, Seokwoo Lee and Moon-Sang Kwon (eds), The Limits of Maritime Jurisdiction (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2014), 297-324; and Chang-Wee Lee, ‘Legal Issues regarding Maritime Boundary 
Delimitation around the Korean Peninsula’ (2014) 2 Korean Yearbook of International Law, 49-68.  
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between overlapping continental shelf entitlements, but also between overlapping continental 
shelf and EEZ entitlements.  
 The LOS Convention does not provide any explicit guidelines for dealing with the 
overlap between the EEZ and the outer continental shelf. However, by closely studying the 
LOS Convention, reviewing the jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals, as well as 
examining the practice of States on this issue, some light may be shed on how to navigate such 
legally ‘murky’ situations. Before turning to these discussions, however, it is important to 
clarify the relationship between the EEZ and the continental shelf. 
 
6.2. Relationship between the EEZ and the Continental Shelf 
Much has been written about the relationship between the EEZ and the continental shelf. Since 
both regimes exist within the same space, it raises the question of whether one regime is 
superior to the other, or whether one regime has absorbed the other into its frame of reference.12 
In particular, questions have been raised as to whether the continental shelf regime is separate 
from the EEZ regime, or whether the EEZ has absorbed the continental shelf regime, at least 
within 200 M from the coast. However, it is clear from the provisions and negotiating history 
of the LOS Convention, as well as from State practice and the precedents set by international 
courts and tribunals post LOS Convention, that the EEZ has not absorbed the continental shelf 
regime. Rather, the two regimes coexist with each another in an integrated manner. 
 Article 56(1)(a) of the LOS Convention clearly states that in the EEZ, the coastal State 
has: 
 
 sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving 
and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the 
waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and 
with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and 
exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the 
water, currents and winds [emphasis added]. 
 
                                                 
12 Francisco Orrego Vicuńa, The Exclusive Economic Zone: Regime and Legal Nature under International Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 1989), at 69. Evans has proposed four theories to explain the relationship between 
the EEZ and the continental shelf. These theories centre on the concepts of absorption, assimilation, parallelism 
and separation. See Malcolm D Evans, ‘Delimitation and the Common Maritime Boundary’ (1994) 64(1) British 
Yearbook of International Law 282-332, at 286-293.  
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If the drafters of the LOS Convention had intended to make the continental shelf regime 
separate from the EEZ regime, they surely would not have provided coastal States with 
jurisdiction over the resources of the seabed and subsoil under the EEZ. Instead, the framers 
would have confined the jurisdiction of coastal States within the EEZ to the resources in the 
water column, with jurisdiction over the resources of the seabed and subsoil falling under the 
continental shelf regime. In this way, the two regimes would have remained distinct from each 
other. However, this is not the case, indicating that both regimes were meant to coexist with 
one another. Proelss has stated that the wording of Article 56(1) “clarifies that if and to the 
extent to which the coastal State has claimed and established an EEZ above its continental shelf, 
the two zones form part of an integral regime”.13 Thus, the exclusive jurisdiction of coastal 
States over the resources of the seabed and subsoil within 200 M from their coasts stems from 
both the EEZ and continental shelf regimes.  
 Similarly, if the drafters had intended to absorb the continental shelf regime within 200 
M from the coast into the EEZ regime, they would have defined the continental shelf as 
beginning from the outer limit of the EEZ to the edge of the continental margin. Instead, Article 
76(1) of the LOS Convention states that: 
 
The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed and subsoil 
of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout 
the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the 
continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the 
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured 
where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to 
that distance [emphasis added]. 
 
According to this definition, the starting point of the continental shelf regime is the same as that 
of the EEZ regime – that is, the outer limit of a coastal State’s territorial sea.14 Thus, up to the 
distance of 200 M from the baselines, the EEZ and continental shelf regimes overlap but remain 
                                                 
13 Alexander Proelss, ‘Article 56: Rights, Jurisdiction and Duties of the Coastal State in the Exclusive Economic 
Zone’, in Alexander Proelss (ed), United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea: A Commentary (CH Beck, 
2017), 418-436, at 436. 
14 Compare the definition of the continental shelf under Art 76(1) with Art 55, which states that the EEZ is an 
area “beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea”.  
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autonomous from each other.15 The retention of both regimes in the LOS Convention ensures 
all economic resources within 200 M fall within the jurisdiction of the coastal State, while 
protecting existing shelf rights established under the 1958 Convention and customary law.16 
 The issue of whether the EEZ should absorb the continental shelf within 200 M was 
also debated during the negotiations at UNCLOS III.17 The first option was to absorb the 
continental shelf into the EEZ regime, creating one regime which would regulate both living 
and non-living resources within 200 M. For example, Austria did not see the need to retain the 
concept of the continental shelf, arguing that the legal content of the term ‘continental shelf’ 
should be absorbed by the new legal notion of the ‘economic zone’.18 Paraguay agreed that the 
idea of a 200 M economic zone meant that the rules governing the continental shelf were no 
longer in force, since that area would be covered by the new zone.19 Switzerland also expressed 
that the two systems could not be combined, with the establishment of the EEZ inevitably 
resulting in the disappearance of the continental shelf regime.20  
The second option was to limit the jurisdiction of the EEZ to the water column only, 
leaving the continental shelf regime intact. A leading proponent of this particular view was 
Nicaragua.21 The third option envisioned the two regimes operating autonomously. According 
to this conception, both the EEZ and the continental shelf regime would apply concurrently up 
to a distance of 200 M from the baseline, and beyond that point, the continental shelf regime 
would continue until the edge of the margin. Australia, for example, submitted that even if there 
was to be an economic zone, it was essential to retain the concept of the continental shelf.22 
Myanmar (then Burma) also stated that the continental shelf should apply to the subjacent sea-
bed of the EEZ regardless of depth, as well as to that part of the continental margin extending 
                                                 
15 David Attard, The Exclusive Economic Zone in International Law, (Clarendon Press, 1987), at 212. 
16 Ibid, at 132. 
17 For further details on these discussions, see Chapter 3, Part 3.2.2 of this thesis.  
18 Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Summary Records of 16th 
Meeting of the Second Committee, UN Doc A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.16, 26 July 1974, at 143. 
19 Ibid, at 145.  
20 Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Summary Records of 19th 
Meeting of the Second Committee, UN Doc A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.19, 30 July 1974, at 157. 
21 Summary Records of 16th Meeting of the Second Committee, supra note 18, at 143.  
22 Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Summary Records of 17th 
Meeting of the Second Committee, UN Doc A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.17, 26 July 1974, at 147.  
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beyond the outer limit of the zone.23 As can be seen from the final draft which was later adopted 
into the LOS Convention, the third option ultimately prevailed, with both the EEZ and 
continental shelf coexisting autonomously within 200 M from the baseline of coastal States. 
 Even before the LOS Convention was adopted in 1982, coastal States had started 
claiming jurisdiction over their seabed within 200 M from their baselines under both the EEZ 
and continental shelf regimes. Judge Attard summarised these early claims in his 1987 
monograph, noting that most of these States had not fused the two regimes.24 According to 
Judge Oda, the EEZ regime in principle incorporated the whole regime of the continental shelf, 
making both regimes exist in parallel.25 In 1985 the ICJ confirmed that both the EEZ and 
continental shelf were linked, as “the rights enjoyed by a State over its continental shelf would 
also be possessed by it over the sea-bed and subsoil of any Exclusive Economic Zone which it 
might proclaim”.26 The ICJ, however, stated that “this does not mean that the concept of the 
continental shelf has been absorbed by that of the Exclusive Economic Zone”,27 thus confirming 
the parallel but autonomous relationship of the two regimes. 
 It is thus clear that the EEZ has not absorbed the continental shelf regime, and that both 
regimes coexist together while remaining autonomous. The question remains, however, of what 
to do in situation where one State’s entitlement over the continental shelf beyond 200 M 
overlaps with the EEZ of another State. How do coastal States deal with the overlap of two 
regimes which exist in parallel but remain autonomous? To answer this question, it is necessary 
to scrutinise the LOS Convention to see if it provides any guidance.  
  
6.3. Can the Continental Shelf beyond 200 M Lawfully Overlap with the EEZ? 
It is clear from the above analysis that both the EEZ and the continental shelf regimes coexist 
autonomously, and that the former has not absorbed the latter. However, in cases where a 
coastal State’s shelf entitlement (where it is based on the existence of the continental margin) 
                                                 
23 Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Summary Records of 29th 
Meeting of the Second Committee, UN Doc A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.29, 6 August 1974, at 224. 
24 Attard, supra note 15, at 140.  
25 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Oda, (1982) ICJ Reports 
157, at para 130. See also Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Separate Opinion of Judge 
Jiménez de Aréchaga, (1982) ICJ Reports 100, at para 55. 
26 Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Merits, Judgment, 3 June 1985, (1985) ICJ Reports 13 
[Libya/Malta], at para 33. 
27 Ibid.  
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overlaps with another State’s EEZ, it also overlaps with the latter’s continental shelf 
entitlement based on distance.28 This raises two issues. First, is there a distinction between a 
continental shelf based on distance (‘inner continental shelf’) and a continental shelf based on 
the existence of the continental margin beyond 200 M (‘outer continental shelf’)? Second, can 
a coastal State’s outer continental shelf entitlement lawfully overlap with another State’s EEZ 
and inner continental shelf entitlement?  
The first question challenges the idea that there is only a ‘single continental shelf’. The 
notion that only a single continental shelf exists was first asserted by the Arbitral Tribunal in 
the delimitation case between Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago.29 In that award, the Arbitral 
Tribunal stated that “there is in law only a single ‘continental shelf’ rather than an inner 
continental shelf and a separate extended or outer continental shelf”.30 This phrase has been 
quoted multiple times in subsequent international Tribunal rulings31 and by law of the sea 
scholars,32 reinforcing the view of a single continental shelf. 
The concept of a ‘single continental shelf’ was indeed an accurate way to describe the 
shelf regime prior to the adoption of the LOS Convention.33 However, this situation was altered 
after the adoption of the LOS Convention, with the definition of the continental shelf not just 
being based on geomorphological factors, but also on the distance criterion.34 Article 76 of the 
LOS Convention establishes two distinct bases of entitlement to a continental shelf within and 
                                                 
28 Evans has stated that the issue of maritime delimitation is “the generation of a line separating the overlapping 
entitlements of States”, see Malcolm D Evans, ‘Maritime Boundary Delimitation’, in Donald R Rothwell, et al 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea (Oxford University Press, 2015), 254-279, at 261. 
29 Although the ICJ had used the term ‘single continental shelf’ in its judgments prior to this case, it had been 
referring to the delimitation of continental shelves less than 200 M. See Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya), Merits, Judgment, 24 February 1982, (1982) ICJ Reports 18 [Tunisia/Libya], at para 133 and Libya 
v Malta, supra note 26, at para 77. 
30 Barbados v Trinidad & Tobago, supra note 7, at para 213. 
31 Bangladesh/Myanmar, supra note 3, at para 361; In the matter of the Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary 
Arbitration, The People’s Republic of Bangladesh and the Republic of India, Award, 7 July 2014, PCA 2010-16 
[Bangladesh v India], at para 77; Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana 
and Côte d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Côte d'Ivoire), Judgment, 23 September 2017, ITLOS, available 
at 
<https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.23_merits/C23_Judgment_23.09.2017_corr.pdf
>, at para 490. 
32 Bjørn Kunoy, ‘Agreed Minutes on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles 
between Greenland and Iceland in the Irminger Sea’ (2013) 12 Chinese Journal of International Law 125, at 
137; Bjarni Már Magnússon, The Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles: Delineation, Delimitation and 
Dispute Settlement (Koninklijke Brill NV, 2015), at 136; Liao, supra note 3, at 6. 
33 At the time, the legal definition of the term ‘continental shelf’ was still largely based (though not identical to) 
the geomorphological definition of the term, see Part 2.3 in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
34 LOS Convention, Art 76(1). 
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beyond 200 M. For a continental shelf within 200 M, distance is the only factor to consider. 
Beyond 200 M, distance no longer plays a part in determining entitlement, with geomorphology 
and geology being the relevant factors.35 It is thus curious that the Tribunals in both the 
Bangladesh/Myanmar and Bangladesh/India disputes stated that “Article 76 of the Convention 
embodies the concept of a single continental shelf”36 when the Article clearly distinguishes 
between the shelf within and beyond 200 M.  
The Tribunals in the above cases pointed to Articles 77 and 83 of the LOS Convention 
as evidencing a single continental shelf.37 Article 77 provides that a coastal State exercises 
exclusive sovereign rights over the continental shelf in its entirety, without distinguishing 
between the continental shelf within and beyond 200 M. This lack of distinction, however, is 
understandable, as the inherent nature of a coastal State’s right over the continental shelf is the 
same within or beyond 200 M. Even so, coastal States are required to make payments and 
contributions when exploiting shelf resources beyond 200 M by virtue of Article 82 of the LOS 
Convention, something they are not required to do when exploiting such resources within 200 
M.  
Furthermore, the rights of coastal States in relation to marine scientific research are 
slightly different in the continental shelf within and beyond 200 M. Consent of the coastal State 
is required for all marine scientific research conducted within the EEZ and continental shelf.38 
The coastal State may withhold its consent if a marine scientific research project in the EEZ 
and continental shelf is of direct significance for the exploration and exploitation of natural 
resources.39 However, on the continental shelf beyond 200 M, coastal State cannot withhold its 
consent for marine scientific research project outside the areas it has designated as areas in 
which exploitation or detailed exploration are to take place.40 This restriction to the sovereign 
right of the coastal State in the outer continental shelf, similar to Article 82 of the LOS 
Convention, is a compromise with the international community in allowing coastal States 
                                                 
35 Note however, that the distance factor still plays a role in providing a ‘cut-off’ to the outer continental shelf, 
see LOS Convention, Art 76(5). 
36 Bangladesh/Myanmar, supra note 3, at para 361; Bangladesh v India, supra note 31, at para 77. 
37 Ibid. 
38 LOS Convention, Art 246(2).  
39 Ibid, Art 246(5)(a).  
40 Ibid, Art 246(6).  
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jurisdiction over the continental shelf beyond 200 M.41 Thus, there are differences between 
coastal States’ rights and obligations in the continental shelf within and beyond 200 M. 
The other provision in the LOS Convention that the Tribunals in both the 
Bangladesh/Myanmar and Bangladesh/India cases used to argue a single continental shelf is 
Article 83. Article 83 of the Convention also makes no distinction between the delimitation of 
the continental shelf within or beyond 200 M. In both situations, delimitation must be effected 
by agreement based on international law in order to achieve an equitable solution. This, 
however, is a broad requirement that covers a wide range of methods of delimitation, as well 
as different circumstances to be considered, in order to achieve an equitable result. Indeed, the 
relevant circumstances to be considered for delimitation of a continental shelf within 200 M 
from the coast might differ from the circumstances relevant to the delimitation of a continental 
shelf beyond 200 M.42 In this regard, it is important to remember that coastal States are required 
to submit information to the CLCS in order to establish the limits of their continental shelf 
beyond 200 M.43 For this reason, Kunoy has opined that although the notion of a single 
continental shelf is true to a certain extent, “it would however seem that such a reasoning 
prejudices the prescribed responsibilities of the [CLCS] and stands in contrast to general 
judicial principles”.44 
Even scholars who accepted the notion of a single continental shelf (as laid down by 
the Tribunal in the Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago case), recognised the differences 
between the shelf within and beyond 200 M. For example, Kunoy has highlighted that “the 
definition of the continental shelf is subject to two mutually exclusive constitutive criteria”.45 
Magnússon has also noted the differences between the continental shelf within and beyond 200 
M, which include obligations under Article 82 of the LOS Convention.46 Even Liao, despite 
proclaiming that “[f]undamentally, there is no difference between the continental shelf based 
on natural prolongation and the continental shelf based on distance”, has acknowledged that 
                                                 
41 Joanna Mossop, The Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles: Rights and Responsibilities (Oxford 
University Press, 2016) at 157.  
42 See Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v Colombia), Judgment, 19 November 2012, (2012) ICJ 
Reports 624 [Nicaragua/Colombia], at para 214. 
43 LOS Convention, Art 76(8); see also Part 4.2 in Chapter 4 of this thesis.  
44 See Bjørn Kunoy, ‘The Admissibility of a Plea to an International Adjudicative Forum to Delimit the Outer 
Continental Shelf Prior to the Adoption of Final Recommendations by the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf’ (2010) 25 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 237, at 258. 
45 Kunoy, supra note 32, at 137.  
46 Magnússon, supra note 32, at 137. 
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“differences exist between the continental shelf within and beyond 200 [M] with regard to 
certain rights and obligations, notably the difference in the procedure of the establishment of 
the outer limits and the revenue-sharing system imposed on the exploitation of the continental 
shelf beyond 200 [M]”.47 Therefore, to state that “in law there is only a single continental 
shelf”48 is an oversimplification of the differences between the shelf within and beyond 200 M 
– one that hides and obfuscates the complexity of the regime. In this regard, even when the 
Tribunals in the Bay of Bengal Cases were espousing their view of a single continental shelf, 
they restricted their comments to Articles 77 and 83 of the LOS Convention.49  
It is thus crucial to understand the context in which the Tribunal in the delimitation case 
between Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago declared the notion of a single continental shelf 
in law. The Tribunal made this statement in the course of considering whether its jurisdiction 
covered the delimitation of the continental shelf extending beyond 200 M.50 In assessing its 
jurisdiction, the Tribunal noted that the relief sought by the disputing Parties was the 
delimitation of the EEZ and continental shelf between Barbados and the Republic of Trinidad 
and Tobago. It was in contemplating this specific issue that the Tribunal affirmed the existence 
of a single continental shelf in law, subsequently finding that its jurisdiction would encompass 
the continental shelf beyond 200 M.51 Thus, in asserting a single continental shelf, the Tribunal 
was not addressing the delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf, or even the 
exercise of rights within different parts of the continental shelf. Rather, the Tribunal was 
deciding a threshold question of jurisdiction with regard to the delimitation of the continental 
shelf beyond 200 M under the broad terms of Article 83 of the LOS Convention. 
In summary, there are differences between the continental shelf within and beyond 200 
M, despite the same rights attaching to the two and the same principles being employed to 
delimit between them. This leads to the second question posited at the beginning of this part. 
In situations where there is an overlap between the entitlement of a coastal State based on the 
existence of the continental margin, and the continental shelf entitlement of another State based 
on distance, should the former stop at the outer limit of the latter? To answer this question, it 
                                                 
47 Liao, supra note 3, at 7. Another difference mentioned by Liao, is the restriction on coastal States’ discretion 
to withhold consent to scientific research on the continental shelf beyond 200 M; see ibid. 
48 For example, the Tribunal in Bangladesh v India repeatedly mentioned this phrase, see Bangladesh v India, 
supra note 31, at paras 77, 299, 404, 437 & 465. 
49 Ibid, at para 77; Bangladesh/Myanmar, supra note 3, at para 361. 
50 Barbados v Trinidad & Tobago, supra note 7, at para 213. 
51 Ibid. 
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is essential to know whether one regime is superior to the other. This, in turn, requires a critical 
examination of the wording of the LOS Convention, the practice of coastal States, as well as 
international jurisprudence – all of which will be discussed in the sections below.  
 
6.3.1. LOS Convention 
The LOS Convention incorporates many of the principles of the continental shelf regime from 
the 1958 Convention, as well as establishing the EEZ regime. However, it does not follow that 
simply because the continental shelf regime predates the EEZ regime that the former is superior 
to the latter. Alternatively, it could be argued that the LOS Convention was crystallising or 
clarifying an emerging rule of customary international law on the continental shelf regime.52 
The opposite is also true, that the older regime of the continental shelf cannot be subordinated 
to the newer regime of the EEZ, as the LOS Convention does not evince any intention to repeal 
or eliminate existing rights to the continental shelf.53 Indeed, this view is overwhelmingly 
supported by the jurisprudence on the subject. In the 2006 dispute between Barbados and 
Trinidad and Tobago for example, the Arbitral Tribunal endorsed the ICJ’s view that “the 
continental shelf and the EEZ coexist as separate institutions, as the latter has not absorbed the 
former (Libya/Malta, I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 13) and as the former does not displace the 
latter”.54 
The wording of some of the provisions contained in the Convention might reveal 
whether there is a hierarchy between the EEZ and continental shelf regimes. Article 56 – which 
deals with the rights, jurisdiction and duties of the coastal State in the EEZ – provides the first 
clue. That this provision gives functional sovereign rights in respect of the seabed and subsoil 
within the EEZ to coastal States55 leads to the presumption that the EEZ (at least in the area 
where it overlaps with the continental shelf) trumps the continental shelf for all practical 
purposes.56 Paragraph 3 of the Article, however, provides that rights with respect to the seabed 
and subsoil under the EEZ regime are to be exercised in a manner consistent with the 
                                                 
52 Kevin A Baumert, ‘The Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf under Customary International Law’ (2017) 
111(4) American Journal of International Law 827 at 836.  
53 Barbados v Trinidad & Tobago, supra note 7, at para 175. 
54 Ibid, at para 234. 
55 LOS Convention, Art 56(1)(a). 
56 Philip Allott, ‘Power Sharing in the Law of the Sea’ (1983) 77(1) American Journal of International Law 1, at 
14. Allott, however, noted the ‘inherent’ nature of the continental shelf, which might have a bearing on the 
delimitation of the continental shelf; see ibid.  
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continental shelf regime.57 Conversely, this suggests that the continental shelf regime might 
reign supreme over the EEZ regime.58  
Ultimately, the wording of Article 56 does not provide any explicit clarification on 
which regime is to take precedence over the other. In fact, the Article does not preference either 
regime. This interpretation seems to be the consensus of most scholars.59 Sharma has stated 
that Article 56(3) is “often cited as an authority to prove the retention intact, and the distinct 
identity of the regime, of the continental shelf in the new framework of the law of the sea”.60 
For Kwiatkowska, the Article declares the application of existing customary international law 
on the continental shelf as codified in the 1958 Convention to the EEZ regime.61 Judge Oda 
has interpreted the provision as signifying that the regime of the EEZ will incorporate, in 
principle, the whole regime of the continental shelf.62 Beckman and Davenport also state that 
the provision makes it clear that the continental shelf regime applies to seabed resources in the 
EEZ.63 According to Evans, the provision was included to provide a level of harmonisation 
between the EEZ and continental shelf regimes.64 
Since none of the EEZ provisions under Part V of the LOS Convention provide any 
clarification of the hierarchy between the EEZ and the continental shelf regimes, we now turn 
to Part VI which deals with the continental shelf. There are several provisions under this part 
which may indicate the hierarchy of the two regimes. The first is Article 77(3), which provides 
that the rights of coastal States over the continental shelf do not depend on occupation, effective 
or notional, or on any express proclamation. This provision, which was taken from the 1958 
                                                 
57 LOS Convention, Art 56(3). 
58 Stuart Kaye, ‘The Use of Multiple Boundaries in Maritime Boundary Delimitation Law and Practice’ (1998) 
19 Australian Yearbook of International Law 49, at 51. Kaye clarifies, however, that this does not mean that 
“the EEZ rights of one State to the seabed are subservient to the rights of the continental shelf coastal State, as 
Article 56(2) requires only ‘due regard’ be had to such rights”. He further states that since “the continental shelf 
grants exclusive rights to the seabed and subsoil, such an interpretation of due regard would necessarily mean 
extinguishment of EEZ rights over the seabed, which is not the tenor of the provision at all”; see ibid.  
59 See Allott, supra note 56; and Kaye, ibid. 
60 Surya P Sharma, ‘The Single Maritime Boundary Regime and the Relationship between the Continental Shelf 
and the Exclusive Economic Zone’ (1987) 2 International Journal of Estuarine and Coastal Law 203, at 209. 
61 Barbara Kwiatkowska, The 200 Mile Exclusive Economic Zone in the New Law of the Sea (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1989), at 12. 
62 Oda, supra note 25, at para 55.  
63 Robert Beckman and Tara Davenport, ‘The EEZ Regime: Reflections after 30 Years’, in Harry N Scheiber 
and Moon Sang Kwon (eds), Securing the Ocean for the Next Generation, Papers from the Law of the Sea 
Institute, UC Berkeley–Korea Institute of Ocean Science and Technology Conference, held in Seoul, Korea, 
May 2012, at 9.    
64 Malcolm D Evans, Relevant Circumstances and Maritime Delimitation (Clarendon Press 1989), at 36. 
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Convention,65 signifies that continental shelf rights exist ipso facto and ab initio, and as such 
do not need to be proclaimed.66 There is no parallel provision in Part V of the LOS Convention, 
which suggests that coastal States must make a declaration to claim rights in their EEZ.67 Thus, 
while a coastal State may have a continental shelf without declaring an EEZ, the converse is 
not possible.68  
That rights over the continental shelf are inherent rights, while those over the EEZ are 
not, does not affect the delimitation of the two regimes.69 This is because, in circumstances 
where a coastal State does not make any proclamation, it will not have an EEZ to overlap with 
another State’s continental shelf. However, the coastal State will still have an entitlement to a 
continental shelf up to 200 M from its baseline, and the inherent nature of the continental shelf 
based on distance is no less than the one based on the extension of the continental margin. 
Furthermore, if a coastal State has claimed an EEZ, there is no indication in the LOS 
Convention that the inherent nature of the continental shelf would trump rights claimed under 
the EEZ, or vice versa. 
The other two provisions under Part VI of the LOS Convention that might be relevant 
are Articles 76(8) and 82. Article 76(8) requires coastal States to submit information to the 
CLCS for recommendation before establishing the limits of their continental shelf beyond 200 
M. No such requirement exists for coastal States when establishing the limits of their EEZ, 
which coincides with the limit of their 200 M continental shelf. Article 82 requires coastal 
States to make contributions to the International Seabed Authority (ISA) with respect to the 
exploitation of shelf mineral resources beyond 200 M. No corresponding contribution is 
required for the exploitation of resources within the EEZ, whether they be living or non-living. 
At first glance, these two provisions seem to indicate that the EEZ regime takes priority 
over the continental shelf regime, at least when compared to the continental shelf beyond 200 
M. Judge Rao had stated that the “complicated method to calculate the outer limits of the 
continental shelf suggests that the entitlement to the continental shelf beyond 200 [M] depends 
on different factors and is not as absolute as the entitlement to the EEZ”, and thus “the 
                                                 
65 Convention on the Continental Shelf, 29 April 1958, UNTS 499, at 311 (entered into force 10 June 1964) 
[Continental Shelf Convention], Art 2(3). 
66 North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v the 
Netherlands), 20 February 1969, (1969) ICJ Reports 3 [North Sea Continental Shelf Cases], at para 19. 
67 Sharma, supra note 60, at 210; Vicuńa, supra note 12, at 71. 
68 Attard, supra note 15, at 141. 
69 Vicuńa, supra note 12, at 71. 
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entitlement to the EEZ takes priority over the entitlement to the continental shelf beyond 200 
[M]”.70 Coastal States do not require approval from any international body to declare the outer 
limits of their EEZ. Similarly, they do not need to make any contributions as a result of 
exploiting their EEZ resources.  
These two requirements, however, do not change the fact that the rights of coastal States 
over the continental shelf are inherent rights. Indeed, the entitlement to such rights is based on 
the natural prolongation of the coastal State’s land territory to the outer edge of the continental 
margin or 200 M from its baselines.71  In this way, the rights of coastal States over the 
continental shelf exist solely because a basis for entitlement exists, not because any outer shelf 
limits have been established.72 This is in line with Article 77(3) of the LOS Convention, which 
states that the rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not depend on occupation 
or on any express proclamation. The establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf 
– and the obligation to submit information to the CLCS in the case of a continental shelf beyond 
200 M – is necessary to define the precise extent of the rights over the continental shelf, but not 
to establish entitlement to the rights themselves.73 
Furthermore, Article 82 of the LOS Convention (which deals with payments and 
contributions for the exploitation of shelf resources beyond 200 M), was the result of a 
compromise between broad margin States and landlocked and disadvantaged States during the 
negotiations of UNCLOS III.74 The latter group sought to limit the entitlement of coastal States 
over the continental shelf to a distance of 200 M, while the former group insisted that their 
shelf rights were well established and inherent in nature, as confirmed by the 1958 Convention 
and the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases.75 In the end, it was agreed that the LOS 
Convention would retain shelf rights beyond 200 M based on the natural prolongation of a 
                                                 
70 See In the matter of the Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration, The People’s Republic of Bangladesh 
and the Republic of India, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Judge PS Rao, 7 July 2014, PCA 2010-16, at 
para 40. 
71 LOS Convention, Art 76(1). 
72 Alex G Oude Elferink, ‘Article 76 of the LOSC on the Definition of the Continental Shelf: Questions 
concerning its Interpretation from a Legal Perspective’ (2006) 21(3) The International Journal of Marine and 
Coastal Law 269, at 277-278. 
73 Ibid, at 278. For further discussion on the entitlement to a continental shelf and whether it is predicated on the 
establishment of outer limits through the CLCS process, see Baumert, supra note 52. 
74 See the discussion in Part 4.3 of Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
75 Continental Shelf Convention, Art 2(3) and North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 190. 
 
178 
 
State’s land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin.76 As a concession, broad 
margin States agreed to make payments and contributions from the exploitation of shelf 
resources beyond 200 M – as embodied in Article 82.77 Thus, the LOS Convention retains the 
inherent rights of coastal States over their continental shelves to the end of the continental 
margin. Article 82 represents a concession provision whereby coastal States agreed to limit 
their own rights and share some of the revenue derived from the exploitation of shelf resources 
beyond 200 M. Therefore, Article 82 cannot be said to diminish the inherent nature of the 
coastal States’ rights over the continental shelf. 
Having examined the wording of the LOS Convention, it is clear that the Convention 
does not establish any kind of hierarchy between the EEZ and the continental shelf. Rather, the 
Convention confirms that both regimes coexist with each other while remaining autonomous. 
In situations where a coastal State’s continental shelf beyond 200 M overlaps with the EEZ of 
another State, the LOS Convention leaves the issue to be determined by international courts 
and tribunals as well as State practice. We will now examine the precedents set by international 
courts and tribunals in dealing with this issue.  
  
                                                 
76 LOS Convention, Art 76(1). 
77 Elferink, supra note 72, at 274. 
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6.3.2. Precedents of International Courts and Tribunals 
It is unsurprising that the LOS Convention is silent on the legal consequences of an overlap 
between the continental shelf of one State beyond 200 M and the EEZ of another State. Indeed, 
when the Convention was adopted in 1982, Conference President Tommy Koh described it as 
“a series of compromises...[that] form an integral whole”.78 In order to safeguard the delicate 
balance struck by the Convention, a dispute settlement regime is contained in Part XV.79 The 
Convention thus recognised that international courts and tribunals would play a role in 
interpreting the Convention, as well as in resolving disputes between State Parties.  
 Prior to the case between Nicaragua and Colombia (which, at the time of writing, is 
before the ICJ), no international Court or Tribunal had been asked whether the LOS Convention 
allows one State’s continental shelf to extend beyond 200 M into the EEZ of another State.80 
The Arbitral Tribunal in the delimitation case between Canada and France on behalf of Saint-
Pierre-et-Miquelon came close in 1992, as France asked the Tribunal to delimit the continental 
shelf of the parties beyond 200 M.81 Canada objected to this claim, arguing that the point at 
which France is making its claim may lie beyond the edge of the continental margin.82 The 
Tribunal, however, decided that it was not competent to delimit continental shelf beyond 200 
M between the parties. In its reasoning, the Tribunal stated that only the CLCS would have the 
competence to consider the outer limit of continental shelf beyond 200 M (if any) and that “it 
is not possible for a tribunal to reach a decision by assuming hypothetically the eventuality that 
such rights will in fact exist”.83 
Even so, there have been a few cases which, though not dealing directly with this 
question, are nevertheless relevant to the current enquiry. The first one is the 1984 decision of 
                                                 
78 ‘A Constitution for the Oceans’, Remarks by Tommy T.B. Koh of Singapore, President of the Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, at xxxvi, available at 
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/koh_english.pdf>.  
79 Klein has remarked that “the dispute settlement regime was requisite for those parts of the Convention where 
a particularly delicate balance of interests had been achieved in the text and third-party adjudication or 
arbitration could be used to safeguard that balance’, see Natalie Klein, ‘The Effectiveness of the UNCLOS 
Dispute Settlement Regime: Reaching for the Stars?’, in Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society 
of International Law), Vol. 108, The Effectiveness of International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2014), 
359-364, at 360.  
80 See Nicaragua v Colombia II, supra note 10. 
81 Case Concerning the Delimitation of Maritime Areas between Canada and the French Republic, Award, 10 
June 1992, (1992) 31(5) International Legal Materials 1149, at para 75.  
82 Ibid, at para 76.  
83 Ibid, at paras 79 & 81.  
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the ICJ in the delimitation dispute between Libya and Malta.84 In that case, and with the closest 
points between the two countries being only 183 M apart (see Map 1 below), Libya and Malta 
asked the Court to delimit the continental shelf boundary between them.85 Although both 
Parties in this case had signed the LOS Convention, it had yet to come into force at the time of 
the dispute. The disputing Parties however, recognised that some provisions in the LOS 
Convention constituted an expression of customary international law and were thus relevant to 
the dispute.86 Specifically, both Parties agreed that Article 83 of the LOS Convention – which 
requires a continental shelf delimitation agreement to be equitable – was relevant to the 
dispute.87 Malta also argued that Article 76 of the LOS Convention formed part of customary 
international law and could therefore be applied to the dispute,88 as has been confirmed by the 
ICJ itself in the 1982 Tunisia/Libya case.89 
 
                                                 
84 Libya v Malta, supra note 26. 
85 Ibid, at para 16. 
86 Ibid, at para 26. 
87 Ibid, at para 29. 
88 Ibid, at para 31. 
89 Tunisia/Libya, supra note 29, at paras 47 & 100. 
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Map 1: Area to be delimited between Libya and Malta (ICJ, 1984) 
 
The disputing Parties, however, disagreed on the legal basis of entitlement to 
continental shelf rights. Libya insisted that natural prolongation remains the fundamental basis 
of entitlement to continental shelf areas, while Malta declared that the natural prolongation 
concept only has significance beyond 200 M from the coast.90 Although this case only dealt 
with the delimitation of the continental shelf, it highlights the relationship between the 
continental shelf and the EEZ. Aside from pointing out that the LOS Convention had not yet 
came into force, Libya submitted three main arguments: (i) that the ‘distance principle’ is not 
a rule of positive international law with regard to the continental shelf; (ii) that the continental 
shelf has not been absorbed by the concept of the EEZ; and (iii) that the rights of the coastal 
State over its continental shelf are inherent ab initio rights. 91 
                                                 
90 Ibid, at para 30. 
91 Libya v Malta, supra note 26, at para 32. 
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The Court acknowledged that the rules underlying the EEZ concept had to be 
considered in the continental shelf dispute currently before it, as the two regimes are linked 
under modern international law. 92  Despite agreeing with Libya that the concept of the 
continental shelf has not been absorbed by the EEZ,93 the Court pointed out that “the rights 
which the Exclusive Economic Zone entails over the sea-bed of the zone are defined by 
reference to the regime laid down for the continental shelf”.94 The Court then explained that 
“where the continental margin does not extend as far as 200 [M] from the shore, natural 
prolongation…is in part defined by distance from the shore, irrespective of the physical nature 
of the intervening sea-bed and subsoil”.95 In reaching this conclusion, the Court interpreted 
Article 76(1) of the LOS Convention, which provides that: 
 
The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed and subsoil 
of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout 
the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the 
continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the 
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured 
where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to 
that distance [emphasis added]. 
 
Thus, according to the ICJ, all of the seabed and subsoil of a coastal State up to 200 M 
from the shore comprise the natural prolongation of the land mass:96 
 
since the rights enjoyed by a State over its continental shelf would also 
be possessed by it over the sea-bed and subsoil of any Exclusive 
Economic Zone which it might proclaim, one of the relevant 
circumstances to be taken into account for the delimitation of the 
continental shelf of a State is the legally permissible extent of the 
Exclusive Economic Zone appertaining to that same State.  
 
                                                 
92 Ibid, at para 33. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid, at para 34. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid, at para 33. 
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Based on this reasoning, the Court ruled that where the distance between two opposing coastal 
States is less than 400 M, the distance factor, and not the geophysical factor, should be 
considered in determining the boundary (see Map 2 below).97 Indeed, this case demonstrates 
that even though the continental shelf concept has not been absorbed into the EEZ concept, 
within the 200 M range the distance principle is the primary determinant of both legal title and 
delimitation.98 
 
 
Map 2: Continental Shelf Boundary between Libya and Malta (ICJ, 1984) 
 
The second case that is relevant to this research comprises two separate but related 
disputes: the Bangladesh/Myanmar and the Bangladesh/India cases (together referred to as the 
                                                 
97 Ibid, at para 39. 
98 See Ted L McDorman, ‘The Continental Shelf’, in Rothwell, et al (eds), supra note 28, 181-202, at 199-200. 
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Bay of Bengal Cases).99 Bangladesh had been negotiating with its neighbours – Myanmar and 
India – to establish maritime boundaries in the Bay of Bengal since the 1970s. However, these 
negotiations were to no avail. The main point of contention was the concavity of Bangladesh’s 
coastline which created a cut-off effect for Bangladesh when using the equidistance principle 
to delimit the maritime boundaries with Myanmar and India (see Map 3 below). Having failed 
to agree on maritime boundaries, on 8 October 2009 Bangladesh invoked the compulsory 
dispute settlement mechanism under Part XV of the LOS Convention and instituted arbitral 
proceedings against Myanmar and India pursuant to Annex VII of the Convention. In 
December 2009, Bangladesh and Myanmar agreed to transfer the proceeding to the 
International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS).  
 
 
Map 3: Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh v India Arbitration Award, 2014) 
 
ITLOS delivered its judgment in the Bangladesh/Myanmar case on 14 March 2012, 
while the Arbitral Tribunal established under Annex VII of the LOS Convention delivered its 
                                                 
99 Bangladesh/Myanmar, supra note 3; Bangladesh v India, supra note 31. 
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award in the Bangladesh v India case on 7 July 2014. Due to the geographical situation of the 
disputing Parties, the maritime boundaries drawn by both Tribunals created areas that lie 
beyond 200 M from the coast of Bangladesh but within 200 M from the coasts of Myanmar 
and India – known as the grey areas (see Map 4 below).100 The Tribunal in the Bangladesh v 
India case emphasised that beyond 200 M from its coast, Bangladesh had no entitlement to an 
EEZ which would otherwise have conferred sovereign rights to the living resources of the water 
column in addition to the resources of the seabed and subsoil. Instead, Bangladesh only had an 
entitlement to the seabed and its subsoil pursuant to the legal regime governing the continental 
shelf.101 Both Tribunals in this case ruled that Bangladesh’s entitlement over continental shelf 
beyond 200 M can indeed extend into the EEZ entitlements of Myanmar and India, which 
created the grey areas.  
 
 
Map 4: The Grey Areas in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh v India Arbitration Award, 2014) 
 
                                                 
100 Bangladesh v India, ibid, at para 498. 
101 Ibid, at para 503. 
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Thus, in the grey areas, the boundaries identified by the Tribunals delimit only the 
States’ sovereign rights to explore the continental shelf as set out in Article 77 of the 
Convention, without limiting the sovereign rights of Myanmar and India to the EEZ in the 
superjacent waters.102 This means that in the grey areas, the seabed and subsoil is unequivocally 
under Bangladesh’s jurisdiction, while the water column in the grey areas is under the 
jurisdiction of Myanmar and India. The Tribunals left it for the disputing Parties “to determine 
the measures they consider appropriate in this respect, including through the conclusion of 
further agreements or the creation of a cooperative arrangement”.103 
 The decisions of both Tribunals in the Bay of Bengal Cases seem to contradict the ICJ’s 
ruling in the Libya/Malta case as well as State practice with regard to the continental shelf 
beyond 200 M. By establishing the grey areas, the Tribunals allowed Bangladesh’s continental 
shelf entitlement beyond 200 M to extend into the EEZ entitlements of Myanmar and India. 
The decisions of the Tribunals attracted criticism, most notably from Judge Rao (who issued a 
dissenting opinion in the Bangladesh v India case). Judge Rao argued that “within 200 [M] 
from the coast, the sovereign rights of a coastal State over the water column and the seabed and 
its subsoil are considered as two indispensable and inseparable parts of the coastal State’s 
rights in the EEZ”. 104  According to Judge Rao, the creation of the grey areas clearly 
contradicted the precedent set by the ICJ, which established that “there cannot be an Exclusive 
Economic Zone without corresponding continental shelf”.105 By separating the jurisdiction 
over the seabed from that of the water column, the grey areas undermined the inseparable parts 
of the EEZ. Judge Rao also highlighted the fact that entitlement to the continental shelf beyond 
200 M is not absolute like the entitlement to the EEZ – a finding which led him to conclude 
that the entitlement to the EEZ takes priority over the entitlement to the continental shelf 
beyond 200 M.106 
It cannot be said, however, that the rulings in the Bay of Bengal Cases have overturned 
the precedent established by the ICJ in the Libya/Malta case. Firstly, neither Tribunal 
categorically stated that a State’s continental shelf beyond 200 M overrides the EEZ of another 
State. Secondly, all three Parties in the Bay of Bengal Cases shared the same continental margin 
                                                 
102 Ibid, at para 505; Bangladesh/Myanmar, supra note 3, at para 474. 
103 Ibid, at para 508. See also Bangladesh/Myanmar, ibid, at para 476. 
104 Rao, supra note 70, at para 31. 
105 Rao, ibid, at para 32. See also Libya v Malta, supra note 26, at para 34. 
106 Rao, ibid, at para 40. 
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– described as a thick layer of sedimentary rock of 14 to 22 kilometres covering practically the 
entire floor of the Bay of Bengal.107 Hence, this case is distinct from a situation where a single 
State has an entitlement to a continental shelf beyond 200 M that encroaches into another 
State’s EEZ. Thirdly, if the Tribunals had not allowed Bangladesh’s continental shelf beyond 
200 M to traverse the EEZ of Myanmar and India, Bangladesh would have been cut off 
completely from its entitlement to a continental shelf beyond 200 M. Indeed, this was due to 
the concavity of Bangladesh’s coast. Therefore, establishing the grey areas was the only way 
for the Tribunals to achieve an equitable result in drawing the boundaries. Since the Bay of 
Bengal Cases are not conclusive in answering the question of whether a hierarchy exists 
between the EEZ and continental shelf regimes, we will now examine the practice of States on 
this matter. 
 
6.3.3. State Practice 
As neither the LOS Convention nor the rulings of international courts and tribunals 
conclusively answer the question of whether one State’s continental shelf beyond 200 M may 
extend into the EEZ of another State, it is necessary to examine State practice on how coastal 
States have dealt with this issue vis-à-vis each other.108 Analysing the general practice of States 
could help in identifying not only how States parties to a treaty interpret the provisions of that 
treaty,109 but also to see if a new customary rule of international law has formed outside of a 
treaty rule. Identifying State practice and determining whether such practice is accepted as law 
(opinio juris), are the two elements required to establish a customary rule of international 
law.110 If a consistent practice exists on how coastal States behave in situations of an overlap 
between the EEZ and continental shelf beyond 200 M, it might be considered an “expression 
of a legal right or obligation (namely, that it is required, permitted or prohibited as a matter of 
                                                 
107 Bangladesh/Myanmar, supra note 3, at paras 444-445; see Bangladesh v India, supra note 31, at para 439. 
108 State practice refers to the conduct of a State, whether in the exercise of its executive, legislative, judicial or 
other functions, and may take a wide range of forms, including but not limited to, executive conducts, legislative 
and administrative acts, conduct in relation to treaties, as well as diplomatic acts and correspondence. See 
Report of the International Law Commission (2016) 68th Session, UN Doc A/71/10 [ILC Draft Conclusions], at 
90-91. 
109 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 January 
1980) [Vienna Convention], Art 31(3)(b). 
110 Ibid, at 82. See also North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 190, at para 77 and Libya/Malta, supra 
note 26, at para 27. 
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law)”.111 Such expression may thus be considered a customary international law rule despite 
the LOS Convention being silent on the issue.  
In order to establish a general practice, the relevant practice must be sufficiently 
widespread and representative, as well as consistent.112  The notion of generality has two 
requirements. First, the practice must be followed by a sufficiently large and representative 
number of States.113 This, however, does not mean that universal participation is required. As 
the ILC has explained, “it is not necessary to show that all States have participated in the 
practice in question”.114 To assess the generality of a State practice, it is only necessary to 
consider the practice of those States that are particularly involved in the relevant activity or 
most likely to be concerned with the alleged rule.115 In this case, the relevant States would be 
coastal States that possess: (i) a continental shelf beyond 200 M; and (ii) an outer continental 
shelf that potentially encroaches into the EEZ of another State. The particular practice of States 
in this regard will be examined through two primary modalities: (i) the submissions of coastal 
States to the CLCS on the outer limits of their continental shelves seaward of their 200 M limit; 
and (ii) maritime boundary treaties which determine the boundary between one State’s 
continental shelf and another State’s EEZ. 
 As of 4 June 2019, there have been 84 submissions to the CLCS for a continental shelf 
beyond 200 M.116 However, not all of these submissions are relevant for the purpose of the 
current investigation. Indeed, 13 submissions concern continental shelves which do not overlap 
with any maritime boundary claim of another State. This is because the submissions concern 
areas which are located vast distances from another State’s maritime zones.117 Thirty-three 
                                                 
111 ILC Draft Conclusions, ibid, at 83. 
112 Ibid, at 94. 
113 It is important that such States are representative of various geographical regions and/or the various interests 
at stake, see ibid, at 94 & 95. 
114 Ibid, at 94. 
115 The ICJ has stated that “an indispensable requirement would be that within the period in question, short 
though it might be, State practice, including that of States whose interests are specially affected, should have 
been both extensive and virtually uniform”, see North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 190, at para 74. 
116 CLCS, Submissions, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Commission on the Limits 
of the Continental Shelf, pursuant to article 76, paragraph 8, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea of 10 December 1982, available at 
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/commission_submissions.htm>.  
117 These submissions relate to Russia, Australia, the United Kingdom (Ascension Island), France (Antilles and 
Kerguelen Islands), the Philippines (in the Benham Rise region), Fiji, Norway (Bouvetøya and Dronning Maud 
Land), France and South Africa jointly (Crozet Archipelago and the Prince Edward Islands), Mauritius (two 
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submissions propose continental shelves beyond 200 M which overlap with the outer 
continental shelf of the submitting State’s adjacent neighbours. Even so, in these submissions 
the edge of the continental margin of the submitting State does not reach the EEZ of their 
opposite neighbours (see Table 1 below).118 Three submissions concern an overlap with the 
outer continental shelf claim of the submitting State’s opposite neighbours, but in these 
instances the States concerned either agreed to delimit a boundary between them119 or made a 
joint submission to the CLCS.120 Only 35 submissions resulted or potentially resulted in an 
overlap between the outer continental shelf of the submitting State and the EEZ of the opposite 
State, and are thus relevant to this research. These 35 submissions were individually or jointly 
submitted by 29 coastal States representing various geographical regions:  
 Africa (Ghana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Somalia);  
 The Americas (Mexico, Nicaragua, Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon (France) and Canada);  
 Asia (Japan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Maldives, China, South Korea, Oman and Indonesia);  
                                                 
submissions for Rodrigues Island and the Chagos Archipelago regions), Seychelles, France (La Réunion Island 
and Saint-Paul and Amsterdam Islands) and Madagascar. See Table 1 below. 
118 Note that the submissions of Argentina and the UK for the area around Falkland Islands, South Georgia and 
the South Sandwich Islands are almost identical, as both States claim sovereignty over these islands. The UK’s 
submission, however, does not include the outer continental shelf of its Antarctic territories (though it has 
reserved the right to include such features in a future submission). For further discussion on the continental shelf 
submissions of Argentina and the UK in Antarctica, see Karen N Scott, ‘Managing Sovereignty and 
Jurisdictional Disputes in the Antarctic: The Next Fifty Years’ (2009) 20(1) Yearbook of International 
Environmental Law 3, at 19-20. Another difference between the two submissions is that Argentina submits that 
Shag Rocks – a cluster of rocky islets located 150 M northwest of South Georgia – generate an EEZ and 
continental shelf of their own. Meanwhile, the UK considers the islets “rocks that cannot sustain human 
habitation or economic life of their own”, and hence are not entitled to an EEZ or continental shelf in 
accordance with Article 121(3) of the LOS Convention; see IBRU, Claims and Potential Claims to Maritime 
Jurisdiction in the South Atlantic and southern Oceans by Argentina and the UK, available at  
<https://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/ibru/south_atlantic_maritime_claims.pdf>. In the submissions of both 
Argentina and the UK, the outer continental shelf projection from South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands 
stops at the 200 M limit from the South Orkney Islands of Antarctica. See Argentine submission of outer limit 
of the continental shelf, available at 
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/arg25_09/arg2009e_summary_eng.pdf>; as well as 
submission of the UK in respect of the Falkland Islands, and of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, 
available at 
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/gbr45_09/gbr2009fgs_executive%20summary.pdf>.  
119 See the submission of Mexico in respect of the western polygon in the Gulf of Mexico, available at 
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mex07/part_i_executive_summary.pdf>, where it has 
agreed to a continental shelf boundary with the USA on 9 June 2000. In its submission, Mexico made it clear 
that neither Mexico nor the USA can extend their continental shelf in western polygon beyond the agreed 
boundary.  
120 See Joint Submission by Malaysia and Viet Nam in the southern part of the South China Sea, available at 
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_mysvnm_33_2009.htm> and the Joint 
Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf by Tuvalu, the Republic of France and 
New Zealand (Tokelau), available at 
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/tft62_12/tft_exsum_doc.pdf>.  
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 Europe (Norway, France, UK, Iceland, Denmark, Portugal and Spain); and,  
 Oceania (New Zealand, Cook Island, Micronesia, Papua New Guinea, Solomon 
Islands, Palau and Tonga).121 
The second requirement to establish generality is that the practice in question be both 
“extensive and virtually uniform”;122 that is to say, it must be a “settled practice”.123 Of the 35 
submissions made by 29 States that are relevant to this research, 31 of them (almost 90%) show 
restraint and do not encroach into the EEZ of their opposite neighbours. These States adopted 
three distinct approaches in dealing with this challenge. They either:  
(i) identified the limit of their outer continental shelf before the EEZ limit of another 
State;  
(ii) identified the limit of their outer continental shelf on the EEZ limit of another State; 
or,  
(iii) treated the EEZ limit of another State as the cut-off point of their outer continental 
shelf entitlement.  
An example of a coastal State which identified the limit of its outer continental shelf 
before it reached the EEZ of another State is Mexico. In its submission for the eastern polygon, 
Mexico intentionally identified the outer limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 M short of 
the outer limits of the EEZ of other States in the region.124 An example of a coastal State which 
identified the limit of its outer continental shelf on the EEZ limit of another State is France. In 
its submission for French Polynesia, France identified two fixed points as comprising the limit 
of their outer continental shelf located at the intersection of the foot of the slope, plus 60 M 
line and the 200 M line of the British Pitcairn Isles.125 Examples of coastal States which treated 
the limit of other States’ EEZ as a cut-off point for their outer continental shelf entitlements 
                                                 
121 See Table 1 below. 
122 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 190, at para 74. 
123 Ibid, at para 27. 
124 See A Partial Submission of Data and Information on the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf of the United 
Mexican States Pursuant to Part VI of and Annex II to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: 
Part I, available at 
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mex58_11/01_Executive_Summary.pdf>.  
125 See Partial Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, pursuant to Article 76, 
paragraph 8 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: French Polynesia, available at 
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/fra79_18/Part1_Summary_French_Polynesia_EN.pdf
>. Other States which adopted this approach in their submissions include New Zealand, France (New 
Caledonia), Japan, the UK (Hatton Rockall Area), the Cook Islands, Ghana, Iceland (Ægir Basin area and the 
western and southern parts of Reykjanes Ridge), Palau, Sri Lanka, Portugal, Mozambique, the Maldives, 
Tanzania, Micronesia (Eauripik Rise) and Canada (Atlantic Ocean); see Liao, supra note 3, at 17. 
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include Norway, Denmark and Indonesia. In its submission on the Norway Basin, Norway 
recognised that its outer continental shelf is limited by the 200 M EEZ limit of Iceland and the 
Faroe Islands (Denmark).126 Similarly, in its submission on the north of the Faroe Islands, 
Denmark stated that the outer limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 M are delineated by 
the 200 M limits of Iceland, Jan Mayen (Norway) and the mainland of Norway.127 Indonesia, 
in its submission on the North Papua region, expressly stated that the outer limits of its 
continental shelf beyond 200 M were constrained by the EEZ entitlement of Palau, Papua New 
Guinea and the Federated States of Micronesia.128 
This practice of restraint is not only evident in the individual submissions of States, but 
also in joint submissions. For example, Micronesia, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon 
Islands in their joint submission clearly recognised that the outer limits of their continental 
shelves beyond 200 M are delineated by the 200 M EEZ limits of Nauru and Tuvalu (see Map 
5 below).129  
 
                                                 
126 See Continental Shelf Submission of Norway in respect of areas in the Arctic Ocean, the Barents Sea and the 
Norwegian Sea, available at 
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nor06/nor_exec_sum.pdf>.  
127 See Partial Submission of the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark together with the Government of the 
Faroes to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: The Continental Shelf North of the Faroe 
Islands, available at 
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/dnk28_09/dnk2009executivesummary.pdf>.  
128 See Continental Shelf Submission of the Republic of Indonesia: Partial Submission with respect to the Area 
of North of Papua, available at <https://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/idn1_83_19/2019-
02-01_IDN-Executive_Summary.pdf>.  
129 Joint Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf concerning the Ontong Java 
Plateau by the Federated States of Micronesia, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, available at 
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/fmpgsb32_09/exsumdocs/fmpgsb2009executivesum
mary.pdf>.  
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Map 5: Outer limit of the continental shelf of Micronesia, PNG and Solomon Islands (CLCS 
Submission, 2014) 
 
The only four outlier submissions are those of China, South Korea, Nicaragua and 
France on behalf of Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon. The submissions of China and South Korea are 
both related to part of the East China Sea, with the claimed limits of their outer continental 
shelves being located well within the 200 M limit of EEZ entitlement of Japan and beyond the 
median line between the countries involved (see Map 6 below).130  
 
                                                 
130 Note that the distance between China and Japan, as well as between South Korea and Japan, is less than 400 
M. See Submission by the People’s Republic of China Concerning the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf 
beyond 200 Nautical Miles in Part of the East China Sea, available at 
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/chn63_12/executive%20summary_EN.pdf>; and 
Partial Submission of Korea to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf Pursuant to Article 76 
Paragraph 8 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, available at 
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/kor65_12/executive_summary.pdf>.  
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Map 6: Disputed areas in the East China Sea (Schofield and Townsend-Gault: 2011 35 Marine 
Policy, at 27) 
 
Nicaragua’s submission concerns the outer limits of its continental shelf in the south-western 
part of the Caribbean Sea, which it claims is well within the 200 M EEZ limit of Colombia (see 
Map 7 below).131  
 
                                                 
131 Submission of Nicaragua to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, available at 
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nic66_13/Executive%20Summary.pdf>. The case 
between Nicaragua and Colombia is currently before the ICJ, and will be discussed in Part 6.3.3 below. 
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Map 7: Delimitation claimed by Nicaragua (ICJ, 2012) 
 
France’s submission on behalf of Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon is unique, as the whole of St Pierre 
and Miquelon’s EEZ – which were drawn by an Arbitral Tribunal in 1992 – is located within 
200 M of Canada’s coasts.132 France it its submission confirms that there is an overlapping area 
between its extended continental shelf and that of Canada’s (see Map 8 below).133 
                                                 
132 Supra note 81.  
133 Partial Submission of the French Republic to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in 
respect of Saint Pierre et Miquelon, at 3-4, available at 
<https://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/fra72_14/SPM_Summary_EN_April2014.pdf>. 
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Map 8: The boundaries of the 1992 EEZ resolution between Canada and France (Eric Gaba 
and Canadian GéoBase) 
 
This inconsistency, however, is not necessarily detrimental in establishing a ‘general 
practice’.134 As the ILC has elaborated, complete consistency in the practice of States is not 
                                                 
134 In Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, the ICJ stated that:  
It is not to be expected that in the practice of States the application of the rules in 
question should have been perfect….The Court does not consider that, for a rule to 
be established as customary, the corresponding practice must be in absolutely 
rigorous conformity with the rule. In order to deduce the existence of customary 
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required, and some inconsistencies and contradictions are allowed.135 Thus, the inconsistent 
practice from China, South Korea, France and Nicaragua does not militate against the general 
practice of coastal States forfeiting a continental shelf beyond 200 M into the EEZ of another 
State. This is because the practice of the remaining 90% of relevant coastal States (as evidenced 
in their CLCS submissions) is virtually uniform. Furthermore, this percentage is unlikely to 
change drastically in the future, as the vast majority of coastal States which have (or potentially 
have) continental shelves beyond 200 M have already submitted either full or partial 
information to the CLCS.136 
It is also worth noting that Japan, Canada and Colombia have objected to the 
submissions made by China, South Korea, France and Nicaragua. Colombia’s objection to 
Nicaragua’s claim is currently before the ICJ.137 Canada completely rejects any claims by 
France on behalf of Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon “to any maritime area, including any areas of 
continental shelf, beyond the area awarded to the French Republic by the Court of 
Arbitration”.138  
Japan – in objecting to the submissions of China and South Korea – has stated that since 
the distance between the States is less than 400 M, China and South Korea cannot unilaterally 
establish the outer limits of their continental shelves. Instead, Japan has submitted that such 
limits should be delimited in accordance with Article 83 of the LOS Convention.139 Japan’s 
view accords with that of the ICJ – that is, where the distance between two opposing coastal 
                                                 
rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct of States should, in general, be 
consistent with such rules. 
See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America), 
Merits, Judgment, 27 June 1986, (1986) ICJ Reports 14, at para 186. 
135 ILC Draft Conclusion, supra note 108, at 96. 
136 Of the 155 coastal States in the world, 85 have made, or potentially could make, a submission to the CLCS 
for a continental shelf beyond 200 M. Currently, 82 countries have submitted full or preliminary information to 
the CLCS. The remaining five States are Colombia (in the Pacific Ocean), Ecuador, Peru, the USA and 
Venezuela. Of these five States, only the USA could have an outer continental shelf that is capable of 
encroaching into its opposite neighbour’s EEZ. See Robert van der Poll and Clive Schofield, Exploring to the 
Outer Limits: Securing the Resources of the Extended Continental Shelf in the Asia Pacific, presented at the 7th 
ABLOS Conference ‘UNCLOS in a Changing World, Monaco, 3-5 October 2012. 
137 See Nicaragua v Colombia II, supra note 10.  
138 See Communication from Canada to the CLCS dated 3 September 2014, available at 
<https://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/fra72_14/2014_09_03_can_nv_un_001.pdf>. 
139 See Communication from Japan to the CLCS dated 28 December 2012, available at 
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/chn63_12/jpn_re_chn_28_12_2012.pdf>; and 
Communication from Japan to the CLCS dated 11 January 2013, available at 
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/kor65_12/jpn_re_kor_11_01_2013.pdf>.  
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States is less than 400 M, the distance factor, and not the geophysical factor, should be 
considered in determining the boundary.140 
 
Table 1 – List of CLCS Submissions as of 4 June 2019 
No Submission by State Date of submission 
Overlap with Opposite 
States’ EEZ 
1. 
Russian Federation 
Russian Federation - partial revised Submission in respect of the 
Okhotsk Sea 
Russian Federation - partial revised Submission in respect of the Arctic 
Ocean 
20 December 2001 
28 February 2013 
3 August 2015 
None 
2. 
Brazil 
Brazil - partial revised Submission - in respect of the Brazilian 
Southern Region 
Brazil - partial revised Submission - in respect of the Brazilian 
Equatorial Margin 
17 May 2004 
10 April 2015 
8 September 2017 
None 
3. Australia 15 November 2004 None^ 
4. Ireland - Porcupine Abyssal Plain 25 May 2005 None* 
5. New Zealand 19 April 2006 Australia, Fiji and Tonga 
6. 
Joint submission by France, Ireland, Spain and the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland - in the area of the Celtic Sea and 
the Bay of Biscay 
19 May 2006 None 
7. Norway - in the North East Atlantic and the Arctic 27 November 2006 
Iceland and Denmark 
(Faroe Islands) 
8. France - in respect of the areas of French Guiana and New Caledonia 22 May 2007 Australia  
9. Mexico - in respect of the western polygon in the Gulf of Mexico 13 December 2007 USA+ 
10. 
Barbados 
Barbados - revised 
8 May 2008 
25 July 2011 
None* 
11. 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland - Ascension 
Island 
9 May 2008 None^ 
12. Indonesia - North West of Sumatra Island 16 June 2008 None* 
13. Japan 12 November 2008 USA and Palau 
14. 
Joint submission by the Republic of Mauritius and the Republic of 
Seychelles - in the region of the Mascarene Plateau 
1 December 2008 None* 
                                                 
140 See Libya v Malta, supra note 26, at paras 39-40.  
 Coastal State’s outer continental shelf claim does not overlap with any other State’s maritime zones. 
 Coastal State’s outer continental shelf claim may overlap with its adjacent neighbours, but there is no overlap 
with the EEZ of its opposite neighbours. 
 Coastal State’s claim overlaps with the outer continental shelf of its opposite neighbour, but they either have 
delimited a maritime boundary between them or submitted a joint submission to the CLCS. 
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No Submission by State Date of submission 
Overlap with Opposite 
States’ EEZ 
15. Suriname 5 December 2008 None* 
16. Myanmar 16 December 2008 None* 
17. France - areas of the French Antilles and the Kerguelen Islands 5 February 2009 None^ 
18. Yemen - in respect of south east of Socotra Island 20 March 2009 None* 
19. 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland - in respect of 
Hatton Rockall Area 
31 March 2009 Iceland  
20. Ireland - in respect of Hatton-Rockall Area 31 March 2009 None* 
21. Uruguay  7 April 2009 None* 
22. Philippines - in the Benham Rise region 8 April 2009 None^ 
23. The Cook Islands - concerning the Manihiki Plateau 16 April 2009 USA and Kiribati 
24. Fiji  20 April 2009 None^ 
25. 
Argentina 
Argentina - partial revised Submission 
21 April 2009 
28 October 2016 
None* 
26. Ghana 28 April 2009 Nigeria 
27. 
Iceland - in the Ægir Basin area and in the western and southern parts 
of Reykjanes Ridge 
29 April 2009 Norway and Denmark 
28. Denmark - in the area north of the Faroe Islands 29 April 2009 Norway 
29. Pakistan 30 April 2009 Oman 
30. Norway - in respect of Bouvetøya and Dronning Maud Land 4 May 2009 None^ 
31. 
South Africa - in respect of the mainland of the territory of the 
Republic of South Africa 
5 May 2009 None* 
32. 
Joint submission by the Federated States of Micronesia, Papua New 
Guinea and Solomon Islands - concerning the Ontong Java Plateau 
5 May 2009 Nauru & Tuvalu 
33. 
Joint submission by Malaysia and Viet Nam - in the southern part of 
the South China Sea 
6 May 2009 None+ 
34. 
Joint submission by France and South Africa - in the area of the Crozet 
Archipelago and the Prince Edward Islands 
6 May 2009 None^ 
35. Kenya  6 May 2009 None* 
36. Mauritius - in the region of Rodrigues Island 6 May 2009 None^ 
37. Viet Nam - in North Area (VNM-N) 7 May 2009 None* 
38. Nigeria  7 May 2009 None* 
39. Seychelles - concerning the Northern Plateau Region 7 May 2009 None^ 
40. 
France - in respect of La Réunion Island and Saint-Paul and 
Amsterdam Islands 
8 May 2009 
None^ 
41. Palau 8 May 2009 
Philippines, Micronesia 
and Indonesia 
42. Côte d'Ivoire  8 May 2009 None* 
43. Sri Lanka 8 May 2009 India 
 
199 
 
No Submission by State Date of submission 
Overlap with Opposite 
States’ EEZ 
44. Portugal 11 May 2009 Morocco 
45. 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland - in respect of 
the Falkland Islands, and of South Georgia and the South Sandwich 
Islands 
11 May 2009 None* 
46. Tonga 11 May 2009 New Zealand 
47. Spain - in respect of the area of Galicia 11 May 2009 France 
48. India 11 May 2009 None* 
49. Trinidad and Tobago 12 May 2009 None* 
50. Namibia 12 May 2009 None* 
51. Cuba 1 June 2009 None* 
52. Mozambique 7 July 2010 France (Europa Island) 
53. Maldives 26 July 2010 Sri Lanka and India 
54. Denmark - Faroe-Rockall Plateau Region 2 December 2010 Iceland and Ireland 
55. Bangladesh 25 February 2011 None* 
56. Madagascar 29 April 2011 None^ 
57. Guyana 6 September 2011 None* 
58. Mexico - in respect of the eastern polygon in the Gulf of Mexico 19 December 2011 USA and Cuba 
59. United Republic of Tanzania 18 January 2012 Seychelles 
60. Gabon  10 April 2012 None* 
61. Denmark - in respect of the Southern Continental Shelf of Greenland 14 June 2012 Canada 
62. 
Joint Submission by Tuvalu, France and New Zealand (Tokelau) - in 
respect of the area of the Robbie Ridge 
7 December 2012 None+ 
63. China - in Part of the East China Sea 14 December 2012 Japan 
64. Kiribati 24 December 2012 None* 
65. Republic of Korea 26 December 2012 Japan 
66. Nicaragua - in the southwestern part of the Caribbean Sea 24 June 2013 Colombia 
67. Federated States of Micronesia - in respect of the Eauripik Rise 30 August 2013 
Indonesia and Papua New 
Guinea 
68. 
Denmark - in respect of the North-Eastern Continental Shelf of 
Greenland 
26 November 2013 Norway 
69. Angola 6 December 2013 None* 
70. Canada - in respect of the Atlantic Ocean 6 December 2013 Denmark 
71. Bahamas 6 February 2014 None* 
72. France - in respect of Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon 16 April 2014 Canada 
73. Tonga - in the western part of the Lau-Colville Ridge 23 April 2014 New Zealand 
74. Somalia  21 July 2014 Yemen 
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No Submission by State Date of submission 
Overlap with Opposite 
States’ EEZ 
75. 
Joint Submission by Cabo Verde, The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Mauritania, Senegal and Sierra Leone - in respect of areas in the 
Atlantic Ocean adjacent to the coast of West Africa 
25 September 2014 None* 
76. Denmark - in respect of the Northern Continental Shelf of Greenland 15 December 2014 
Russia, Canada and 
Norway 
77. Spain - in respect of the area west of the Canary Islands 17 December 2014 None* 
78. Oman 26 October 2017 Pakistan 
79. France - in respect of French Polynesia 6 April 2018 UK (Pitcairn Islands)  
80. Joint Submission of the Republic of Benin and the Togolese Republic 21 September 2018 None* 
81 Liberia 23 October 2018 None* 
82 Mauritius - concerning the Southern Chagos Archipelago region 26 March 2019 None^ 
83 Indonesia - in the area of North of Papua (Eauripik Rise) 11 April 2019 
Palau, Papua New Guinea 
and Federated States of 
Micronesia 
84 Canada – in respect of the Arctic Ocean 23 May 2019 USA and Denmark 
Source: Author’s analysis derived from coastal States’ submissions to the CLCS 
 
Additionally, some coastal States have concluded boundary agreements delimiting their 
outer continental shelf and EEZ even before lodging submissions with the CLCS. There are 
currently 19 bilateral agreements involving the delimitation of outer continental shelves,141 but 
only one deals with delimitation between the outer continental shelf and the EEZ. Australia 
and New Zealand concluded a boundary agreement in 2004 which delimits, inter alia, the 
boundary between New Zealand’s continental shelf beyond 200 M and Australia’s EEZ.142 
Pursuant to the treaty, New Zealand has agreed that its continental shelf beyond 200 M in the 
region extending from Three Kings Ridge to Lord Howe Rise ends at the outer limits of the 
EEZ generated from Australia’s Lord Howe Island (see Map 9 below). 
 
                                                 
141 See Clive Schofield and Leonardo Bernard, Dispute Concerning the Delimitation of Continental Shelf 
Beyond 200 M, presentation at the Conference on New Knowledge and Changing Circumstances in The Law of 
the Sea, held in Reykjavik, Iceland on 28-30 June 2018. 
142 The Treaty between the Government of Australia and the Government of New Zealand establishing certain 
Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Boundaries, signed 25 July 2004. 
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Map 9: Australia – New Zealand Maritime Boundary (International Maritime Boundary, 2005) 
 
Micronesia and Palau have also concluded a maritime boundary agreement which 
delimits the EEZ between them. The agreement anticipates both Parties making future 
submissions to the CLCS and is without prejudice to the rights of each Party over the outer 
continental shelf. The agreement makes it clear that “no Party shall claim an [outer] continental 
shelf that intrudes into the Exclusive Economic Zone, as delimited by Annex 1, of the other 
Party”.143  These bilateral maritime boundary agreements support the practice of States in 
                                                 
143 Treaty between the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of Palau Concerning Maritime 
Boundaries and Cooperation on Related Matters, 5 July 2006, Art 3. 
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refraining from encroaching into another State’s EEZ when making outer continental shelf 
submissions to the CLCS. 
Another recently concluded boundary agreement that is relevant – albeit not concerned 
with an outer continental shelf boundary – is the treaty between Timor-Leste (formerly known 
as East Timor) and Australia. Timor-Leste and Australia are neighbouring States, separated by 
the Timor Sea at a distance of approximately 300 M. Timor-Leste is a former territory of 
Indonesia which gained independence in 2002. Following its independence, Timor-Leste 
agreed on a provisional arrangement in the Timor Sea pending a boundary agreement with 
Australia. 144  This agreement preserved the ‘Zone of Cooperation’ previously created by 
Australia and Indonesia to jointly explore and exploit the resources of an area of the continental 
shelf in the Timor Sea (known as the Joint Petroleum Development Area or ‘JPDA’).145 
Following the agreement, the Governments of both countries embarked upon negotiations to 
resolve petroleum revenue rights from gas and oil fields that lie partly or wholly outside the 
JPDA. These negotiations, however, failed to reach any resolution on determining the EEZ 
boundary between the two Parties. While Australia opted out from the compulsory dispute 
settlement mechanism under the LOS Convention for disputes related to maritime boundaries, 
Timor-Leste commenced the compulsory conciliation proceedings under Section 2 of Annex 
V of the Convention.146  Indeed, this was the first time proceedings of this kind had ever been 
invoked. 
Even though Australia did not make any submission to the CLCS concerning a 
continental shelf beyond 200 M in the Timor Sea area, it had consistently argued that its 
continental shelf entitlement went beyond the 200 M limit of its EEZ to the edge of the Timor 
Trough. This claimed entitlement was well within Timor-Leste’s side of the EEZ based on the 
median line, which it considered the outer limit of its continental margin.147 Australia thus 
proposed two separate boundaries in the Timor Sea, one for the water column and another for 
the continental shelf. In making this proposal, Australia relied on the precedent set by its 
                                                 
144 Timor Sea Treaty between the Government of East Timor and the Government of Australia, East Timor-
Australia, 20 May 2002 (entered into force 2 April 2003), 2258 UNTS 3. 
145 Treaty between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia on the Zone of Cooperation in an area between the 
Indonesian Province of East Timor and Northern Australia [Timor Gap Treaty], 11 December 1989. 
146 In the Matter of the Maritime Boundary between Timor-Leste and Australia (The ‘Timor Sea Conciliation’), 
Notification Instituting Conciliation under Section 2 of Annex V of UNCLOS, 11 April 2006, PCA 2016-10. 
147 In the Matter of the Maritime Boundary between Timor-Leste and Australia (The ‘Timor Sea Conciliation’), 
Report and Recommendations of the Compulsory Conciliation Commission between Timor-Leste and Australia 
on the Timor Sea, 9 May 2018, (2018) PCA 2016-10, at para 234. 
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boundary agreements with Indonesia – also located in the Timor Sea – in which separate 
boundaries for the water column and the continental shelf were agreed.148 It is important to 
note, however, that the continental shelf boundary between Australia and Indonesia was agreed 
on in 1971, just after the ICJ issued its decision in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases. As 
previously discussed, the ICJ’s ruling in this series of cases introduced the concept of natural 
prolongation in continental shelf delimitation, 149  with the ruling pre-dating the LOS 
Convention and thus the creation of the EEZ regime. After the LOS Convention came into 
force, both States decided to respect the existing continental shelf boundary and negotiate a 
separate boundary for the water column.150  
According to Timor-Leste, the introduction of the 200 M distance criterion for the 
continental shelf under the LOS Convention meant that the concepts of natural prolongation 
and the geology and geomorphology of the seabed were no longer relevant to shelf delimitation 
between two States situated less than 400 M apart.151 The tension between the distance criterion 
and the geomorphology criterion formed the main subject of the conciliation proceedings. In 
mid-2017, and following a year of conciliation, Australia indicated that it was willing to 
consider a single maritime boundary based on equidistance in order to resolve the issue. In 
2018, both Parties finally agreed on an EEZ boundary that mostly followed the equidistance 
line (see Map 10 below).152 
 
                                                 
148 See Agreement between the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia and the Government of the 
Republic of Indonesia Establishing Certain Seabed Boundaries in the Area of the Timor and Arafura Seas 
Supplementary to the Agreement of 18 May 1971, 9 October 1972 (entered into force 8 November 1973), 974 
UNTS 319; and Treaty between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia 
establishing an Exclusive Economic Zone Boundary and Certain Seabed Boundaries, 14 March 1997, ATNIF 4.  
149 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 190. 
150 See Leonardo Bernard and Clive Schofield, ‘Separate Lines: Challenges and Opportunities of Differentiated 
Seabed and Water Column Boundaries’ in Myron H Nordquist, John Norton Moore and Ronan Long (eds), 
International Marine Economy (Brill Nijhoff Publishers, 2017), 282-321, at 309. 
151 The ‘Timor Sea Conciliation’, Report and Recommendations of the Compulsory Conciliation Commission 
between Timor-Leste and Australia on the Timor Sea, supra note 147, at para 232.  
152 Treaty between Australia and the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste Establishing Their Maritime 
Boundaries in the Timor Sea, 6 March 2018. For further analysis on the conciliation process, see Clive 
Schofield and I Made Andi Arsana, Settling Timor-Leste’s International Limits and Boundaries, in Andrew 
McWilliam and Michael Leach (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Contemporary East Timor, (Routledge, 
2019), 285. 
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Map 10: Maritime boundaries in the Timor Sea (Arsana and Schofield, 2019, at 295) 
 
Even though the maritime boundary delimitation between Australia and Timor-Leste 
did not involve any area beyond 200 M from each State,153 the arguments of both Parties and 
the boundary ultimately agreed upon are relevant to this research. Australia’s claim that its 
continental shelf continued beyond the median line was tantamount to saying that the 
continental shelf regime should trump the EEZ regime, despite the distance between the two 
countries being less than 400 M.154 The boundary finally agreed upon, however, indicates that 
Australia renounced this position, accepting that the boundary should be based on the median 
line instead of the natural prolongation concept. This supports the practice of States in 
abandoning the natural prolongation principle when extending their outer continental shelf into 
the EEZ of another State. 
However, establishing that a particular State practice is followed consistently and by a 
sufficiently widespread and representative number of States is not sufficient to identify a rule 
of customary international law. Indeed, it is also necessary to establish the binding character 
                                                 
153 This situation is similar to that between China and Japan, as well as between South Korea and Japan, see 
supra note 130. 
154 Note, however, that Australia adopted the opposite position vis-à-vis its boundary with New Zealand, where 
it insisted that New Zealand recognise the full extent of its EEZ, notwithstanding the limit of the latter’s outer 
continental shelf. See supra note 142. 
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of the practice in question.155 In other words, such a practice must be undertaken because the 
States “felt or believed themselves legally compelled or entitled to do so by reason of a rule of 
customary international law”.156 Acceptance as law (opinio juris) may be reflected in a wide 
variety of forms, including: “public statements made on behalf of States; official publications; 
government legal opinions; diplomatic correspondence; decisions of national Courts; treaty 
provisions; and conduct in connection with resolutions adopted by an international 
organization or at an intergovernmental conference”.157 
None of the 31 submissions relevant to this research provide any explanation as to why 
the claims of the relevant States stopped at or before the outer limits of the EEZ of their opposite 
neighbours. Several official communications relating to those submissions, however, are 
telling of the intention of the States concerned. In Oman’s objection to Pakistan’s submission, 
for example, Oman noted that Pakistan’s claim touched on the outer limits of its EEZ.158 Since 
Oman had not claimed an EEZ, it reserved the right to do so,159 which in turn would have 
affected the western area of Pakistan’s continental shelf claim. In its response, Pakistan 
acknowledged that its submission was made without prejudice to “future delimitation or any 
continental shelf submission to be made by Oman”.160 Pakistan did not object to Oman’s right 
under the LOS Convention to claim EEZ to the 200 M limit, which could be interpreted as a 
recognition by Pakistan that the limits of Oman’s EEZ would determine the western limit of its 
outer continental shelf.161  
The Philippines’ objection to Palau’s submission, and the exchange of communication 
that followed, also reveals Palau’s opinio juris. In its objection, the Philippines pointed out that 
Palau’s claim to a continental shelf beyond 200 M not only overlapped with the 200 M 
                                                 
155 ILC Draft Conclusion, supra note 108, at 96. 
156 Ibid, at 97 
157 Ibid, at 99. 
158 Communication from Oman to the CLCS dated 7 August 2009, available at 
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/pak29_09/2014_10_09_PAK_NV_UN_003_14-
00794.pdf>.  
159 Ibid. 
160 Communication from Pakistan to the CLCS dated 9 October 2014, available at 
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/pak29_09/2014_10_09_PAK_NV_UN_003_14-
00794.pdf>.  
161 This is also reflected in the recommendation of the CLCS, see CLCS, Summary Of Recommendations Of The 
Commission On The Limits Of The Continental Shelf In Regard To The Submission Made By The Islamic 
Republic Of Pakistan On 30 April 2009, dated 13 March 2015, available at 
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/pak29_09/2015_03_13_SC_PAK.pdf>.  
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continental shelf of the Philippines, but also its EEZ.162 In its response, Palau repeated the 
statement made in its submission – that “the extension of Palau’s continental shelf in the West 
Area is limited to the east by the 200 M area under the jurisdiction of the Philippines”, stressing 
that such limitation was taken in compliance with Article 76 of the LOS Convention.163 
Similarly, Palau and Micronesia agreed in its maritime boundary treaty that the outer 
continental shelf of neither State would intrude on the other State’s EEZ, thus recognising the 
full extent of each other’s EEZ over the continental shelf beyond 200 M.164 
Apart from the examples above, it is difficult to determine whether any other State has 
refrained from encroaching on the EEZ of their opposite neighbours out of clear legal 
obligation or simply political convenience.165 New Zealand for example, concluded a boundary 
agreement with Australia before making a submission to the CLCS. Under the Treaty both 
States agreed that the limits of New Zealand’s outer continental shelf in the Three Kings Ridge 
does not encroach on Australia’s 200 M EEZ limit generated from Norfolk Island.166 However, 
it is not clear from the Treaty whether New Zealand’s refrain was due to an overarching sense 
of law or merely a tool of political convenience with a long-standing economic and political 
partner.167 Similarly, the submissions by Norway, Denmark and Iceland all reveal that the 
States agreed among themselves that their submissions would be without prejudice to future 
maritime delimitation.168 
                                                 
162 Communication from the Philippines to the CLCS dated 4 August 2009, available at 
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/plw41_09/clcs_41_2009_los_phl.pdf>.  
163 Communication from Palau to the CLCS dated 22 July 2010, available at 
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/plw41_09/clcs_41_2009_los_plw.pdf>.   
164 Ted L McDorman and Clive Schofield, ‘Federated States of Micronesia-Palau’ in David A Colson and 
Robert W Smith (eds), International Maritime Boundaries (The American Society of International Law, 2011), 
4348-4362, at 4350. 
165 Opinio juris is different from other non-legal motives, such as comity, political expediency or convenience; 
see ILC Draft Conclusion, supra note 108, at 97. 
166 Treaty between the Government of New Zealand and the Government of Australia establishing certain 
Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Boundaries, signed 25 July 2004. 
167 The author had an informal conversation with a legal scholar from New Zealand in Sydney on 18 August 
2018. The scholar revealed that during the negotiation of the treaty, Australia refused to entertain any notion that 
New Zealand’s outer continental shelf could encroach into Australia’s EEZ. 
168 Agreed Minutes on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles between the Faroe 
Islands, Iceland and Norway in the Southern Part of the Banana Hole of the Northeast Atlantic, signed 20 
September 2006. However, the author had an informal discussion with a former consultant to Norway’s CLCS 
submission in Reykjavik on 28 June 2018. The former consultant stated that Norway never considered 
encroaching on the EEZ of another State, because “that is the law”.  
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There are only a few instances where coastal States have revealed that their practice of 
not encroaching on the EEZ of other States was based on existing legal doctrine. In its written 
pleadings to the ICJ in the Gulf of Maine case, Canada argued against the creation of a grey 
area in cases of a single maritime boundary.169 The grey area (which extends beyond 200 M) 
is an inevitable result in situations where a line other than the equidistance line is used as the 
boundary between adjacent coastal States.170 It stems from the fact that entitlement to the EEZ 
is solely based on distance from the coast, while delimitation of the EEZ can be effected on the 
basis of principles other than distance.171 Canada viewed that the grey area “would deprive one 
State of a portion of its [EEZ] so that another State may exercise continental shelf rights beyond 
its own [EEZ]”.172 Canada continued by saying that “such a result is generally inconsistent with 
the doctrine of non-encroachment as it applies in the context of the 200 [M] distance principle” 
[emphasis added].173  
In the Jan Mayen case, Denmark argued in its written pleadings that using the ratio of 
the relevant coastal length of Greenland and Jan Mayen (Norway) would result in a line beyond 
the 200 M limit from Greenland’s coast towards Jan Mayen.174 Denmark, however, viewed that 
such a line “cannot be upheld because it is incompatible with the existing legal regime 
governing the right of States to claim certain areas of the sea bordering their coast”.175 Denmark 
further stated that “any maritime zone off the east coast of Greenland would in the concrete 
circumstances not be allowed to extend beyond 200 [M]”.176 
It thus seems there are only scant instances of opinio juris supporting the general 
practice of States forfeiting an outer continental shelf that encroaches into the EEZ of another 
State. The ILC in its report, however, states that “[i]t is not necessary to establish that all States 
                                                 
169 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United States of America), 
Counter-Memorial of Canada, 28 June 1983, at para 575. 
170 For further discussion on the grey area issue, see Alex G Oude Elferink, ‘Does Undisputed Title to a 
Maritime Zone Always Exclude its Delimitation: The Grey Area Issue’ (1998) 13(2) International Journal of 
Marine and Coastal Law 143. 
171 Ibid, at 147. 
172 Counter-Memorial of Canada, supra note 169, at para 575.  
173 Ibid. Based on a private conversation which the author had with a legal scholar from Canada in New York on 
25 September 2018. Canada maintained this ‘doctrine of non-encroachment’ in negotiating its continental shelf 
boundary with Denmark (Greenland).  
174 Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v Norway), Memorial of 
the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark, Vol I, 31 July 1989, at para 372. 
175 Ibid, at para 374. 
176 Ibid, at para 375. 
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have recognised (accepted as law) the alleged rule as a rule of customary international law”.177 
Nevertheless, it is premature to argue that there exists a rule of customary international law that 
a continental shelf beyond 200 M should not encroach into another State’s EEZ.  
Although these State practice has yet to amount to a customary rule of international 
law, it does show how the State parties to the LOS Convention interpret the provisions on the 
limits of continental shelf beyond 200 M.178  The majority of State parties in their CLCS 
submissions seem to respect the 200 M EEZ limit of their neighbours and adjust the outer limits 
of their continental shelf accordingly. This practice of restraint is also shown in the few 
boundary agreements concluded between State parties of the LOS Convention involving 
delimitation of continental shelf beyond 200 M. This State practice indicates the understanding 
of the majority of parties to the LOS Convention on the meaning of Article 76 paragraph 1 on 
the entitlement of the continental shelf, as well as Article 57 on the breadth of the EEZ. 
 
6.4. Conclusion 
This Chapter has sought to explain what happens in the event of an overlap between the 
continental shelf beyond 200 M and the EEZ. It is clear that the EEZ regime (as created by the 
LOS Convention) has not absorbed the continental shelf regime. Instead, both regimes exist 
independently and in parallel. The EEZ regime, however, has definitely changed the nature of 
the continental shelf regime, with Article 76(1) of the LOS Convention establishing the outer 
limit of the continental shelf as either the edge of the continental margin or a distance of up to 
200 M from the baselines. This raises the question of whether a hierarchy exists between the 
continental margin rule (which is based on natural prolongation) and the 200 M rule (which is 
based on distance). The ICJ, however, has clarified that both the edge of the continental margin 
and the distance up to 200 M from the baselines constitute the natural prolongation of a coastal 
State’s land territory.179  
The LOS Convention does not expressly prescribe any superiority between the EEZ 
regime and that of the continental shelf. Moreover, the decisions of international courts and 
tribunals do not evince one regime being preferenced over the other. Even so, it is undeniable 
                                                 
177 ILC Draft Conclusion, supra note 108, at 98. 
178 It is common practice to take into account the manner in which governments had applied a treaty since its 
adoption to analyse a commitment under such treaty, see Sean D Murphy, ‘The Relevance of Subsequent 
Agreement and Subsequent Practice for the Interpretation of Treaties’ in Georg Nolte (ed), Treaties And 
Subsequent Practice (Oxford University Press, 2013), 82, at 85. 
179 Libya v Malta, supra note 26, at para 34. 
 
209 
 
when examining CLCS submissions (as well as maritime boundary agreements), that there is 
a consistent and geographically widespread practice of coastal States refraining from 
encroaching into another State’s EEZ. Although this general practice has not yet crystallised 
into a rule of customary international law, it does demonstrate how States are dealing with this 
situation, and could thus indicate the understanding of State parties to the LOS Convention on 
how to interpret the limits of their entitlement of continental shelf beyond 200 M. 
The two cases relevant to the investigation do not answer the question of whether one 
State’s continental shelf beyond 200 M may extend into the EEZ of another State. The 
Libya/Malta case stands for the proposition that in delimiting the maritime area between two 
opposing States less than 400 M apart, distance should be the main factor. However, this case 
does not cover situations where two States are more than 400 M apart. And while the Bay of 
Bengal Cases allow a State’s continental shelf to extend beyond 200 M into the EEZ of another 
State, the unique geographical situation in those series of cases might prevent the ruling from 
being universally applied. We thus await the ICJ’s decision in the case between Nicaragua and 
Colombia that is currently being adjudicated. This will be discussed further in the next Chapter. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
7.1. Introduction 
The hypotheses of this thesis are that the continental shelf regime does not trump the Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) regime, and that the continental shelf cannot extend beyond 200 M into 
the EEZ of another State.  
To test the hypotheses, five research questions were posed. The first question dealt with 
the history and nature of the ‘inherent right’ of coastal States with regard to the continental 
shelf. To answer this question, Chapter 2 of the thesis traced the history and development of 
the continental shelf regime in order to find the origin of this ‘inherent right’. Indeed, the 
answer to this first question was central to determining whether the continental shelf regime is 
superior to the EEZ regime, as will be elaborated in Part 7.2 below. 
The second research question asked if a hierarchy exists between the continental shelf 
regime within and beyond 200 M. To answer this question, Chapter 3 of the thesis investigated 
the history of the EEZ regime, and in particular, the way in which its introduction influenced 
the legal limits of the continental shelf regime (with such limits forming the basis for the 
investigation in Chapter 4). The distinction which the research has revealed between the 
continental shelf within and beyond 200 M will be summarised in Part 7.3 of this Chapter.  
The third research question centred on the natural prolongation principle and considered 
whether the principle points to the supremacy of the continental shelf regime over the EEZ. 
The natural prolongation principle rose to prominence with the ruling of the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ) in the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases.1 Chapter 5 of the thesis thus 
analysed the role of the natural prolongation principle in continental shelf delimitation cases, 
the findings of which will be discussed in Part 7.4 below. 
The fourth research question considered whether the EEZ regime intended to absorb 
the continental shelf regime. The EEZ regime was established with the adoption of the 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention),2 while the continental 
shelf regime had been a fixture of international law for a few decades before the Convention’s 
introduction. In order to answer this question, Chapter 6 of the thesis closely analysed the text 
                                                 
1 North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v the 
Netherlands), 20 February 1969, (1969) ICJ Reports 3 [North Sea Continental Shelf Cases], at para 19. 
2 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, (entered into force 16 November 
1994) 1833 UNTS at 3 [LOS Convention].  
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of the LOS Convention, as well as State practice and the precedents established by international 
courts and tribunals. The result of this analysis is presented in Parts 7.5, 7.6 and 7.7 of this 
Chapter.  
The fifth and final research question sought to examine how boundary delimitation can 
be conducted in situations where the continental shelf beyond 200 M of one coastal State 
overlaps with the EEZ of another State. This final research question is addressed in Part 7.8 of 
this Chapter, based on the analysis and findings of the research conducted for this thesis. 
  
7.2. The Legal Nature of the Continental Shelf 
As a legal construct, the continental shelf has undergone substantial revision since its 
introduction in the early 20th century. Indeed, the legal concept of the continental shelf differs 
from the geomorphological concept, although some elements of the geomorphological 
approach have been incorporated into the legal concept. Despite the various changes to the 
legal definition of the continental shelf – from the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental 
Shelf (Continental Shelf Convention) to the 1982 LOS Convention – States have perennially 
accepted that the continental shelf is subject to coastal State jurisdiction.  
 The 1945 Truman Proclamation is widely considered the “first clear assertion” that the 
continental shelf is subject to the jurisdiction of the coastal State.3 The Proclamation claimed 
that “the continental shelf may be regarded as an extension of the land-mass of the coastal 
nation and thus naturally appurtenant to it”.4 Surprisingly, this broad claim over the continental 
shelf was not protested by the international community. Instead, an increasing number of 
coastal States followed the example set by the United States and claimed jurisdiction over their 
own continental shelves. Although the claims which followed the Truman Proclamation varied 
in legal and geographical scope, the idea that coastal States had certain rights over the 
continental shelf quickly gained currency.5 
 The 1958 Continental Shelf Convention confirmed the appurtenance of the continental 
shelf to the coastal State. Article 2 stated that the rights of the coastal State over the continental 
shelf are exclusive and “do not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or on any express 
                                                 
3 Robin R Churchill and Alan V Lowe, The Law of the Sea (Manchester University Press, 3rd ed, 1999), at 143. 
4 1945 US Presidential Proclamation No 2667, Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural 
Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, (1945) 10 Fed Reg 12,305 [Truman 
Proclamation].  
5 Churchill and Lowe, supra note 5, at 144. 
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proclamation”.6 The nature of these rights was confirmed by the ICJ in its 1969 judgment in 
the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases:7 
 
the rights of the coastal State in respect of the area of continental shelf 
…exist ipso facto and ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty over the 
land, and as an extension of it in an exercise of sovereign rights for the 
purpose of exploring the seabed and exploiting its natural resources. In 
short, there is here an inherent right [emphasis added]. 
 
The inherent nature of coastal States’ rights over the continental shelf is preserved in 
the LOS Convention.8 Indeed, the inherent nature of such rights is one of the main differences 
between the continental shelf regime and the EEZ regime, with rights over the latter regime 
needing to be proclaimed by coastal States.9 It is clear from an examination of the history and 
development of the shelf regime that the ‘inherent nature’ of these rights derives from the 
continental shelf being considered a continuation of the land territory of the coastal State. The 
Truman Proclamation asserted that “the continental shelf may be regarded as an extension of 
the land-mass of the coastal nation”,10 with the ICJ later confirming (in the context of the North 
Sea Continental Shelf Cases), that “the area of continental shelf…constitutes a natural 
prolongation of [the coastal State’s] land territory into and under the sea”.11 This is not the case 
with the EEZ, which as a legal concept is based on distance rather than a geomorphological or 
geological concept.  
 
7.3. The EEZ and the Legal Limit of the Continental Shelf 
Even before the establishment of the EEZ regime, coastal States had been attempting to extend 
their jurisdiction over large ocean areas based on distance from their coasts. In 1947, for 
example, Chile claimed jurisdiction over the continental shelf and the waters above it - not on 
the basis of geology or geomorphological factors – but on the basis of a parallel line 200 M 
                                                 
6 Convention on the Continental Shelf, done at Geneva on 29 April 1958, UNTS 499, at 311 (entered into force 
10 June 1964) [Continental Shelf Convention], Art 2(2)-(3). 
7 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 190, at para 19. 
8 LOS Convention, Art 77(2)-(3).  
9 David Attard, The Exclusive Economic Zone in International Law (Clarendon Press, 1987), at 141. 
10 Truman Proclamation, supra note 26. 
11 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 190, at para 19. 
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from its coast. 12  Following the First United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS I), several coastal States also claimed fisheries zones beyond their territorial seas to 
various distances.13 
 When the establishment of the EEZ regime was debated at the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), it was proposed that the EEZ regime replace 
the continental shelf regime, as the former regime would give coastal States jurisdiction over 
both the seabed and the waters above it up to 200 M from their coasts.14 However, owing to 
strong resistance not only from coastal States with broad continental margins,15 but also from 
States which had already agreed on continental shelf boundaries with their neighbours, the 
proposal was ultimately unsuccessful.16 It was thus agreed that the continental shelf regime 
would be preserved, together with the newly established EEZ regime.  
 As the EEZ regime grants coastal States exclusive jurisdiction not only over the 
resources of the water column, but also of the seabed and subsoil,17 the EEZ regime overlaps 
with the continental shelf regime up to a distance of 200 M from the coast. Thus, the entitlement 
of coastal States over the seabed and subsoil up to 200 M from their coast is not solely based 
on the EEZ regime. Article 76(1) of the LOS Convention provides that coastal States have 
jurisdiction over the continental shelf to a distance of 200 M from their coasts. This means 
within 200 M, coastal State jurisdiction over the seabed and subsoil is based on both the EEZ 
and continental shelf regimes. Beyond 200 M, coastal States have jurisdiction over the seabed 
and subsoil where their continental margin extends beyond that point.18  
 The dual limits of the continental shelf – one based on distance and the other based on 
geomorphological factors – creates a distinction between the continental shelf within and 
beyond 200 M. The LOS Convention, however, does not establish a hierarchy between these 
                                                 
12 Richard Young, 'Recent Developments with Respect to the Continental Shelf' (1948) 42 The American 
Journal of International Law 849, at 853. 
13 Tommy Koh, 'The Exclusive Economic Zone' (1988) 30 Malaya Law Review 1, at 2. 
14 See, for example, statement of Austria, Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law 
of the Sea, Summary Records of 16th Meeting of the Second Committee, UN Doc A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.16, 26 
July 1974, at 143. 
15 See, for example, statement of Australia, Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law 
of the Sea, Summary Records of 17th Meeting of the Second Committee, UN Doc A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.17, 26 
July 1974, at 147. 
16 See, for example, statement of Indonesia, Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea, Summary Records of 20th Meeting of the Second Committee, UN Doc A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.20, 
30 July 1974, at 169. 
17 LOS Convention, Art 56(1)(b). 
18 LOS Convention, Art 76(1). 
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two legal limits. Hence, the potential exists for one State’s continental shelf entitlement based 
on geomorphological factors beyond 200 M to overlap with another State’s continental shelf 
entitlement based on the 200 M distance criterion from the coast. In such a situation, it is 
unclear if geomorphological factors – owing to the continental shelf being a natural 
prolongation of a coastal State’s land territory – override the legal entitlement based on 
distance.  
 
7.4. The Diminished Role of the ‘Natural Prolongation’ Principle 
The principle of natural prolongation significantly influenced the development of the 
continental shelf regime after the ICJ made explicit reference to it in its 1969 decision in the 
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases. The natural prolongation principle emphasised the 
importance of geological and geomorphological factors to a continental shelf entitlement, 
considerations which were not taken into account by the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention. 
The application of this principle to the continental shelf regime was the catalyst for coastal 
States including the whole continental margin into the legal definition of the continental shelf 
during UNCLOS III. During the Conference, coastal States argued that the whole continental 
margin forms a natural prolongation of the land territory.19 
 Based on this argument, the definition of the continental shelf in the LOS Convention 
includes the whole continental margin, even if the edge of such margin is located beyond 200 
M from the coast. 20  However, the role of the natural prolongation principle in maritime 
delimitation was diminished following the adoption of the LOS Convention. The Convention 
not only established a new maritime zone based on distance – the EEZ – but also redefined the 
meaning of natural prolongation which forms the basis for continental shelf entitlement. Article 
76(1) of the LOS Convention describes the natural prolongation of a land territory as extending 
to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 M from the coast. This 
means that within 200 M, entitlement to maritime zones – whether it be the EEZ or continental 
shelf – is purely based on distance and not on geological or geomorphological factors. 
                                                 
19 See, for example, arguments from Bangladesh and Mexico, see respectively Official Records of the Third 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Summary Records of 16th Meeting of the Second Committee, 
UN Doc A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.16, 26 July 1974, at 144 and Official Records of the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea, Summary Records of 20th Meeting of the Second Committee, UN Doc 
A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.20, 30 July 1974, at 166. 
20 LOS Convention, Art 76(1). 
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 This interpretation has been confirmed by the rulings of international courts and 
tribunals. The ICJ has stated that in boundary disputes relating to continental shelves located 
less than 200 M from the coasts of the States in question, the governing rule “is based not on 
geological or geomorphological criteria, but on a criterion of distance from the Coast”.21 
Moreover, in 1985, an Arbitral Tribunal also stated that the scope of the natural prolongation 
principle has been reduced with the establishment of the distance rule for determining the 
continental shelf.22 Even so, the principle of natural prolongation continues to plays a role in 
establishing the entitlement of coastal States to a continental shelf beyond 200 M. However, it 
is now settled that within 200 M, distance is the primary factor to be considered for both 
entitlement and delimitation of the EEZ and continental shelf, as opposed to the principle of 
natural prolongation. This is the case notwithstanding a few opposing views in the minority, 
such as those of China and South Korea in relation to the East China Sea (see the discussion in 
Part 6.3.3 above). 
 
7.5. The Relationship between the Continental Shelf and the EEZ in the LOS 
Convention 
As mentioned at the end of Part 7.4 above, since the adoption of the LOS Convention, distance 
has become the primary factor in determining coastal States’ entitlement over the EEZ and 
continental shelf within 200 M. This however, does not mean that the EEZ has absorbed the 
continental shelf regime. The ICJ has stated that both regimes are linked and coexist parallel 
to, yet remain autonomous from, each other.23 Even though coastal States possess inherent 
rights over the seabed and subsoil up to 200 M from the coast, once they declare an EEZ, both 
regimes form “part of an integral regime”.24 
 Although the continental shelf regime exists parallel to the EEZ regime, it nonetheless 
remains distinct from the continental shelf regime beyond 200 M. The inherent nature of coastal 
States’ rights over the continental shelf are the same within and beyond 200 M, with Article 83 
                                                 
21 Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Merits, Judgment, 3 June 1985, (1985) ICJ Reports 13 
[Libya/Malta], at para 61. 
22 Arbitration Tribunal for the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, 
Award, 14 February 1985, XX Reports of International Arbitral Awards 119, at para 115. 
23 Libya/Malta, supra note 21, at para 33. 
24 Alexander Proelss, ‘Article 56: Rights, Jurisdiction and Duties of the Coastal State in the Exclusive Economic 
Zone’ in Alexander Proelss (ed), United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea: A Commentary (CH Beck, 
2017), at 436. 
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of the LOS Convention applying to the entire continental shelf for the purpose of delimitation. 
However, the basis for continental shelf entitlement within 200 M is based on distance, while 
an entitlement beyond 200M is based on geological and geomorphological factors. 
Furthermore, coastal States are required to receive recommendations from the CLCS in 
determining the outer limits of their continental shelf beyond 200 M, and to make contributions 
to the international community for any exploitation conducted within such limits.25 These 
stipulations do not apply in relation to the continental shelf within 200 M. 
 Despite these distinctions, the LOS Convention does not create a hierarchy between the 
continental shelf within and beyond 200 M, or between the EEZ and continental shelf regimes. 
Article 56 of the LOS Convention, which deals with the EEZ, does not preference either the 
EEZ or the continental shelf regime. Paragraph 3 of the Article – which requires that rights 
with respect to the seabed and subsoil under the EEZ regime be exercised in a manner 
consistent with the continental shelf regime26 –  has been interpreted as an attempt to harmonise 
the two regimes.27 The LOS Convention thus confirms that both regimes coexist with, yet 
remain autonomous from, one another. In doing so, the LOS Convention has left the issue to 
be clarified by the jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals, the writings of 
international law scholars, as well as State practice which may crystallise into a customary law 
rule. 
 
7.6. The Lack of Precedents from International Courts and Tribunals 
Until recently, neither the ICJ nor any other international Court or Tribunal had been presented 
with a dispute concerning overlapping entitlements between the continental shelf beyond 200 
M of one State and the EEZ of another State. This situation has changed with a case presently 
before the ICJ between Nicaragua and Colombia where Nicaragua is claiming that its 
continental shelf extends well beyond and into the EEZ of Columbia (see further Part 7.8 
below).28 The ICJ case between Libya and Malta in 1984 only dealt with the delimitation of 
the continental shelf between the two States. Since the distance between Libya and Malta is 
less than 400 M, and both Parties were signatories to the LOS Convention, the ICJ applied 
                                                 
25 LOS Convention, Art 82. 
26 LOS Convention, Art 56(3). 
27 Malcolm D Evans, Relevant Circumstances and Maritime Delimitation (Clarendon Press, 1989), at 36. 
28 See Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia beyond 200 
nautical miles from the Nicaraguan Coast (Nicaragua v Colombia), Application Instituting Proceedings, 16 
September 2013. 
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Article 76(1) of the Convention. This Article defines the continental shelf as a natural 
prolongation of the land territory to a distance of 200 M, or to the edge of the continental 
margin. Since none of the Parties were entitled to a continental shelf beyond 200 M, the ICJ 
stated that distance was the primary consideration in determining the boundary.29 The ICJ has 
heard two other cases where the disputing Parties used geophysical factors to support their 
arguments, but those factors were considered irrelevant by the Court because the Parties shared 
the same shelves.30 The ICJ thus confirmed that geophysical factors do not play a role in 
delimiting the continental shelf within 200 M. 
 In 2012, both ITLOS and an Arbitral Tribunal established under Annex VII of the LOS 
Convention dealt with related delimitation disputes in the Bay of Bengal involving Bangladesh 
and Myanmar31 and also Bangladesh and India.32 Both cases dealt with adjacent coastal States 
in a concave coastline which share the same continental margin. Due to the geographical 
situation of the area, the boundary lines drawn by the Tribunals resulted in two partially 
overlapping grey areas (see Map 4 in Chapter 6, Section 6.3.2 above) – areas of extended 
continental shelf which lie beyond 200 M from the coast of Bangladesh but within 200 M from 
the coasts of Myanmar and India respectively.33 In these cases, the Tribunals indicated that a 
coastal State’s entitlement of continental shelf beyond 200 M can indeed extend into the EEZ 
entitlement of another State. The Tribunals found that Bangladesh has jurisdiction over the 
seabed and subsoil in the grey areas, while Myanmar and India possess jurisdiction over the 
water column. Thus, in both cases, the Arbitral Tribunals confirmed that the geophysical 
factors of Bangladesh’s seabed took precedence over the continental shelf component of the 
EEZ of India and Myanmar.  
                                                 
29 Libya v Malta, supra note 21, at para 39. 
30 See Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Merits, Judgment, 24 February 1982, (1982) ICJ 
Reports 18 [Tunisia/Libya], at para 67; and Case Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf 
of Maine Area (Canada v United States of America), Judgment, 12 October 1984, (1984) ICJ Reports 246, at 
para 44. These cases differ from the Jan Mayen Conciliation, where geological factors were considered 
irrelevant because neither party was found to have natural prolongation in the disputed area; see Conciliation 
Commission on the Continental Shelf Area between Iceland and Jan Mayen, Report and Recommendations to 
the Governments of Iceland and Norway, June 1981, XXVII Reports of International Arbitral Awards 1, at 822. 
For a more detailed discussion of these cases, see Suzette V Suarez, The Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf: 
Legal Aspects of their Establishment (Springer, 2008), at 225-228.  
31 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar), Judgment, 14 March 
2012, (2012) ITLOS Reports 4 [Bangladesh/Myanmar]. 
32 In the matter of the Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration, The People’s Republic of Bangladesh and 
the Republic of India, Award, 7 July 2014, PCA 2010-16 [Bangladesh v India]. 
33 Bangladesh v India, ibid, at para 498. 
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 Aside from these two cases, there has not been any other decision dealing with 
overlapping entitlements between the continental shelf beyond 200 M and the EEZ. 
Furthermore, the Libya/Malta case and the Bay of Bengal Cases do not provide clear guidance 
in answering the research question. In the Libya/Malta case, the ICJ stated that within 200 M 
geophysical factors should not be considered in the context of maritime delimitation. 34 
However, in the Bay of Bengal Cases, the Tribunals clearly considered the geophysical factors 
of Bangladesh’s seabed to be a more compelling source of entitlement than the EEZ of India 
and Myanmar. The rulings of international courts and tribunals in this series of cases has thus 
proved inconclusive in determining whether a hierarchy exists between the two regimes. It is 
hoped that the ICJ will clarify this issue when it hands down its decision in the second 
Nicaragua and Colombia case. In the meantime, some guidance can be gleamed from the 
practice of States in relation to overlapping entitlements. 
 
7.7. The Practice of Restraint by Coastal States in Establishing a Continental Shelf 
Beyond 200 M 
The practice of coastal States in establishing the limit of their continental shelves beyond 200 
M has been virtually uniform. Of the few bilateral maritime boundary treaties that deal with 
continental shelf entitlements beyond 200 M, it is clear that coastal States have refrained from 
extending their continental shelves beyond 200 M into the EEZ of their neighbours. 35 
Furthermore, although many coastal States could potentially extend their continental shelves 
beyond 200 M into the EEZ of the opposite neighbours, such States have refrained from doing 
so in their submissions to the CLCS.36  
Unfortunately, it is difficult to find an explanation in these submissions as to why 
coastal States have refrained from encroaching into their neighbours’ EEZ. Does such action 
(or lack thereof) owe to a sense of entrenched legal obligation or simply political convenience? 
The CLCS submissions are generally silent on this issue. However, in the course of their 
                                                 
34 Antunes has opined that in the Libya v Malta case, “[n]atural prolongation was then ‘checkmated’ as a 
relevant fact in delimitations between coasts situated less than 400 M apart”, and that “the Court’s conclusion is 
so blunt that it leaves no scope for elaboration on natural prolongation.” See Nuno Marques Antunes, Towards 
the Conceptualisation of Maritime Delimitation: Legal and Technical Aspects of a Political Process (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2003), at 311. 
35 The Treaty between the Government of Australia and the Government of New Zealand establishing certain 
Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Boundaries, 25 July 2004; Treaty between the Federated States 
of Micronesia and the Republic of Palau Concerning Maritime Boundaries and Cooperation on Related 
Matters, 5 July 2006, Art 3. 
36 See Table 1 – List of CLCS Submissions, in Chapter 6.  
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communications (whether they be CLCS submissions37 or litigation correspondence in ICJ 
maritime boundary disputes), some States have revealed that their practice of restraint was 
based on the doctrine of non-encroachment of the 200 M distance principle.38 Additionally, 
although this opinio juris is hardly sufficient to establish a rule of customary international law, 
existing State practice shows a trend of how coastal States have dealt with this issue. This 
consistent practice of the majority of State parties of the LOS Convention indicates how they 
interpret their obligations under the Convention, especially under Article 76 paragraph 1 on the 
limits of the continental shelf, as well as Article 57 on the coastal States entitlement to the EEZ,  
The exceptions to this practice can be found in the CLCS submissions of China, South 
Korea, France on behalf of Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon and Nicaragua. The submissions of China 
and South Korea involve an area in the East China Sea where both States are less than 400 M 
apart from their opposite neighbour, Japan. Both China and South Korea have claimed that 
their continental shelves extend well beyond 200 M and traverse the median line between them 
and Japan. This argument, however, is in contradiction with the precedent set by the ICJ that 
geophysical factors do not play a role in the delimitation of the continental shelf within 200 
M.39 The recent boundary agreement between Australia and Timor Leste also demonstrates 
that where the area to be delimited is less than 400 M, distance is the primary consideration.40  
In the case of Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon, Canada has firmly rejected to any claim made 
by France to any entitlement beyond the EEZ boundary drawn by the Arbitral Tribunal in 
1992.41 Lastly, Nicaragua’s submission deals with an area in the Caribbean Sea where its 
continental shelf beyond 200 M traverses Colombia’s claimed EEZ. Although the CLCS has 
not given its recommendation on Nicaragua’s submission, the ICJ is currently considering the 
dispute between Nicaragua and Colombia, and may thus provide clear guidance on how States 
should proceed in circumstances of overlapping EEZ and continental shelf entitlements beyond 
                                                 
37 See for example, communication from Pakistan to the CLCS dated 9 October 2014, available at 
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/pak29_09/2014_10_09_PAK_NV_UN_003_14-
00794.pdf>;  Communication from the Philippines to the CLCS dated 4 August 2009, available at 
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/plw41_09/clcs_41_2009_los_phl.pdf>; and 
Communication from Palau to the CLCS dated 22 July 2010, available at 
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/plw41_09/clcs_41_2009_los_plw.pdf>. 
38 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United States of America), 
Counter-Memorial of Canada, 28 June 1983, at para 575. 
39 Libya v Malta, supra note 21, at para 39. 
40 Treaty between Australia and the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste Establishing Their Maritime 
Boundaries in the Timor Sea, 6 March 2018.  
41 See Communication from Canada to the CLCS dated 3 September 2014, available at 
<https://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/fra72_14/2014_09_03_can_nv_un_001.pdf>. 
 
220 
 
200 M. The strikingly consistent practice of States in this matter – though with limited 
exceptions as outlined above – might be influential in the ICJ’s consideration of this case. This 
will be discussed further below.  
 
7.8. The Way Forward 
As mentioned earlier, there have not been many disputes involving overlapping entitlements 
between one State’s continental shelf beyond 200 M and another State’s EEZ. This is 
remarkable when one considers that more than 80 coastal States have submitted information to 
the CLCS in relation to their continental shelves beyond 200 M. Indeed, the vast majority of 
coastal States have taken much care to ensure that their continental shelves beyond 200 M do 
not encroach on another State’s EEZ. This practice of restraint has undoubtedly contributed to 
the dearth of disputes between States on this matter. One of the few exceptions to this practice, 
however, is Nicaragua. 
 Nicaragua has twice asked the ICJ to delimit the overlapping entitlements between its 
continental shelf beyond 200 M and Colombia’s EEZ. Nicaragua’s first request in 2012 was 
rejected by the ICJ42 on the basis that Nicaragua was yet to “discharge its obligation” under the 
LOS Convention to submit information to the CLCS regarding its continental shelf beyond 200 
M.43 On 16 September 2013, after submitting ‘final’ information regarding the limits of its 
continental shelf beyond 200 M to the CLCS, Nicaragua again asked the ICJ again to delimit 
the overlapping entitlements between the two countries. This time, the ICJ decided that it has 
jurisdiction to hear the case, as it considered Nicaragua to have discharged its obligation to 
communicate the information regarding the limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 M to the 
CLCS.44 The ICJ further stated that the CLCS’ role relates only to the delineation of the outer 
limits of the continental shelf, and not delimitation.45 The ICJ considered that the delimitation 
of continental shelf beyond 200 M can be undertaken independently of a recommendation from 
                                                 
42 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v Colombia), Judgment, (2012) ICJ Reports 624 [Nicaragua v 
Colombia I], at para 129. 
43 Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia beyond 200 Nautical 
Miles from the Nicaraguan Coast (Nicaragua v Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 17 March 2016, 
(2016) ICJ Reports 100, at para 107. 
44 Ibid, at para 107. 
45 Ibid, at para 110. 
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the CLCS, and that such recommendation is not a prerequisite before Nicaragua can ask the 
ICJ to settle a dispute regarding such delimitation.46  
The ICJ’s decision in this case confirms that delimitation of continental shelf between 
opposite States could be undertaken before delineation. This is important, as although there are 
precedents in the Bay of Bengal sitation, where international tribunals decided to delimit 
continental shelf beyond 200 M between Bangladesh, Myanmar and India without waiting for 
the CLCS to delineate the outer limits, these precedents involved situations where the parties 
were adjacent States.47 Thus, the determination of the outer limits of the continental shelf in 
those cases would not affect the boundary lines – except where such lines would end.48 The 
situation between Nicaragua and Colombia is distinct, as both countries are opposite of each 
other. Judge Gaja highlighted this problem in his declaration, saying that “in most instances 
the delineation of the outer limits should come first, because it would otherwise be difficult to 
pursue the ‘equitable solution’ required by Article 83 of [the LOSC]”.49 The majority of the 
ICJ, however, seems to be of the view that even without delineating Nicaragua’s outer limit of 
continental shelf, it could still come up with an equitable boundary between Nicaragua and 
Colombia. The ICJ is yet to decide this case, and its decision would definitely guide coastal 
States on how to deal with this overlap in the future.50 Based on the ICJ’s precedent and the 
development of State practice on the issue, there are several possibilities as to how the ICJ 
might decide the case. 
 The first possibility is for the ICJ to declare that Nicaragua’s continental shelf 
entitlement beyond 200 M cannot encroach into the EEZ entitlement of Colombia, with the 
                                                 
46 Ibid, at para 114. 
47 Bangladesh/Myanmar, supra note 31; Bangladesh v India, supra note 32. 
48 For another example of delimitation of continental shelf beyond 200 M without recommendation from the 
CLCS, but in a domestic context, see Arbitration between Newfoundland and Labrador and Nova Scotia 
Concerning Portions of the Limits of Their Offshore Areas as Defined in the Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore 
Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation Act and the Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Accord 
Implementation Act, Award of the Tribunal in the Second Phase, 26 March 2002. 
49 Nicaragua v Colombia, supra note 43, Declaration of Judge Gaja, 17 March 2016. 
50 Any decision of the ICJ is only binding on the Parties to the particular case, see Statute of the International 
Court of Justice, Art 59. However, decisions of the ICJ and other international Tribunals can be useful to 
“discover and formulate customary rules and general principles of law”, see Alain Pellet, ‘Decisions of the ICJ 
as Sources of International Law?’ in Gaetano Morelli Lectures Series, Vol 2 (International and European Papers 
Publishing, 2018), at 17. Furthermore, any decision of the ICJ would be instructive for future disputes, because 
although “those decisions are in no way binding on the [ICJ], [the Court] will not depart from its settled 
jurisprudence unless it finds very particular reasons to do so”, see Application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v Serbia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 18 
November 2008, (2008) ICJ Reports 428, at para 53. 
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result that the delimitation line is drawn at the outer limit of Colombia’s EEZ. The legal basis 
for this approach has been laid down by the ICJ itself in the Libya v Malta case, with the Court 
stating that within 200 M, distance is the primary factor in conducting delimitation.51 Following 
this precedent, the ICJ could reason that the geomorphological and geological elements of 
Nicaragua’s seabed are no longer relevant once they reach the 200 M limit of Colombia’s EEZ. 
This approach is also consistent with the majority of State practice, with coastal States 
eschewing extended continental shelf jurisdiction beyond 200 M into the EEZ of another State. 
Moreover, confirmation of such practice would provide coastal States with a stronger legal 
obligation to conform to such practice, which in turn serves as an opinio juris element to 
solidify such practice as a rule of customary international law. 
 By confirming that a coastal State’s continental shelf beyond 200 M cannot encroach 
into the EEZ of another State, the ICJ would in effect be clarifying that Article 76(1) of the 
LOS Convention provides all coastal States with a minimum continental shelf entitlement to a 
distance of 200 M from the baseline. However, this would mean that the concept of distance – 
and thus the EEZ and continental shelf within 200 M – would take primacy over the concept 
of natural prolongation (which is the basis for entitlement to a continental shelf beyond 200 
M). Adopting such a stance, however, is something the ICJ has been reluctant to do in the past. 
Even after dismissing the geomorphological factor in favour of the distance factor for 
delimitation within 200 M, the ICJ stated that the concepts of natural prolongation and distance 
are “not opposed but complementary”.52 
 The second possibility is for the ICJ to allow Nicaragua’s continental shelf entitlement 
beyond 200 M to overlap with Colombia’s EEZ. The Court could draw attention to the fact that 
under the LOS Convention, neither the EEZ nor the continental shelf regime occupies a 
privileged position for the purpose of maritime delimitation. The ICJ could also distinguish its 
precedent in the Libya v Malta dispute on the basis that the opposing coastal States in that case 
were less than 400 M apart from each other. Therefore, the Court could assert that, while for 
Colombia distance is the primary consideration for delimitation (due to the overlapping area 
between the two States being within 200 M from their coasts), for Nicaragua geomorphology 
and geology are the main factors for delimitation (since the overlapping area is beyond 200 M 
from their coasts of the two States).  
                                                 
51 Libya v Malta, supra note 21, at para 39. 
52 See Libya v Malta, supra note 21, at para 34. 
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 By allowing the different entitlements to overlap, the ICJ would have to delimit the 
overlapping area between the two countries. In its first delimitation case with Colombia, 
Nicaragua sought from the Court “a continental shelf boundary dividing by equal parts the 
overlapping entitlements to a continental shelf of both Parties”. 53  This continental shelf 
boundary would not coincide with the outer limit of Colombia’s EEZ, which would mean that 
while Colombia’s jurisdiction over the water column of its EEZ would still extend out to 200 
M from its coast, its jurisdiction over the continental shelf component of the EEZ would be 
less than 200 M. Any continental shelf boundary delimitation within 200 M of Colombia would 
also create a grey area in which Nicaragua would have jurisdiction over the seabed and 
Colombia would have jurisdiction over the water column. If this was the outcome of the case, 
this would be the first grey area involving coastal States with opposite coasts.54 Indeed, a grey 
area is usually created in situations of adjacent coasts where the boundary drawn is not an 
equidistance line.55  However, there is nothing to prohibit the ICJ from drawing multiple 
boundaries, and thus creating a grey area in disputes involving opposite coasts.56  
 Another possibility is for the ICJ to allow the entitlements of both Nicaragua and 
Colombia to overlap, but to draw the boundary at the outer limit of Colombia’s EEZ. Using the 
three-stage method of delimitation favoured by the ICJ, the Court would have a lot of flexibility 
in adjusting the equidistance line in the second and third stages.57 The ICJ could take into 
account the distance factor in the second stage and adjust the boundary to coincide with the 
outer limit of Colombia’s EEZ. The Court could also decide in the third stage that the 
provisional equidistance line is disproportionate considering the coastal length of both Parties 
and the relevant disputed area,58 and that drawing the boundary at the outer limit of Colombia’s 
EEZ eliminates this disproportionality.  
                                                 
53 Nicaragua v Colombia I, supra note 42, at para 113. 
54 Indonesia and Australia also have separate boundaries – one for the seabed and one for the water column, but 
this is due to the boundaries having been negotiated at different times. See the discussion in Part 6.3.3 of the 
previous Chapter.  
55 Alex G Oude Elferink, ‘Does Undisputed Title to a Maritime Zone Always Exclude its Delimitation: The 
Grey Area Issue’ (1998) 13(2) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 143, at 143-144. 
56 Leonardo Bernard and Clive Schofield, ‘Separate Lines: Challenges and Opportunities of Differentiated 
Seabed and Water Column Boundaries’ in Myron H Nordquist, John Norton Moore and Ronan Long (eds), 
International Marine Economy, (Brill Nijhoff Publishers, 2017), 282-321, at 309. 
57 See the discussion in Part 5.5 of Chapter 5.  
58 According to Jagota, the concept of ‘proportionality’, “while not applicable to geological and juridical 
appurtenance of the continental shelf, may properly be used as a criterion to evaluate the effect of geographical 
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 The ICJ has taken a similar approach in dealing with the question of maritime 
entitlement generated from an island, which was one of the issues considered in the Black Sea 
Case. In that case, Ukraine argued that Serpents’ Island, located 20 M off its coast in the Black 
Sea, should be considered when constructing the provisional equidistance line, as the Island 
contains both vegetation and fresh water, and is thus capable of sustaining human habitation 
and an economic life of its own.59 Romania, on the other hand, maintained that Serpents’ Island 
should not be used in drawing the delimitation line.60 According to Romania, human survival 
on the island depends on supply from elsewhere and its natural conditions do not support 
economic activities, rendering it a ‘rock’ under Article 121(3) of the Convention.61 
Despite the Parties filing detailed pleadings with competing interpretations of Article 
121 of the LOS Convention, the ICJ side-stepped the issue altogether. Indeed, according to the 
Court, any continental shelf and EEZ entitlements possibly generated by Serpents’ Island “are 
fully subsumed by the entitlements generated by the western and eastern mainland coasts of 
Ukraine itself”.62 Thus, in the Court’s view, it did not need to consider whether Serpents’ Island 
fell under paragraphs 2 or 3 of Article 121 of the LOS Convention.63 
The ICJ also used this approach a few years later in the first delimitation case between 
Nicaragua and Colombia. In that case, the Court decided it was unnecessary to decide whether 
or not the Colombian island of Serrana was entitled to an EEZ and continental shelf, as its 
“small size, remoteness and other characteristics mean that, in any event, the achievement of 
an equitable result requires that the boundary line follow the outer limit of the territorial sea 
around the island”. 64  Thus, the Court could use a similar approach and declare that the 
achievement of an equitable result in the current case between Nicaragua and Colombia 
requires the boundary line to follow the outer limit of Colombia’s EEZ.  
 By allowing the two different bases of entitlement to overlap, the equality of the two 
regimes would be maintained. However, by drawing the continental shelf boundary at the 200 
M limit of Colombia’s EEZ, the ICJ’s ruling would still be consistent with the practice of 
                                                 
features on a delimitation in marginal areas.” See SP Jagota, Maritime Boundaries (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
1985), at 175.  
59 Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v Ukraine), Judgment, 3 February 2009, (2009) ICJ Reports 
61, at 184.  
60 Ibid, at 180.  
61 Ibid.  
62 Ibid, at 187.  
63 Ibid.  
64 Nicaragua v Colombia I, supra note 42, at para 238. 
 
225 
 
coastal States in refraining from extending their continental shelf into the EEZ of another State. 
At the same time, Nicaragua would still be allowed to extend its continental shelf beyond 200 
M, while Colombia would still have the full entitlement to an EEZ to 200 M from its baselines.  
Although this approach would not necessarily elevate current State practice into a rule 
of law, it would not dismiss it either, thus allowing room for the prevailing practice of States 
to crystallise into a rule of customary international law in the future. It is acknowledged that 
the comments above are necessarily speculative as no one can really predict with any certainty 
how the ICJ will rule in a particular dispute. Another factor which might influence the Court’s 
decision is that the Colombian islands of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina are 
entitled to both an EEZ and continental shelf of their own.65 Considering that these islands lie 
approximately 380 M from Colombia’s mainland, their entitlement to an EEZ and 200 M 
continental shelf would overlap with that of the Colombian mainland.66  Thus, it will be 
interesting to see if the ICJ allows Nicaragua’s entitlement to an outer continental shelf to 
overlap not only with Colombia’s EEZ generated from the mainland, but also from the EEZ of 
the Colombian islands. 
The ICJ’s decision could resemble one of the scenarios described above, or as 
demonstrated by its decision in the first delimitation case between Nicaragua and Colombia 
case, the ICJ could devise some novel and unanticipated way to solve the dispute. Whatever 
the decision of the Court, it will surely shape the development of the approach in dealing with 
overlapping entitlements between the continental shelf beyond 200 M and the EEZ. 
 
7.9. Concluding Remarks 
This thesis has investigated whether a coastal State’s entitlement to a continental shelf beyond 
200 M may extend into the EEZ of another State. As the LOS Convention does not provide an 
answer to this question, there is uncertainty caused by lack of a generally accepted 
interpretation of provisions of the Convention. Against this uncertainty, the author has 
thoroughly interrogated the records of the negotiations of UNCLOS III to discern the motives 
and intentions of negotiating States when debating the continental shelf and EEZ regimes. The 
thesis has also explored the history and development of the continental shelf regime prior to 
the LOS Convention to better understand the nature of the regime, and consequently its 
relationship with the newer EEZ regime. As the decisions of international courts and tribunals 
                                                 
65 See ibid, at para 168.  
66 See ibid, at para 22.  
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assist in interpreting the provisions of the LOS Convention, relevant jurisprudence has been 
critically appraised in order to provide clarification on the issue. Finally, the thesis has 
embarked on an extensive and methodical examination of the practice of States by examining 
either their CLCS submissions or their maritime boundary agreements on this issue. 
Following a systematic and comprehensive analysis of the data described above, it can 
be concluded that there is currently no concrete legal rule prohibiting a State’s continental shelf 
beyond 200 M from encroaching into the EEZ of another State. The main argument in favour 
of this approach is that coastal States have inherent rights over the natural prolongation of their 
land territory to the edge of the continental margin. However, the idea of natural prolongation 
extending all the way to the continental margin is a relatively new concept, one which arose 
from the negotiations of UNCLOS III. Neither the 1945 Truman Proclamation nor the 1969 
decision of the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases envisioned the concept of natural 
prolongation extending beyond the geomorphological continental shelf – which typically has 
an average depth of 200 M and excludes the continental slope and rise. A group of coastal 
States with broad continental margins succeeded in redefining the legal definition of the 
continental shelf in the LOS Convention to include both the slope and rise – in effect, the whole 
continental margin. In return, however, broad margin States agreed that the continental shelf 
extends to at least 200 M from the baseline, giving all coastal States a minimum entitlement 
over the continental shelf based on distance. In doing so, the continental shelf entitlement 
became geographically the same as the entitlement to the EEZ.  
The LOS Convention does not prohibit a coastal State from extending its jurisdiction 
beyond 200 M from its coast into the EEZ of another State. However, that the Convention does 
not expressly prohibit such conduct does not constitute a deliberate and conscious choice on 
the part of Conference participants. Indeed, the official record of UNCLOS III shows that the 
issue was never discussed, indicating that the Conference never envisioned an overlap of 
entitlements. As discussed in Part 4.4 of Chapter 4, the Conference did not anticipate many 
coastal States being entitled to a continental shelf beyond 200 M - a factor which may explain 
why the Conference never considered a possible overlap between the relevant maritime zones. 
However, even if the Conference underestimated the number of coastal States possessing a 
continental shelf beyond 200 M, it was still prepared for some States to have such an 
entitlement, as evidenced by Article 76(1) of the LOS Convention. Hence, if the absence of a 
provision dealing with an overlap between the continental shelf beyond 200 M and the EEZ is 
not an oversight on the part of the Conference, perhaps the negotiating States did not view the 
continental shelf beyond 200 M as being capable of encroaching into another State’s EEZ. 
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In addition to allowing coastal States with broad continental margins to extend their 
jurisdiction over the continental shelf beyond 200 M, the other important achievement of 
UNCLOS III was the creation of the EEZ regime and the acknowledgement that all coastal 
States have a minimum continental shelf to a distance of 200 M from their baselines. Coastal 
States agreed at UNCLOS III to allow States with broad continental margins to extend their 
jurisdiction over the continental shelf beyond 200 M. However, it is unlikely that coastal States 
would have agreed to such an extension at the expense of their own EEZ and 200 M continental 
shelf entitlements, particularly if one considers the difficulty encountered by such States in 
securing such entitlements in the first instance.  
This view is supported by the practice of coastal States following the entry into force 
of the LOS Convention. When submitting information on the limits of their continental shelves 
beyond 200 M to the CLCS, most coastal States refrained from encroaching into the EEZ of 
neighbouring States. For some States, this practice of restraint derives from a sense of legal 
obligation – namely, an interpretation of the LOS Convention which does not allow the 
continental shelf beyond 200 M to encroach into the EEZ of another State.67 Additionally, the 
same practice of restraint could be seen in the few boundaries agreements that deal with 
continental shelf beyond 200 M, as discussed in Part 6.3.3 above. This practice could also be 
interpreted as an indication of the views of State parties to LOS Convention on how the 
obligation to arrive at an equitable solution in delimiting maritime boundaries must be 
implemented in such situations.68 Furthermore, the ICJ has set a precedent stating that within 
200 M, distance is the primary factor in boundary delimitation, not geomorphology or geology. 
Together, the prevailing practice of States and the judicial precedent set by the ICJ point 
towards an emerging rule of customary international law – one which asserts that a coastal 
State’s continental shelf beyond 200 M should stop at the outer limit of another State’s EEZ. 
The case between Nicaragua and Colombia (currently before the ICJ) specifically deals 
with this issue, and no doubt the ICJ’s decision will influence the development of this 
‘emerging customary international law rule’. Based on the author’s research into the 
widespread practice of States on this issue, as well as international jurisprudence on the subject, 
a decision from the ICJ which confirms the thesis hypothesis would most certainly be 
welcomed by jurists and States alike. Indeed, such a decision would prevent the continental 
shelf beyond 200 M of one State from encroaching into the EEZ of another State, clarifying 
                                                 
67 See the discussion in Part 6.3.3 of the previous Chapter.  
68 LOS Convention, Arts 74 & 83.  
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the rules under the LOS Convention and crystallising prevailing State practice into customary 
international law. In making such a pronouncement, the ICJ would provide a level of certainty 
to coastal States on how to deal with overlapping maritime entitlements in the future. However, 
it is also open to the ICJ to ignore current State practice and thus halt the development of a 
customary international law rule. Instead, the ICJ could devise a new set of rules to govern this 
highly fraught area of maritime law. A middle ground approach is also possible, with the ICJ 
delivering a ruling which neither halts nor confirms such a rule, but merely gives it room to 
develop naturally over time. Whichever way the Court decides, the international community 
stands ready and willing to act accordingly.   
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